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I. INTRODUCTION
What’s in a name?  That which we call a rose  
By any other would smell as sweet.1
When William Shakespeare wrote these oft-repeated words around 
1595,2 he undoubtedly would have been unaware of asbestos and mixed-
dust claims, or perhaps even torts, for that matter.  Thus, little could he have 
known that over four centuries later, crafty plaintiffs’ attorneys, eager to get 
around legislation and insurance policies that would purport to limit or al-
together restrict asbestos lawsuits, would lend credence to Juliet’s soliloquy 
by disguising or molding asbestos cases as “mixed-dust” claims.   Mixed-
dust claims are nothing new; indeed, they have been brought with varied 
success since at least the early 1960s.3   However, because of the parallels 
between the contraction of mixed-dust pneumoconiosis, which is a form of 
lung disease, and asbestos exposure, and because current or pending legisla-
tion, as well as insurance exclusion policies, can impact whether and how 
much a person may recover for asbestos-related illnesses, there may be a 
surge in the number of asbestos-related claims brought under the rubric of 
mixed-dust disease.  This article will address that possibility by analyzing 
whether this would be possible under both the current and likely future state 
of the law, and if so, what some of the ensuing ramifications might be.   
Part I of this Comment will provide a brief medical background of 
mixed-dust claims, namely in terms of what they are and how they are 
brought about.  Included in this discussion will be an analysis of how and 
where mixed-dust diseases are typically contracted, as well as some of the 
varieties of the affliction and the physical effects that the diseases can have 
on those affected.  Also in this section is an examination of asbestosis, a 
variation of pneumoconiosis that is caused by inhalation of asbestos parti-
cles.       
1
 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 2, sc. 2. (William Lyon Phelps ed., Yale Univ. 
Press 1923). 
2
 R. Moore, Romeo and Juliet: Introduction, Enotes.com, at http://www.allshakespeare.com/ 
romeo.php?id=830 (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).  The author, being mindful of the finicky nature of the 
Internet and its too-frequent ephemeral website addresses, has kept on file a copy of this Internet-
derived source, along with all other such sources used throughout this paper.    
3
 E.g., Groff v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 239 N.Y.S.2d 738 (N.Y. App. Div. 1969). 
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In Part II, the current state of the law and insurance policies as it per-
tains to pneumoconiosis is explored.  The author begins by examining some 
workers’ compensation claims involving both ordinary pneumoconiosis and 
mixed-dust pneumoconiosis, with an emphasis on how courts employ simi-
lar techniques in resolving such claims, including a highly deferential stan-
dard to lower tribunals’ factual determinations.  The focus then shifts to 
state and federal statutes dealing with both ordinary and mixed-dust pneu-
moconiosis, including a discussion of some features mutually shared by 
these statutes.  Also examined in this context is one state’s procedures for 
filing pneumoconiosis-related workers’ compensation claims, as well as the 
federal Black Lung Act, which establishes a compensation scheme for per-
sons suffering from pneumoconiosis derived from inhaling coal dust.   
Also in Part II is an exploration of insurance law as it applies to 
mixed-dust claims, particularly through a dissection of the type of insurance 
commonly secured by businesses known as a commercial general liability 
policy.  The discussion begins by providing background information on 
some of the impetuses for insurers’ attempts to limit their liability in the 
context of tort claims through pollution exclusion clauses.  The author then 
introduces some of the key interpretative issues that courts struggle with in 
dealing with the applicability of these policies to a particular set of circum-
stances, including what substances qualify as “pollutants” for purposes of 
pollution exclusion clauses.  Following is an analysis of some of the most 
prevalent doctrines that courts employ in interpreting insurance policies, 
including a discussion of the similarities between how these and other types 
of cases involving “ordinary” contract disputes are resolved.  This is ac-
complished largely by examining judicial opinions dealing with the appli-
cability of pollution exclusion clauses in particular contexts, such as envi-
ronmental pollution.      
Finally, Part II concludes by addressing some of Congress’ attempts at 
finding a legislative solution to the asbestos litigation problem in America.  
Initially, the author examines several bills that never became law, such as 
the Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1998 and the Asbestos Com-
pensation Act of 2000.  The focus is then shifted to Congress’ latest attempt 
at asbestos reform through the Fairness in Asbestos Resolution Act, or 
FAIR Act for short.  To that end, some of the bill’s key aspects that might 
influence how or whether asbestos claims are filed, specifically as it relates 
to a possible increase in the number of mixed-dust claims filed.  Among 
these is the Act’s suppression of all conflicting state and federal laws, as 
well as the requirement that claimants be able to exclude substances other 
than asbestos as having caused their injuries for some types of claims.           
Part III predicts how today’s and tomorrow’s insurance law, particu-
larly ever-broadening pollution exclusion clauses, as well as possible future 
legislation dealing with asbestos, namely the FAIR Act, might impact the 
number of mixed-dust claims filed.  In connection with the insurance aspect 
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of the query, special attention is given to exclusion clauses specifically 
dealing with asbestos, which are becoming increasingly common, as well as 
how those and other types of exclusion clauses affect the duties of insur-
ance carriers in terms of defending or indemnifying claims.  Also explored 
is the interesting question of what would occur if only one of the substances 
comprising a mixed-dust claim were found to be excluded under an appli-
cable insurance policy.     
As for the possible ramifications that legislation like the FAIR Act 
would have on the filing of mixed-dust claims, the author addresses the 
issue by focusing primarily on certain key aspects of the FAIR Act that 
might influence whether and how some asbestos plaintiffs might proceed.  
Among these are that the Act would serve as the only means by which per-
sons suffering from asbestos-related ailments could file claims to receive 
compensation and that some claimants whose injuries were caused or influ-
enced by substances other than asbestos might not be eligible for recovery 
under the Act.   
Part IV is concerned with the role that causation could play in tort suits 
or workers’ compensation claims involving mixed-dust disease.  The sec-
tion begins by comparing the elements of causation that might be impli-
cated in mixed-dust tort claims to those typically encountered in traditional 
toxic tort cases.  Next is addressed some basic causation hurdles that 
mixed-dust tort plaintiffs are likely to face, including proving that they were 
exposed to toxic substances and that the exposure to those substances is 
what caused their illness.  The author then explores, using the Federal Rules 
of Evidence as background, some of the principal evidentiary issues that 
mixed-dust plaintiffs might encounter in their attempts to introduce scien-
tific and medical evidence pertinent to their case.   
Following is a discussion of some techniques and strategies a plaintiff 
seeking to make out a mixed-dust claim might rely on.  In conjunction with 
this is an explanation of what is likely the most reliable procedure to iden-
tify potential injury-causing substances, which is conducted using a scan-
ning electron microscope.  The author then presents examples of how courts 
grappling with mixed-dust claims, both in workers’ compensation and tort, 
have addressed the issue of causation.   
The next portion of Part IV describes ways in which legislatures, 
through the creation of administrative and other alternative means of com-
pensation, and courts, by relaxing or modifying the traditional methods of 
proving one’s case in a tort claim, have made it possible for certain persons 
to recover monetary relief for their injuries.  An example of how legisla-
tures have acted to facilitate recovery by those who suffer injuries in the 
workplace is the passage of “presumption” statutes, which serve to either 
conclusively or rebuttably establish that one or more of an injured worker’s 
employers were responsible for the injuries caused.  As for some of the ju-
dicial doctrines aimed at helping certain plaintiffs make out a case for re-
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covery who otherwise would have lost in court, these include the “substan-
tial factor” test and “burden-shifting" to defendants.  This segment finishes 
by analyzing how and whether existing laws and doctrines originally cre-
ated to deal with other areas of the law, such as “ordinary” pneumoconiosis 
(as opposed to the mixed-dust kind) and asbestos cases, would impact 
mixed-dust claims. 
In the last section of Part IV, the author explores the feasibility and de-
sirability of adopting alternatives to litigation as a way of dealing with 
mixed-dust claims.  The first of such methods discussed is the use of set-
tlements, and to that end, the relative advantages and disadvantages of set-
tlements are discussed.  Also addressed are no-fault compensation schemes, 
either statutory or judicially created, that aim to provide injured persons 
with monetary relief while eliminating the need for lengthy and difficult 
litigation.  Some examples of such schemes employed in the past are the 
National Childhood Vaccine Program Injury Act and the agreement reached 
in the Agent Orange litigation.                
In Part V, the conclusion, the author begins by providing a brief sum-
mary of the major points from each section.  He then posits that while in-
surance law and possible future legislation dealing with asbestos could re-
sult in a substantial number of would-be asbestos plaintiffs choosing to file 
their claims under the rubric of mixed-dust, the exact degree of this occur-
rence will depend on several factors, including in what direction insurance 
law goes, if and to what extent the provisions of the FAIR Act or similar 
legislation are passed, and how or whether courts and legislatures act to 
ease some of the causation hurdles that mixed-dust claimants would face.         
A. A Brief Medical Explanation of Mixed-Dust Claims4
As its name implies, mixed-dust claims arise when a plaintiff alleges 
that he has become ill from coming into contact, i.e., inhaling, two or more 
types of particles of an airborne nature.5  In medical circles, this condition is 
typically referred to as mixed-dust pneumoconiosis.6  One of the factors that 
4
 The primary purpose of this section is to provide the reader with some general medical back-
ground of mixed-dust claims.  More specific information, particularly how these diseases can be diag-
nosed, are addressed in greater detail in connection with causation issues that mixed-dust plaintiffs are 
likely to face in infra Part IV.C.   
5
 See DORLAND’S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY, Definition of Pneumoconiosis (W.B. 
Saunders 2003), http://www.mercksource.com/pp/us/cns/cns_hl_dorlands.jspzQzpgzEzzSzppdocsz 
SzuszSzcommonzSzdorlandszSzdorlandzSzdmd_p_25zPzhtm (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) [hereinafter 
Definition of Pneumoconiosis]. 
6
 See Barbara Barron, Dealing With Alternative Exposures: Mixed Dust Pneumoconioses, 1 
MEALEY’S LITIG. REP.: SILICA, May 2003, at 1, 1 [hereinafter Alternative Exposures].  Another name for 
pneumoconiosis is “interstitial lung disease,” see Lawrence Martin, Pitfalls in Diagnosis of Occupa-
tional Lung Disease for Purposes of Compensation -- One Physician’s Perspective, 13 J.L. & HEALTH
49, 59 (1998-99) (using the terms interchangeably), which one source defines as “an inflammation in 
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make mixed-dust disease unique from other medical conditions (and why it 
is hard to prove)7 is the varied ways in which someone may develop the 
condition, particularly in the workplace.  Among the afflicted have been 
shipyard workers (asbestos, silica, fiberglass, and miscellaneous metal-
based fumes), crane operators (coal dust, silica, and asbestos), brick layers 
(silica, asbestos, and cement dusts), and steel mill operators (silica, asbes-
tos, metal fumes, carbon dust, mica, graphite, and clay).8  But even though 
mixed-dust pneumoconiosis is, by definition, caused by the inhalation of 
two or more substances, the result of the disease (in terms of the impact on 
the individual’s health) in most instances would not necessarily be different 
from lung ailments caused by inhaling a single substance, as in either case, 
the afflicted person’s diagnosis would be the same—pneumoconiosis—with 
the main distinguishing factor between the two types of diseases being that 
mixed-dust pneumoconiosis involves more than one material.9 Thus, some 
background on “ordinary” pneumoconiosis is highly relevant to our discus-
sion.
Pneumoconiosis is defined as a “diagnosable disease[] of the lung pro-
duced by the inhalation of dust (dust being understood to be particulate 
matter in the solid phase, excluding living organisms).”10  It is a chronic 
disease,11 and typically “affect[s] the lung parenchyma (the lung tissue itself 
or the essential parts of the lung that are concerned with its function)”;12 in 
this regard, pneumoconiosis involves not only the reaction of the lungs due 
and around the tiny air sacs of the lung (alveoli) caused by an allergic reaction to inhaled organic dusts 
or, less commonly, chemicals.”  THE MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL INFORMATION – SECOND HOME 
EDITION, CHAPTER 51: ALLERGIC DISEASES OF THE LUNG (2004), http://www. 
merck.com/mrkshared/mmanual_home2/sec04/ch051/ch051b.jsp (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) [hereinaf-
ter MERCK MANUAL].  Labeling all cases of mixed-dust pneumoconiosis as interstitial lung disease may 
be misleading, however, as interstitial lung disease can have several different causes.  See Frank Chung 
& Elizabeth Dean, Pathophysiology and Cardiorespiratory Consequences of Interstitial Lung Disease – 
Review and Clinical Implications: A Special Communication, 69 PHYSICAL THERAPHY 956, 956 (1989) 
(stating that “[the term i]nterstitial lung disease comprises over 130 diseases”); see generally American 
Lung Association, Interstitial Lung Disease and Pulmonary Fibrosis, available at 
http://www.lungusa.org/site/pp.asp?c=dvLUK9O0E&b=35436 (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) [hereinafter 
Pulmonary Fibrosis] (providing background information on the disease, including various ways in 
which it can be caused).  
7
 For a general overview of the difficulties inherent in establishing causation, see infra Part IV.  
8
 See Mark Love & Scott Goldberg, Mixed-Dust Claims Could Be the Next Wave; Asbestos 
Exclusions May Not Work in New Context, 25 NAT’L L.J., Sept. 8, 2003, at 17, 18-19; see Alternative 
Exposures, supra note 6, at 2-9 (collecting pneumoconiosis cases and organizing them by substances 
and places of occupational exposure). 
9
 See ATTORNEY’S TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE § 14-205 (3d. ed. 2003) [hereinafter ATTORNEY’S
TEXTBOOK] (stating that symptoms “are not specifically diagnostic of the particular disease”); See also 
Alternative Exposures, supra note 6, at 1 (differentiating mixed-dust pneumoconiosis from ordinary 
pneumoconiosis by the number of substances each consists of).  
10
 Alternative Exposures, supra note 6, at 1 (borrowing from PULMONARY MED. 638 (Clarence A. 
Guenter ed., J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1982)). 
11
 See ATTORNEY’S TEXTBOOK, supra note 9.  
12
 Id.
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to particle inhalation, but also the subsequent alteration of the lung structure 
and function.13   It should be noted that although the symptoms manifesting 
from this disease can approximate ones caused by other lung diseases, 
pneumoconiosis is a unique diagnosis and is to be distinguished from more 
commonly known diseases like asthma, bronchitis, and emphysema.14
Pneumoconiosis is most often contracted in occupational settings,15 since 
13
 See id.
14
 See Ira Madan, Occupational Asthma and Other Respiratory Diseases; ABC of Work Related 
Disorders, 313 BRITISH MED. JOURNAL 291, 292 (1996) (stating that pneumoconiosis is a “generic term 
for the lodgement of any inhaled dusts in the lungs irrespective of the effects (excluding asthma and 
[other lung diseases]”); Medical Centre for Occupational and Environmental Health, Occupational and 
Environmental Lung Disease, available at http://www.medicine.manchester.ac.uk/ 
coeh/teachinglearning/resources/lung (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) (noting that a diagnosis of pneumoco-
niosis “excludes diseases mainly of the airways like asthma, bronchitis and emphysema”); see MERCK 
MANUAL, supra note 6, INTRODUCTION: OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASES, http://www.merck. 
com/mmhe/sec04/ch049/ch049a.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) (grouping pneumoconiosis apart from 
other diseases).  
15
 See infra note 38; infra note 40 and accompanying text. One interesting instance of occupa-
tional exposure to toxic substances that has already resulted in a plethora of mixed-dust claims is the 
tragic events that occurred in Ground Zero on September 11, 2001, especially the collapsing of the 
World Trade Center Towers and some nearby buildings.  See generally MICHEL BRUNEAU ET AL.,
OVERVIEW OF DAMAGE TO BUILDINGS NEAR GROUND ZERO (2002),
http://mceer.buffalo.edu/publications/wtc/02-SP02Screen.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2006; on file with 
author) (surveying damage caused by the terrorist attacks, particularly to the area in and surrounding 
Ground Zero).  Not only did almost 3,000 people die in the ensuing carnage, see Final Designs Unveiled 
for WTC Memorial (Nov. 19, 2003), at http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Northeast/11/19/ 
attacks.memorial.ap/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2006), but the collapse of the buildings also released a great 
deal of pollution and toxic materials into the air, including particles of asbestos, cement, glass, jet fuel, 
and other products, see Ground Zero Workers’ Health Cloudy (Sept. 11, 2003), at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/10/earlyshow/contributors/emilysenay/main572586.shtml (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2006), and thousands of people, particularly rescue workers who persisted near Ground 
Zero for periods of weeks or even months after the terrorist attacks, have developed, or are at risk of 
developing, several ailments ranging from “World Trade Center cough” to acid reflux disease to emphy-
sema to asthma and even cancer.  See Health Problems Plague Ground Zero Workers (Mar. 2, 2003), at 
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/health/2003-03-02-wtc-workers_x.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 
2006). 
In what was likely a prelude of things to come, in September of 2004 a class action lawsuit against 
the construction companies charged with overseeing the removal of debris at Ground Zero was filed in 
federal court in the Southern District of New York.  The lawsuit purported to represent thousands of 
rescue and clean-up workers who lingered for days or weeks in Ground Zero in the aftermath of the 
terrorist attacks.  See generally Complaint, Divirgilio v. Silverstein Properties (No. 21-MC100), avail-
able at http://www.877wtchero.com/complaint.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2006; on file with author). The 
workers claim to be suffering from an array of health problems, including constant coughing, dizzy 
spells, shortness of breath, loss of hearing, development of tumors, acid reflux disease, and asthma.  See 
id. at 14-17.  In addition to seeking compensatory damages, the class also seeks to establish a medical 
monitoring program.  See id. at 13.   
Interestingly, the complaint is replete with references to what undoubtedly would fall within the 
scope of mixed dust: “The catastrophe created an immense cloud of caustic dust…”; “Residential … and 
other public buildings were coated with the toxic mix of chemical dust”; “Contaminated dust from the 
towers is trapped in air conditioning, heating and ventilation systems….”; “[S]afety precautions were 
needed to protect the rescue workers … and anyone else exposed to the caustic dust….”; “The high 
alkalinity of the WTC dust produced bronchial hyper-reactivity, persistent cough, and increased risk of 
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that is where high and frequent doses of pollutants are more likely to occur, 
but the disease may also be found with some regularity in residents of areas 
with excessive amounts of particulate matter in the air.16  It must be stressed 
that in order for the disease to develop, there must be exposure to high con-
centrations of airborne dusts, which can be either inorganic, i.e., non-living, 
such as iron, tin, barium, asbestos, coal, and, silica,17 or organic, which 
would typically involve some kind of mold.18  Furthermore, not everyone 
that inhales particles into their lungs, even if done with significant fre-
quency or in a heavy amount, will develop pneumoconiosis, for the human 
lungs are able to rid the body of certain substances, depending on the size 
and nature of the particles.19
As one can imagine, there are many recognized forms of pneumoco-
nioses (plural of pneumoconiosis)—at least two-dozen in all,20 and expect-
edly, they are classified according to the materials that are responsible for 
their development.21 Thus, among the numerous types are silicosis (silica-
based), asbestosis (asbestos-based), talcosis (talc-based), graphitosis 
(graphite-based), berylliosis (beryllium-based), tabacosis (tobacco-based), 
asthma.”; “240 New York City firefighters … received treatment of acute respiratory symptoms caused 
by inhalation of airborne smoke and dust….”  Id. at 3-4.  Recently, the United States Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruled that at least certain of plaintiffs’ claims could proceed.  In re WTC Disaster Site, 
414 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 2005). 
Similar lawsuits stemming from the World Trace Center disaster have been filed against other enti-
ties, including the Environmental Protection Agency, or EPA. See, e.g., http://www.911ea.org/ 
Current_Lawsuits.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) (describing such a lawsuit).  
The tragic World Trade Center situation also illustrates the potential causation problems mixed-dust 
plaintiffs might face, given that it would most likely be impossible to know exactly which substances 
might have caused which injuries, and from where the substances originated.  See New York Committee 
for Occupational Safety and Health, NYCOSH Testimony at the EPA Ombudsman Investigative Hearing 
on the Environmental and Public Health Impact of the World Trade Center Attack, available at 
http://www.nycosh.org/WTCcatastrophe/EPAOmbudsHearingFeb23.html (last modified Jan. 19, 2006; 
last visited Feb. 26, 2006) (“The variability of the contents of the World Trade Center and the massive 
scale and intensity of destruction make it virtually impossible to anticipate, let alone sample, all possible 
resulting contaminants.”); see generally infra Part IV.A-C (addressing some of the causation burdens 
mixed-dust plaintiffs might face, including identifying and linking the alleged injury-causing substances 
to a defendant).  
16
 See Definition of Pneumoconiosis, supra note 5. 
17
 See ATTORNEY’S TEXTBOOK, supra note 9. 
18
 See Love & Goldberg, supra note 8, at 17.   
19
 See id. at 18:   
Particles . . . [that are] big enough [tend] to be caught in the upper airways and eliminated out 
through the nose and mouth. [Very small p]articles . . . are small enough to be dealt with by the 
body’s immune response . . . . Particles between these sizes can accumulate in the lungs, however, 
. . . [sometimes] causing scarring. Many of the inorganic dusts, such as asbestos and silica, con-
tinue to cause scarring in the lungs long after they are inhaled.  
Id.
20
 See Alternative Exposures, supra note 6, at 2-7; infra note 22 and accompanying text (provid-
ing examples of substances that can cause pneumoconiosis).   
21
 See Definition of Pneumoconiosis, supra note 5 (stating that the various conditions “are often 
named for the implicated substance”). 
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and siderosis (iron-based).22  And it would be remiss to not mention the 
exotic variant of pneumoconiosis known as pneumonoultramicroscopicsili-
covolcanoconiosis (very fine silica dust).23
B. Similarities Between Pneumoconiosis and  
 Asbestos-Related Lung Diseases 
Little or no introduction to health problems wrought by asbestos is 
needed, and indeed, an in-depth or abstract explanation of asbestos-related 
legal or medical problems is beyond the scope of this Comment.  For our 
purposes, it suffices to say that asbestos is responsible for one of the worst 
medical crises the United States has seen,24 and that the situation has proven 
to be a significant impetus for insurers to exclude coverage for asbestos and 
similar pollutants, as well as for Congress to propose legislation seeking to 
control the rampant litigation related to asbestos claims.25  Primarily be-
cause of this, an examination of the similarities in medical terms between 
asbestos-related diseases and pneumoconiosis is warranted.   
Rather than comparing asbestos ailments in general to pneumoconio-
sis, it would be more fruitful to restrict the discussion of such diseases to 
that of asbestos’ manifestation of pneumoconiosis, aptly named asbestosis.26
Simply put, asbestosis is the name given to pneumoconiosis caused by the 
inhalation of asbestos.27  The disease is characterized by a scarring of the 
lungs caused by the deposit of asbestos fibers,28 and typical symptoms dis-
played by those suffering from asbestosis include heart failure,29 progres-
22
 See generally id. (listing these and other causes of pneumoconiosis); see also text accompany-
ing supra note 20 (noting that there are over two dozen causes of pneumoconiosis); infra note 97 (men-
tioning byssinosis, a type of pneumoconiosis caused by inhalation of cotton particles).   
23
 See Dictionary.com, What is the Longest Word in the Dictionary?,
http://dictionary.reference.com/help/faq/language/l/longestword.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).  
As of yet, no person has actually been diagnosed with this variation of pneumoconiosis, see id., but it 
warrants mention here by virtue of the word’s dubious distinction as the longest word in the English 
language. See id.
24
 See generally Paul F. Rothstein, What Courts Can Do in the Face of the Never-Ending Asbestos 
Crisis, 71 MISS. L.J. 1 (2001) (providing background on medical and litigation costs brought on by 
asbestos).  
25
 These will be discussed in infra Part II. 
26
 Many different types of diseases other than asbestosis are known to be caused by asbestos, 
including lung cancer and mesothelioma, a rare cancer of the chest and abdomen lining.  See generally 
American Lung Association, Asbestos, available at http://www.lungusa.org/site/pp.asp?c= 
dvLUK9O0E&b=35368 (last visited Feb. 17, 2006) [hereinafter Asbestos] (describing ill affects of 
asbestos).  However, this Comment will focus more on asbestosis, since that condition is a type of 
pneumoconiosis, see accompanying text to infra note 27, and is therefore more relevant to the discus-
sion.    
27
 See Asbestos, supra note 26.   
28
 See id.
29
 See AMERICAN COUNCIL ON SCIENCE AND HEALTH, PAMPHLET ON ASBESTOS 3 (1992) (on file 
with author). 
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sively worsening dyspnea,30 dry-cough,31 and non-specific chest discom-
fort.32  These symptoms are not unlike those commonly associated with 
pneumoconiosis in general,33 so the likeness between asbestosis and pneu-
moconiosis in terms of both contraction and symptoms cannot be denied.   
With this brief medical background in hand, we can now proceed to 
examine insurance policies and law relating to pneumoconiosis.       
II. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW AND INSURANCE
In order to better appreciate the relationship between a possible future 
surge in mixed-dust claims and insurance policies and legislation dealing 
with asbestos and pneumoconiosis that are in existence today, an analysis of 
pertinent insurance policies and laws, both federal and state, is necessary.  
This, in turn, requires an examination of case law dealing with insurance 
policies, particularly opinions resolving interpretive issues concerning what 
is and is not covered under a policy, as well as claims filed in tort or work-
ers’ compensation cases where the claimants alleged to be suffering from 
some form of pneumoconiosis.    
A. Case Law Dealing with Pneumoconiosis 
Reported cases involving claims of pneumoconiosis first appeared in 
the early twentieth-century, both in state34 and federal35 courts, and, not sur-
prisingly, are still occurring today.36  Many of these cases, then and now, are 
appeals from lower decisions that either awarded or denied workers’ com-
pensation benefits to claimants who alleged they developed pneumoconio-
sis in the workplace.37  That these claimants might be correct is not surpris-
30
 See Basil Varkey et al., Asbestosis, available at http://www.emedicine.com/med/topic171.htm 
(last modified July 8, 2005; last visited Feb. 26, 2006).  Dyspnea is a condition where an afflicted person 
experiences difficulty in breathing, and is sometime referred to as “air hunger.”  See Dictionary.com, at 
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=dyspnea (last visited Feb. 26, 2006).  
31
 See Varkey, supra note 30. 
32
 See id. 
33
 See generally Pulmonary Fibrosis, supra note 6 (providing symptoms on interstitial lung dis-
ease).  As noted earlier in note 6, pneumoconiosis is sometimes referred to as interstitial lung disease.    
34
 E.g., Kovaliski v. Collins Co., 128 A. 288, 288 (Conn. 1925) (Workers’ compensation case 
where plaintiff contracted pneumoconiosis due to “grinding,” described by the court as “the process of 
removing on a revolving stone the rough surfaces and edges of axes and other tools there manufac-
tured”).  
35
 E.g., Grammer v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 71 F.2d 38, 39 (10th Cir. 1934) (Wrongful 
death action where plaintiff died of pneumoconiosis arising out of his employment as a cleaner of gas 
oil stills).  A still in this context is “[a]n apparatus for distilling liquids . . . consisting of a vessel in 
which the substance is vaporized by heat and a cooling device in which the vapor is condensed.”  See 
Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=still (last visited Feb. 17, 2006). 
36
 E.g., Drummond Co. v. Johnson, 886 So. 2d 825 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003). 
37
 E.g., supra note 34.  Some plaintiffs nonetheless elect to bring the claim under a tort theory, 
such as wrongful death.  See, e.g., Triff v. National Bronze & Aluminum Foundry Co., 20 N.E.2d 232, 
233 (Ohio 1939) (administratrix of decedent who died of silicosis sued decedent’s former employer, 
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ing, as occupational lung disease is the number-one work-related illness in 
the United States.38  It is also not surprising to learn that a fair number of 
asbestos cases (which, as discussed earlier, share definite similarities with 
pneumoconiosis cases as a whole, 39) are also brought under workers’ com-
pensation,40 rather than in the torts context.  One likely reason for this is that 
under the workers’ compensation laws of most states, plaintiffs are gener-
ally foreclosed from pursuing claims against their employers through the 
courts, but rather must rely on the applicable state’s workers’ compensation 
scheme;41 this is commonly referred to as the “exclusive remedy” rule,42 and 
a similar limitation applies to federal employees.43
alleging various counts of negligence such as failure to inform workers of dangerous workplace condi-
tions and failure to provide a safe workplace).  
38
 NEW YORK STATE DEP’T OF HEALTH, OCCUPATIONAL LUNG DISEASE REGISTRY (2002), 
http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/lung/lungreg.pdf (last modified Dec. 2002; last visited Feb. 17, 
2006; on file with author). 
39
 See generally supra Part I.B. 
40
 See Deirdre A. McDonnell, Comment, Increased Risk of Disease Damages: Proportional 
Recovery as an Alternative to the All or Nothing System Exemplified by Asbestos Cases, 24 B.C. ENVTL.
AFF. L. REV. 623, 644 n.186 (1997) (noting that the majority of asbestos claims stem from persons who 
were injured due to “occupational exposure”); see also Melissa A. Vallone, Note, Employer Liability for 
Workplace Environmental Tobacco Smoke: Get Out of the Fog, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 811, 828 (1996) 
(stating that “[starting i]n the 1950s, many asbestos plaintiffs pursued remedies through state workers’ 
compensation laws”).  Some of the possible reasons behind a plaintiff’s choice to pursue an asbestos 
claim under a workers’ compensation scheme as opposed to in tort might have to do with the expense, 
time, and uncertainty that are inherently involved in lawsuits, which are alleviated somewhat under the 
“no-fault” structure of most states’ workers’ compensation schemes.  See Joan T.A. Gabel & Nancy R. 
Mansfield, The Information Revolution and its Impact on the Employment Relationship: An Analysis of 
the Cyberspace Workplace, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 301, 342 (2003) (“Workers’ compensation is a no-fault 
system in which employees recover . . . [a]s long as the employee’s injury ‘arises out of and in the 
course of employment . . . .’”); see Rachel Schaffer, Grabbing Them by the Balls: Legislatures, Courts, 
and Team Owners Bar Non-Elite Professional Athletes From Workers’ Compensation, 8 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 623, 636-39 (2000) (providing an overview of workers’ compensation 
schemes).  
Nonetheless, there are drawbacks to proceeding with a claim under workers’ compensation as op-
posed to filing a lawsuit, chief among those being that the maximum amount recoverable under workers’ 
compensation would likely be much lower than the damages that might be awarded in a lawsuit.  See 
Sidney A. Shapiro, Economic Analysis of State Employment Law Issues Symposium: The Necessity of 
OSHA, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 22, 28 (1999) (“All states have caps on damages and other limitations 
that significantly restrict [the amount awarded under] workers’ compensation . . . .”).  And because 
employers are often immune from lawsuits stemming from work-related injuries, see infra notes 41-43 
and accompanying text, persons who choose to sue for their injuries stemming from asbestos exposure 
might have no choice but to go after the manufacturer(s) of the asbestos product(s) that caused the 
plaintiff’s injuries, and this would not be desirable because many of these companies simply cannot 
afford to pay any judgments entered against them, see infra note 306 and accompanying text.      
41
 See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Reker,  100 S.W.3d 756 (Ky. 2003) (after analyzing Ken-
tucky’s Workers’ Compensation Scheme, found in sections 342.011-990 of the Kentucky Revised Stat-
utes (2002), the court held that the plaintiff’s exclusive remedy for securing benefits for injuries sus-
tained on the job lay within the state’s workers’ compensation scheme).   
42
 See, e.g., John D. Copeland, The New Arkansas Workers’ Compensation Act: Did the Pendulum 
Swing Too Far?, 47 ARK. L. REV. 1, 41 (1994) (“[Under most workers’ compensation schemes,] em-
ployers are granted immunity from most employee tort claims because workers’ compensation is the 
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The role of the courts in a workers’ compensation case involving a 
mixed-dust claim may be gauged by examining a typical opinion such as 
Clinchfield Coal Company v. Reed.44  In Clinchfield, the Virginia Court of 
Appeals was faced with an appeal from the defendant, Clinchfield Coal 
Company, challenging an award of medical benefits by the Virginia Work-
ers’ Compensation Commission to the claimant, Farrell D. Reed, for the 
coal workers’ pneumoconiosis he allegedly had developed from his job.45
In affirming the award of benefits,46 the court first noted that a very 
deferential standard applied in that context.47  The court then briefly defined 
coal workers’ pneumoconiosis as “a disease of the lung that results from the 
accumulation of coal dust in the lungs”48 and proceeded to examine the evi-
dence presented to the Commission.49  After noting that the evidence in the 
record sufficiently supported the Commission’s finding that the plaintiff had 
contracted the illness through his employment,50 the court turned to the de-
cisive question before it, namely whether the plaintiff’s disease was one for 
which compensation could be had under Virginia’s workers’ compensation 
scheme.51 After analyzing the relevant statutory provision,52 the court recog-
nized that the disease the plaintiff was suffering from, coal workers’ pneu-
exclusive remedy. . . . [M]ost jurisdictions [have] traditionally recognized only a few narrow exceptions 
to the exclusive remedy doctrine.”); see Jennifer Moyer Gaines, Comment, Employer Liability for 
Domestic Violence in the Workplace: Are Employers Walking a Tightrope Without a Safety Net?, 31 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 139, 144-48 (2000) (providing background on the “exclusivity” rule in workers’ compen-
sation schemes).     
43
 See generally William R. Kraus, How “Exclusive” is “Exclusive”? The Federal Employees’ 
Compensation Act and Compensatory Damages in Discrimination Cases, 43 A.F. L. REV. 145 (1997) 
(exploring the exclusivity rule in federal workers’ compensation laws). 
44
 577 S.E.2d 538 (Va. Ct. App. 2003).       
45
 See id. at 539. 
46
 Id. 
47
 Id. (“On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party before 
the commission.”) (internal quotations omitted). The majority of courts adopt a similarly deferential 
standard in workers’ compensation appeals.  See, e.g., Brad A. Elward, Workers’ Compensation Reviews 
and Appeals: A Review and Suggestion for Change, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 493, 517-18 (2002) (noting 
that “[the m]anifest weight of the evidence [standard] is the most common standard of review in work-
ers’ compensation appeals,” and that “so long as ‘some’ evidence is presented to support the [workers’ 
compensation board’s] decision, that decision must be affirmed”). 
48
 Clinchfield, 577 S.E.2d at 539.  
49
 Id.  
50
 Id. 
51
 Id. at 540-42.  
52
 Id.  The court focused primarily on section 65.2-403(B) of the Virginia Code (2003), which at 
the time provided in part that “[a]n employee who has an occupational disease that is covered by this 
title shall be entitled to the same hospital, medical and miscellaneous benefits as an employee who has a 
compensable injury by accident”). 
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moconiosis, was indeed a compensable injury for the purposes of workers’ 
compensation,53 and affirmed the judgment.54
The Clinchfield case is illustrative of the type of analysis courts will 
undertake in reviewing workers’ compensation claims for injuries stemming 
from pneumoconiosis.  First, they are highly deferential to the conclusions 
reached by the tribunals below, whether it be a trial court or administrative 
body.55  Second, the courts will focus on interpreting and applying statutory 
schemes to the case before it, rather than tort or other legal principles.56
Finally, they will tend to engage in the difficult analysis of medical evi-
dence and related questions only to the extent that is necessary to review 
the lower body’s decision.57
Sometime after cases related to “simple” pneumoconiosis appeared,58
cases involving claims of mixed-dust pneumoconiosis began appearing in 
various courts, with the first of these tracing back to New York courts in 
1963.59  They continue to appear with some frequency,60 and as with cases 
alleging ordinary pneumoconiosis,61 a good number - in fact, most - of re-
ported opinions involving claims of mixed-dust pneumoconiosis are in the 
form of appeals from workers’ compensation board decisions.62
53
 See Clinchfield, 577 S.E.2d at 541. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied in part on the 
Commission’s statement that “[a]sbestosis is but one of the several occupationally-induced pneumoco-
nioses for which workers’ compensation benefits, including medical benefits, are available." Id.
54
 Id. at 543.  
55
 See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
56
 See, e.g., Kusenko v. Republic Steel Corp., 484 A.2d 374, 376 (Pa. 1984) (noting that 
“[r]esolution of th[e] issue [of whether benefits should be awarded] necessarily requires an examination 
of the statutory language which governs the recovery of benefits in a Workmen’s Compensation case”). 
57
 See, e.g., Bethenergy Mines, Inc. v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 572 A.2d 843, 844-45 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 1990) (noting that “the referee is the ultimate factfinder in a workmen’s compensation case 
and he has the sole prerogative of assessing credibility and resolving conflicts in testimony”).  
58
 See, e.g., supra notes 34-35 (examples of such cases). 
59
 Groff, 239 N.Y.S.2d 738.  Groff involved an appeal by an employer of a decision by New 
York’s workers’ compensation board that awarded benefits to a worker for disabilities he developed as a 
result of working as a miner.  Id. at 739.  The plaintiff had been diagnosed with, among other things, 
mixed-dust pneumoconiosis after coming into contact with gypsum and silica.  Id. at 739-40.  The Groff 
case was mentioned in passing earlier in supra note 3 and the text accompanying it.     
60
 E.g., Bailey v. N. Am. Refractories Co., 95 S.W.3d 868 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001).  Bailey is some-
what unusual in that it is not a workers’ compensation case; rather, certain employees of a factory that 
made asbestos-containing products sued the manufacturer, alleging that the company’s negligence was 
responsible for the various diseases they had contracted, among them being mixed-dust pneumoconiosis 
(of which asbestos was one factor).  Id. at 870.   For an examination of how the Bailey court addressed 
the plaintiffs’ claims, which by so doing allows one to glean some of the differences between a claim 
filed in tort and one filed in workers’ compensation, see infra Part IV.D.1.                                  
61
 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
62
 E.g., supra note 59 (providing an example of such a case).  A search on Westlaw done on 
February 26, 2006, for both federal and state cases containing the words “mix! dust pneum!” (! is a 
wildcard character in Westlaw, meaning, for example, that any words beginning with “mix” would be 
found) netted thirty-three cases, and most of those involved workers’ compensation claims (including 
many from Pennsylvania, which is not surprising given the amount of mining that is done there.]  A 
similar but broader search done the same day using the words “mix!-dust" was a bit more fruitful, yield-
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Mixed-dust pneumoconiosis cases share another similarity with other 
types of pneumoconiosis cases; although mixed-dust pneumoconiosis cases 
are obviously not identical to those in which plaintiffs allege “ordinary” 
pneumoconiosis,63 courts will, at least when dealing with workers’ compen-
sation cases, take a comparable approach in deciding both.  Illustrative of 
this is Alston v. Chrysler Corporation,64 an appeal from a decision by 
Michigan’s Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) in 
which the court chose to adopt the magistrate’s findings that the plaintiff 
was afflicted with mixed-dust pneumoconiosis and asbestos, and then went 
on to find Chrysler Corporation responsible for paying the worker medical 
benefits.65  As was the case in Clinchfield,66 the court in Alston began its 
opinion by noting the extremely deferential standard that applies in appeals 
from workers’ compensation decisions involving mixed-dust pneumoconio-
sis.67
The court then proceeded to the merits of the claim by analyzing the 
magistrate’s findings that the “plaintiff was disabled by a work-related dust 
disease resulting from his exposure to asbestos.”68 [Oddly enough, “[t]he 
magistrate did not expressly state the type of dust disease from which the 
plaintiff suffered.”]69  As is typical in these cases,70 the magistrate reached 
ing 48 cases.  Possible reasons for there being many more mixed-dust workers’ compensation claims 
than tort claims are explored in supra note 40 and accompanying text and infra note 334 and accompa-
nying text.           
63
 The most glaring difference between the two is, of course, that mixed-dust pneumoconiosis 
involves at least two substances, while ordinary pneumoconiosis is composed of only one.  See text 
accompanying supra note 5; supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
64
 622 N.W.2d 795 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000).      
65
 Id. at 796-97.  Chrysler did not challenge the magistrate’s findings to the effect that the plaintiff 
had been stricken with the diseases as a result of his work, but rather argued that it should be reimbursed 
for the benefits it paid the plaintiff by the Silicosis, Dust Disease, and Logging Industry Compensation 
Fund (Fund).  Id. at 796.  In reversing the magistrate’s ruling on this point and finding against Chrysler, 
the Alston court noted that Chrysler failed to establish a prerequisite of the Fund’s reimbursement, 
namely that the diseases that the plaintiff was suffering from represented “a threat to the automobile 
industry,” i.e., that the potential of similar claims by workers being filed could have a crippling eco-
nomic effect on the industry. Id. at 796-99.     
66
 The Clinchfield case was discussed in supra notes 44-54 and accompanying text.
67
 See Alston, 622 N.W.2d at 796: 
Our review of a decision of the WCAC [Worker’s Compensation Appellate Commission] is limited 
to whether the WCAC exceeded its authority or committed an error of law . . . . If there is any evi-
dence supporting the WCAC’s factual findings, and if the WCAC did not misapprehend its admin-
istrative appellate role in reviewing decisions of the magistrate, then the courts must treat the 
WCAC’s factual findings as conclusive. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
68
 Id. at 796. 
69
 Id. 
70
 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.68 (Anderson 2005):  
Before awarding compensation for disability or death due to silicosis, asbestosis, or coal miners’ 
pneumoconiosis, the administrator shall refer the claim to a qualified medical specialist for ex-
amination and recommendation with regard to the diagnosis, the extent of disability, the cause of 
death, and other medical questions connected with the claim. (emphasis added).   
65
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her conclusion by relying on the submitted testimony of doctors.71  In par-
ticular, there was evidence presented from two doctors that indicated the 
plaintiff suffered from, inter alia, mixed-dust pneumoconiosis that was 
likely caused by a combination of the plaintiff being exposed to asbestos in 
the workplace and his habit of smoking.72  On appeal, the court summarily 
adopted the magistrate’s findings on this issue, and although the correctness 
of the magistrate’s medical findings was not the central issue in the case,73
Alston is nonetheless indicative of the extreme deference that courts give to 
lower tribunals’ decisions in workers’ compensation cases.74  As was al-
luded to earlier, the court ultimately affirmed the WCAC’s ruling that 
Chrysler was responsible for the plaintiff’s benefits.75
B. Legislation Concerning Pneumoconiosis 
          1.    State Laws 
As of present, many states have enacted laws dealing with pneumoco-
niosis, usually in the context of workers’ compensation.76  These statutes 
range from providing definitions of pneumoconiosis77 to listing examples of 
compensable pneumoconiosis78 to creating presumptions in favor of pneu-
moconiosis victims.79  In terms of liability in occupational settings, although 
Such a requirement is common among workers’ compensation statutes, probably because, as the 
Supreme Court recognized in Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982),  “there certainly is no reason to 
think judges or juries are better qualified than appropriate professionals in making [medical] decisions.” 
Id. at 322-23.     
71
 See Alston, 622 N.W.2d at 796-97.  
72
 Id.  
73
 See supra note 65. 
74
 See supra notes 47, 57, 67 and accompanying text.  
75
 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
76
 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-5-110 (2003); D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1510 (2003); 820 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 310/1 (2003); IOWA CODE § 85A.12 (2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.316 (BANKS-BALDWIN 
2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 418.531 (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-72-303 (2003); N.Y. WORKERS’
COMP. LAW § 44-A (CONSOL. 2003); N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-01.1 (2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
4123.68; 77 PA. CONST. STAT. § 411.1 (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-34-2 (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-
6-303 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-513 (MICHIE 2003); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-14 (2003). Additionally, 
in mid-2004 the legislature of Ohio passed a comprehensive bill regulating mixed-dust claims in several 
regards, including defining what a mixed-dust claim is, establishing what a claimant must prove in order 
to prevail, and detailing who may be held liable for such claims.  See generally OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2307.84-902.        
77
 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 25-5-110: 
Occupational pneumoconiosis [is a] disease of the lungs caused by inhalation of minute particles 
of dust over a period of time, which dust is due to causes and conditions arising out of and in the 
course of the employment, without regard to whether the causes or conditions are inherent in the 
employment or can be eliminated or reduced by due care on the part of the employer.    
78
 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1510 (listing silicosis and asbestosis as examples of occupa-
tional diseases).  
79
 See, e.g., N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 44-a (“The employer in whose employment an em-
ployee was last exposed to an injurious dust hazard shall be liable for the payments required by this 
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there are slight variations, typically the employer who will be held liable for 
compensating those who have contracted pneumoconiosis is the one in 
whose employ the afflicted were last exposed to the agent(s) causing pneu-
moconiosis.80
The various state statutes dealing with workers’ compensation for 
pneumoconiosis typically provide for procedures on how a worker may 
initiate a claim.81  An example of such a statute is section 342.316 of the 
Kentucky Statutes,82 which outlines in detail the steps that a claimant seek-
ing benefits for occupational diseases must follow.  First, he must file a 
“claim for resolution” that lists, among other things, the worker’s complete 
work history, replete with the names and addresses of past employers and 
the dates of employment.83  The employee must also provide at least one 
written medical report supporting his claim, prepared by a licensed physi-
cian, “which shall be made on the basis of clinical or X-ray examination 
performed in accordance with accepted medical standards and shall contain 
full and complete statements of all examinations performed and the results 
thereof.”84  In addition to the report, the claim must be accompanied by a 
chest X-ray examination “and appropriate pulmonary function tests”85 that 
“comply with accepted medical standards.”86  The statute then minutely 
details the medical requirements and procedures that the examining physi-
cian must abide by.87
chapter when disability or death of the employee shall be due to silicosis or other dust disease.”)  This 
and similar statutes creating presumptions regarding pneumoconiosis have been enacted by many states, 
as well as the federal government, and are examined in further detail in infra Parts II.B.1-2, IV.E.1.a.   
80
 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.316(1)(a) (“The employer liable for compensation for 
occupational disease [including pneumoconiosis] shall be the employer in whose employment the em-
ployee was last exposed to the hazard of the occupational disease.”); see also infra notes 399, 403 (dis-
cussing the “last injurious exposure” rule). 
81
 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.316; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4123.68; VA. CODE ANN. §
65.2-513; W. VA. CODE § 23-4-8 (2003). 
82
 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.316 
83
 Id. § 342.316 (3)(a). 
84
 Id. 
85
 Id. § 342.316 (3)(a)(2).  Requiring a workers’ compensation claimant to submit this type of 
evidence is not uncommon.  See generally infra Part IV.D.2 (discussing workers’ compensation case 
where similar requirements were imposed on the claimant).  
86
 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.316 (3)(b). 
87
 Id. § 342.316 (3)(b)(1)-(2):  
Chest X-rays shall be of acceptable quality with respect to exposure and development . . . . Physi-
cians’ reports of X-ray interpretations shall . . . classify the X-ray interpretation using the latest 
ILO Classification and be accompanied by a completed copy of the latest ILO Classification re-
port. Only interpretations by National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) certi-
fied "B" readers shall be admissible.  
. . . Spirometric testing shall be conducted in accordance with the standards recommended in the 
latest edition available of the "Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment" published by 
the American Medical Association and the 1978 ATS epidemiology standardization project with 
the exception that the predicted normal values for lung function shall not be adjusted based upon 
66
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Assuming that the employee complies with these filing requirements, 
the claim will then proceed to the next phase; the commissioner in charge of 
workers’ compensation will notify the employer “and all other interested 
parties” by furnishing them with a copy of the application and any other 
materials submitted by the claimant.88  The claim will then be assigned to an 
administrative law judge,89 and within thirty days of receiving notice of the 
claim, the employer must notify the commissioner and “all parties of re-
cord” of its acceptance or denial of the claim.90
If the employer denies the claim, within forty-five days of the claim 
being assigned to a judge, the employer must arrange for the employee to 
be examined by a physician of the employer’s choosing.91  This examina-
tion must conform to the same requirements as that of the examination re-
port filed by the claimant, and the results of the examination must be pro-
vided to the commissioner and “all other parties.”92  The commissioner will 
then determine if the parties’ filings are in consensus as specified by the 
statute,93 and if he does so conclude, his findings will constitute fairly con-
clusive evidence and will be forwarded to the parties and the judge handling 
the case.94  If the commissioner deems that the parties’ filings are contradic-
tory to one another, the judge will have to weigh the evidence and make a 
determination on the merits of the claim.95  Either way, unless the parties 
reach a settlement beforehand, the judge’s ruling is due no later than sixty 
days from the time of the initial hearing.96
           2.    Federal Laws 
As with state statutes, one can find federal codes and regulations deal-
ing with pneumoconiosis, among the most prominent of which is the Black 
Lung Benefits Act.97 Congress deemed it necessary to pass this legislation 
the race of the subject. . . . Reports of spirometric testing shall include a description by the physi-
cian of the procedures utilized in conducting such spirometric testing and a copy of the spirometric 
chart and tracings from which spirometric values submitted as evidence were taken.   
88
 Id. § 342.316 (4)(a). 
89
 Id. § 342.316 (4)(b). 
90
 Id. § 342.316 (4)(c). 
91
 Id. § 342.316 (4)(d).  Giving an employee the ability to choose a physician in the context of 
workers’ compensation is not uncommon.  See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 4601(a) (West 2004) (providing 
that in workers’ compensation claims, “[if the] employee so requests, the employer shall tender the 
employee one change of physician”).    
92
 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.316 (4)(d).
93
 Id. § 342.316 (4)(f). 
94
 Id. § 342.316 (4)(d)-(e). 
95
 Id. § 342.316 (4)(e). 
96
 Id. § 342.316 (4)(h). 
97
 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-45 (2003).  The current version of the Black Lung Benefits Act is the evolu-
tionary product of Congressional action tracing back to the 1960s.  See generally Eric R. Olson, Reduc-
ing the Overburden: The Doris Coal Presumption and Administrative Efficiency Under the Black Lung 
Benefits Act, 99 MICH. L. REV. 696 (2000) (providing information and historical background on the Act).   
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because it found that “there [we]re a significant number of coal miners . . . 
who are totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis arising out of employment 
in . . . coal mines . . . and that few States provide benefits for [these] coal 
miners or their surviving dependents.”98  As is suggested by its name, the 
focus of the Act is fairly narrow, as it applies only to pneumoconiosis 
claims that derive from working in coal mines.99  Furthermore, the Act was, 
and still is, intended to complement, rather than replace, states’ workers’ 
compensation schemes for pneumoconiosis claims, for only when a claim-
ant is not eligible for state benefits100 or when the state benefits are inade-
quate101 does the Act apply.  And the Act, as with many state compensation 
schemes,102 creates statutory presumptions that favor claimants.103
For another example of federal law dealing with pneumoconiosis, the reader may wish to study 
American Textile Manufacturers Institute v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981), where the Supreme Court 
had the opportunity to examine the validity of (and ultimately uphold) Title 29, Section 1910.1043 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations (2004), which represented the Occupational Safety and Health Admini-
stration’s highest threshold of tolerable occupational exposure to “cotton dust,” a substance that can lead 
to a variation of pneumoconiosis known as byssinosis.  More information on this condition can be found 
in Donovan, 452 U.S. at 495-505.       
98
 30 U.S.C. § 901(a). 
99
 30 U.S.C. § 902(b) (“The term ‘pneumoconiosis’ [in this Act] means a chronic dust disease of 
the lung and its sequelae, including respiratory and pulmonary impairments, arising out of coal mine 
employment.”). 
100
 See 30 U.S.C. § 931(a): 
On and after January 1, 1974, any claim for benefits for death or total disability due to the pneu-
moconiosis shall be filed pursuant to the applicable State workmen’s compensation law, except 
that during any period when miners or their surviving widows, children, parents, brothers, or sis-
ters, as the case may be, are not covered by a State workmen’s compensation law which provides 
adequate coverage for pneumoconiosis . . . .  
101
 30 U.S.C. § 931(b)(1):  
For purposes of this section, a State workmen’s compensation law shall not be deemed to provide 
adequate coverage for pneumoconiosis during any period unless it is included in the list of State 
laws found by the Secretary to provide such adequate coverage during such period. The Secretary 
shall, no later than October 1, 1972, publish in the Federal Register a list of State workmen’s com-
pensation laws which provide adequate coverage for pneumoconiosis and shall revise and repub-
lish in the Federal Register such list from time to time, as may be appropriate to reflect changes in 
such State laws due to legislation or judicial or administrative interpretation.  
102
 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
103
 E.g., 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(1) (stating that “[i]f a miner who is suffering or suffered from pneu-
moconiosis was employed for ten years or more in one or more coal mines there shall be a rebuttable 
presumption that his pneumoconiosis arose out of such employment”); 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(2) (providing 
that “[i]f a deceased miner was employed for ten years or more in one or more coal mines and died from 
a respirable disease there shall be rebuttable presumption that his death was due to pneumoconiosis”). 
Other presumptions applicable to the Black Lung Act can be found in the Federal Code.  See, e.g., 20
C.F.R. § 718.304 (2003) (establishing irrebuttable presumption that a miner’s death was due to pneumo-
coniosis or that a miner was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis at the time of death if certain evi-
dence is presented or under certain situations); 20 C.F.R. § 718.305 (2003) (creating rebuttable presump-
tion that a miner is or was totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis or that his death was caused by pneu-
moconiosis if he was a coal miner for fifteen years or more and certain evidence, such as an X-ray, 
establishes a pulmonary impairment); 20 C.F.R. § 718.306 (2003) (providing rebuttable presumption 
that the survivors of a miner who was employed for 25 years or more and died prior to March 1, 1978, 
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Mainly through provisions of the Federal Code, the Black Lungs Act 
specifies, as do many state statutes,104 the procedures that claimants seeking 
benefits must fulfill.105  The Act’s procedures have already been analyzed by 
other commentators,106 and so only a cursory examination is necessary here.  
The basic requirements that a claimant must comply with in order to receive 
benefits under the Act, particularly in terms of what evidence of his injuries 
he must present, are outlined in title 20, sections 718.201-206 of the Code 
of Federal Regulations.107  Not surprisingly, a threshold matter for the eligi-
bility of benefits is a determination that the claimant suffers from pneumo-
coniosis,108 and this may be achieved primarily through four means: 1) pro-
viding a chest X-ray that shows evidence of pneumoconiosis, 109 2) submit-
ting an autopsy or biopsy report, 110 3) relying on the various presumptions 
afforded by Congress, 111 and 4) procuring a finding by a physician “exer-
cising sound medical judgment” that the miner suffers or has suffered from 
pneumoconiosis.112
C. Insurance Policies Dealing with Pneumoconiosis 
Analyzing the potential impact that a possible surge in mixed-dust 
claims might have requires a look at the current state of insurance policies 
and how they might serve to limit, or at least complicate, such a trend.113
are entitled to the payment of benefits); see generally Olson, supra note 97 (discussing the role that 
presumptions have played in the Black Lung Benefits Act).  
104
 See generally supra Part II.B.1 (describing the procedures a person must follow to initiate a 
workers’ compensation pneumoconiosis claim in Kentucky). 
105
 The bulk of these are located in Title 20, Sections 718.101-307 of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions (2003).   
106
 See Olson, supra note 97, at 698-700; Rita A. Massie, Student Work, Modification of Benefits 
for Claimants Under the Federal Black Lung Benefits Program, 97 W. VA L. REV. 1023, 1030-37 (1995) 
(both describing the process of filing claims under the Act).   
107
 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.201-206 (2003). 
108
 20 C.F.R. § 718.202.  Linking the alleged cause of the plaintiff’s injury to a defendant is, un-
surprisingly, an essential element of almost any type of claim, whether it be in the nature of workers’ 
compensation or tort.  See infra notes 372-73 and accompanying text.  
109
 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(1).  The X-ray must be in conformity with the requirements listed in 
Title 20, Section 718.102 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 
110
 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(2).  The autopsy or biopsy must be conducted under the procedures speci-
fied in Title 20, Section 106 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 
111
 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(3).  The presumptions specifically referenced are Title 20, Sections 
718.304-06 of the Code of Federal Regulations, and these were discussed in supra note 103.    
112
 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(4).  The physician’s finding must “be based on objective medical evidence 
such as blood-gas studies, electrocardiograms, pulmonary function studies, physical performance tests, 
physical examination, and medical and work histories,” and furthermore, must “be supported by a rea-
soned medical opinion.” Id.
113
 There are, of course, many different types of insurance policies, ranging from automobile to 
property to life insurance.  See generally Douglas R. Richmond, Issues and Problems in "Other Insur-
ance," Multiple Insurance, and Self-Insurance, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1373 (1995) (discussing various types 
of insurance policies and how they differ in terms of coverage and interpretation).  However, given that 
the majority of mixed-dust claims arise out of work-related occurrences, which in turn means that many, 
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That is because today, most companies are protected by some form of in-
surance.
114
  Of course, this fact does not end, but rather begins, the question 
of if and to what extent companies will be liable for mixed-dust claims, for 
that question will naturally depend on the language of the policy.115  Thus, 
an examination of the most common types of insurance applicable in this 
context, as well as how courts have addressed these policies, is warranted.   
          1.    The Commercial General Liability Policy (CGL) 
The most widely used type of insurance policy by businesses is the 
CGL,116 which are form policies developed by the Insurance Service Office 
(ISO).117  These policies, as their name suggests, are broad and intended to 
“provide[ ] insurance for businesses against responsibility for accidents,”118
particularly for claims of bodily injury and property damage.119 Typically, 
if not most, of the defendants will be companies, see supra note 40, the focus of this section will be on 
the type of insurance policies that businesses typically carry, namely the so-called comprehensive or 
commercial general liability policy (CGL), see infra note 116 and accompanying text.  The titles of the 
policies are misleading, for while they “suggest[ ] the expectation of maximum coverage,” Timothy 
Stanton, Now You See It, Now You Don’t: Defective Liability Insurance, 25 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 109, 111 
n.16 (1993), the scope of CGL policies is such that in actuality they only guard businesses against cer-
tain types of risks, see id. at 111 n.15-16.    
114
 See George W. Kuney, Misinterpreting Bankruptcy Code Section 363(f) and Undermining the 
Chapter 11 Process, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 235, 286 n.195 (2002) (recognizing that “most companies 
carry substantial amounts of liability insurance”). 
115
 See, e.g., Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., 227 Cal. Rptr. 203, 205 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1986) (“The starting point [of determining an insurer’s liability], of course, is the plain meaning of the 
policy language.”). 
116
 See, e.g., Lisa A. Small, Offensive and Defensive Insurance Coverage for Patent Infringement 
Litigation: Who Will Pay?, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 707, 712 (1998) (“The most common type of 
liability insurance coverage for businesses is Comprehensive (or Commercial) General Liability (‘CGL’) 
insurance.”); Lee H. Ogburn, The Progression of Trigger Limitation in Maryland—Determining the 
Appropriate Trigger of Coverage, Its Limitations, and Ramifications, 53 MD. L. REV. 220, 221 (1994) 
(“[T]he policy that most businesses purchase to protect against claims . . . for bodily injury or property 
damage [is the CGL] . . . . “); see also infra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (describing purpose of 
CGL policies).    
117
 The ISO is a private institution that exists primarily to write standard policy forms for the 
insurance industry.  See Small, supra note 116, at 712.  Aside from writing the actual policies, the ISO 
files the policies with the various states’ insurance regulators, see Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cal., 509 U.S. 
764, 772 (1993), which is required by the law of many states, see Melody A. Hamel, Comment, The 
1970 Pollution Exclusion in Comprehensive General Liability Policies: Reasons for Interpretations in 
Favor of Coverage in 1996 and Beyond, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 1083, 1103 (1996) (stating that most states 
require proposals for new policy language to be filed with and approved by the state insurance commis-
sioner prior to inclusion of that language in policies).  In addition, and somewhat expectedly, the ISO 
also supplies insurance companies with useful statistical information pertaining to the industry: for 
example, it collects and interprets data on the premiums charged, claims filed and paid, and defense 
costs expended with respect to each form.  See Hartford, 509 U.S. at 772.  More information about the 
ISO may be had at its website, http://www.iso.com (last visited Feb. 17, 2006).    
118
 Harry G. Prince, Contract Interpretation in California: Plain Meaning, Parol Evidence and the 
Use of the “Just Result” Principle, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 557, 592 n.195 (1998).   
119
 See Small, supra note 116; Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Pittsburg, 768 F. Supp. 1463, 1468 n.5 
(D. Kan. 1991) (both recognizing that CGL policies are meant to insure a business against personal 
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the policies will first identify the risks that are covered, and then specify 
possible exclusions from those general areas of risk.120  For the purpose of 
this Comment, the most noteworthy of these exclusions is the “pollution 
exclusion” clause, which, significantly, may be found in virtually all CGLs 
in existence today.121  Somewhat obviously, the ISO periodically updates 
these forms to correspond with changing times and needs;122 in the context 
applicable here, namely what type of liability related to mixed-dust inci-
dents is and is not covered by CGL insurance policies, the most influential 
version has been, and continues to be, the one authored by the ISO in 
1986.123  Because of this, the impact that the 1986 CGL policy has had, and 
may have, on mixed-dust claims may be better appreciated by briefly exam-
ining the evolution over time that these “pollution exclusion” clauses have 
undergone.124
    a)  Reasons for the Prevalence of Pollution Exclusion Clauses and 
How They Evolved Over Time.  It is agreed by most that the primary reason 
for today’s proliferation of pollution exclusion clauses was the "enormous 
expense and exposure resulting from the ‘explosion’ of environmental liti-
injury and property damage claims).  But see supra note 113; infra note 125 (both noting that the actual 
coverage provided by the policies can be disappointing to insureds). 
120
 See Prince, supra note 118, at 592 n.195.
121
 See Doerr v. Mobil Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 123 n.1 (La. 2000) (“Some form of th[e abso-
lute] pollution exclusion [clause] is part of the standard CGL policy purchased by almost all large and 
small businesses since the mid-1980s.”); Bryan C. Devine, Recent Decision, The Standard Pollution 
Exclusion Clause in Commercial General Liability Insurance Policies Bars Coverage for Personal 
Injuries Resulting from On-Site Exposure to Pollutants Discharged Within a Construction Envelope: 
Madison Construction Co. v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance Co., 38 DUQ. L. REV. 949, 958 (2000) (“By 
1970, . . . pollution exclusion clauses were a standard feature of virtually all commercial general liability 
policies.”). 
122
 See Ogburn, supra note 116, at 221 n.5 (noting that the standard CGL policy has undergone 
several “significant revisions”); see Jim L. Julian & Charles L. Schlumberger, Insurance Coverage for 
Environmental Clean-Up Costs Under Comprehensive General Liability Policies, 19 U. ARK. LITTLE 
ROCK L.J. 57, 57-59 (1996) (outlining changes made by the ISO to its policies as a response to external 
events).   
123
 See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reason and Pollution: Correctly Construing the "ABSOLUTE" Exclu-
sion in Context and in Accord with Its Purpose and Party Expectations, 34 TORT & INS. L.J. 1, 5 (1998) 
(noting that “[today’s] absolute pollution exclusion was drafted during the early 1980s and was incorpo-
rated into the standard form CGL in 1986”); Amanda C. Leiter, Note, Environmental Insurance: Does It 
Defy the Rules?, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 259, 294 n.173 (2001) (“Significant parts of the 1986 abso-
lute pollution exclusion, and in particular the definition of ‘pollutants’[,] . . . remain unaltered in subse-
quent versions of the exclusion.”). 
124
 For the purposes of this Comment, a brief look at the history and purpose of the CGLs’ pollu-
tion exclusion clause will suffice.  However, for those seeking a more comprehensive study of the myr-
iad changes that have occurred to pollution exclusion clauses since their origin, and the reasons for those 
changes, many fine sources exist.  See Richardson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 826 A.2d 310, 314-19 
(D.C. Cir. 2003), vacated on other grounds by 832 A.2d 752 (2003); Leiter, supra note 123, at 280-84; 
Jonathan C. Averback, Comment, Comparing the Old and the New Pollution Exclusion Clauses in 
General Liability Insurance Policies: New Language—Same Results?, 14 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 601, 
604-10 (1987) (all providing background and historical information on the evolution of the “pollution 
exclusion” clause in insurance policies, particularly those promulgated by the ISO).  
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gation."125 Even so, the clauses trace back to well over half a century, with 
the first significant change to them occurring in 1966.126  Prior to then, CGL 
policies provided coverage for bodily injury or property damage caused by 
"accidents."127  To complicate things, however, what constituted an accident 
was not defined in the policies, which led to much confusion and, ulti-
mately, litigation.128  Tired of this, in 1966 the ISO replaced the “accident” 
trigger with that of the “occurrence” trigger, with “occurrence” being de-
fined as “an accident, including injurious exposure to conditions, which 
results, during the policy period, in bodily injury and property damage that 
was neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.”129
Much to the dismay of the ISO, insurance companies, and insureds, the 
125
 Weaver v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 674 A.2d 975, 977 (N.H. 1996) (quoting Vantage Dev. Corp. 
v. American Environment Technologies Corp., 598 A.2d 948, 953 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991)). It 
might seem elementary that insurance companies would try to limit their responsibility to defend or 
indemnify claims filed against their insureds, but the extent of the companies’ efforts in the pollution 
exclusion context is such that one court had this to say of one insurance carrier who contended that its 
policy did not cover asbestos-related risks: “In plain language, [the insurance carrier here] has adopted 
the unholy mantra, ‘we collect premiums; we do not pay claims.’” Owens-Illinois v. United Ins. Co., 
625 A.2d 1, 17 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).  And perhaps it is more than just a mere coincidence 
that it was in 1986, the same year that the “absolute” pollution exclusion clause was created and that the 
“insurance crisis” began, see infra notes 138-139 and accompanying text, that these general insurance 
policies became known as “commercial,” rather than “comprehensive,” general liability policies (which, 
incidentally, is how they are still referred to as today).  See Thomas K. Bick & Lisa G. Youngblood, The 
Pollution Exclusion Saga Continues: Does it Apply to Indoor Releases?, 5 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 119, 124 
(1997) (noting that 1986 “marked a change in the name of the liability policy from a comprehensive 
general liability policy to a commercial general liability policy”); Kenneth S. Abraham, The Rise and 
Fall of Commercial Liability Insurance, 87 VA. L. REV. 85, 89 (2001) (deducing that the 1986 name 
change of CGL policies from comprehensive to commercial “can only be assumed [to have been] an 
effort to eliminate the disadvantage that insurers faced in litigation over whether there was coverage 
under a ‘comprehensive’ policy’”).      
126
 See American States Ins. Co. v. Koloms, 687 N.E.2d 72, 79-80 (Ill. 1997) (stating that “in 
response [to various events,] the insurance industry [significantly] revised the CGL policy in 1966”).   
127
 See Center for Creative Studies v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 871 F. Supp. 941, 943 n.3 (E.D. 
Mich. 1994) (explaining how CGL policies went from being “accident-based” to “occurrence-based” in 
1966). 
128
 See id. at 944 (“The biggest interpretation issue to date has been over what the terms ‘sudden’ 
and ‘accidental’ [in CGL policies] mean.”).  The courts certainly did their part in ensuring uncertainty as 
to the meaning of “accident,” for the word took vastly different connotations depending on which court 
was deciding the issue.  See E. Joshua Rosenkranz, Note, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the 
Looking Glass, 74 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1243 (1986) (“The courts ignored the insurers’ intentions by formu-
lating a variety of definitions for the word ‘accident.’”).  For example, some courts took the clause at 
face value and precluded coverage for losses that were foreseeable because, they reasoned, something 
that is foreseeable could not have happened “accidentally,” i.e., suddenly.  See id. Other courts took an 
opposite approach and concluded that just because something was foreseeable did not mean it could not 
be “accidental,” and in support of their stance, would cite to negligent acts as an example; these were 
“accidental” in the sense that they were not done with intent, but could still be deemed foreseeable.   See 
id.  
129
 Morton Int’l v. General Accident Ins. Co., 629 A.2d 831, 849 (N.J. 1993). 
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1966 change did not entirely eliminate the confusion over under which cir-
cumstances the pollution exclusion clause applied.130
At around the same time of the 1966 revision, Congress passed sub-
stantial amendments to the Clean Air Act,131 which had the effect, inter alia, 
of imposing greater economic burdens on insurance underwriters, particu-
larly those providing standard-form CGL policies.132 These burdens were 
increased yet further by contemporaneous and well-publicized environ-
mental disasters, such as Times Beach and Love Canal.133  Mainly because 
of these events, in 1970 the ISO promulgated the first “true” pollution ex-
clusion clause,134 which, in pertinent part, provided:  
[This policy shall not apply to bodily injury or property damage] aris-
ing out of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, 
soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste ma-
terials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, 
the atmosphere or any watercourse or body of water; but this exclu-
sion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is 
sudden and accidental.135   
130
 See Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 80 (“Despite [the 1966] changes, courts continued to construe the 
policy to cover damages resulting from long-term, gradual exposure to environmental pollution.”); see
Sharon M. Murphy, Note, The "Sudden and Accidental" Exception to the Pollution Exclusion Clause in 
Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies: The Gordian Knot of Environmental Liability, 45 
VAND. L. REV. 161, 165-67 (1992) (describing the reasons for the 1966 revision, and how the change did 
not have the intended effect the insurance industry had hoped for).  
131
 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2003). 
132
 See Pittsburg, 768 F. Supp. at 1469 n.8 (recognizing that “sweeping legislation” passed by 
Congress, including the Clean Air Act, led to an increase in the adoption of pollution exclusion clauses 
by insurers).  
133
 See Aetna Life, 871 F. Supp. at 941 (noting that the Times Beach and Love Canal incidents 
served as an impetus for the adoption of pollution exclusion clauses).  In Love Canal, which is located 
near Niagara Falls, New York, a public school and residential subdivisions were unwittingly built in the 
1950s on top of reclaimed land that had previously been used by Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corpo-
ration as a dumpsite for chemical wastes.  See Jill E. Evans, Challenging the Racism in Environmental 
Racism: Redefining the Concept of Intent, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1219, 1237 n.86 (1998).  Public authorities 
later discovered that the town’s water supply had been contaminated by the chemicals, resulting in the 
ultimate evacuation of hundreds of families and an almost complete devaluation of the area’s property 
value.  See id.   
A similarly disastrous situation occurred in Times Beach, Missouri, where in 1971, a waste oil 
dealer sprayed contaminated oil on Times Beach’s dirt roads in an extremely misguided attempt to keep 
the dust down.  See id. at 1237 n.87.  Times Beach residents were unaware of the danger for years, even 
though virtually all households in the area started experiencing somewhat rare health problems.  See id. 
In 1982, the government, aware of the potentially deadly consequences, recommended a property buy-
out of the area, and since then, all of Times Beach’s residents, numbering over 2000 in all, have moved 
out.  See id. 
134
 See Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 81 (explaining that “the insurance industry drafting organizations 
began in 1970 the process of drafting and securing regulatory approval for the standard pollution-
exclusion clause," and that “[t]he result of these efforts was the addition of an [early pollution exclusion 
clause] to the standard-form CGL policy in 1970”). 
135
 Devine, supra note 121, at 959 n.74 (emphasis added).  
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As will be explained shortly, the ISO’s attempt to reduce confusion 
over the pollution exclusion clause’s applicability to particular factual situa-
tions by adding the phrase “sudden and accidental” was not as successful as 
the organization would have hoped.             
b)  Interpretative Issues Associated With Pollution Exclusion 
Clauses.  Somewhat predictably, the next intensely debated issue over the 
next decade or so pertaining to pollution exclusion clauses was the meaning 
of “sudden and accidental,”136 leading one commentator to describe this 
issue as one of “the most hotly litigated insurance coverage questions of the 
late 1980’s."137  Partly because of this, in 1986 (the exact year that the “in-
surance crisis” peaked)138 the ISO felt compelled to yet again change its 
pollution exclusion clause, this time to a version that was to be dubbed the 
“absolute” pollution exclusion clause:139
It is agreed that this policy does not apply to personal injury or prop-
erty damage arising out of the contamination of the environment by 
pollutants introduced at any time into or upon land, the atmosphere or 
any watercourse or body of water or aquifer. This exclusion applies 
whether or not the contamination is introduced into the environment 
intentionally or accidentally or gradually or suddenly and whether or 
not the insured or any other person or organization is responsible for 
the contamination.140
136
 See Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 80 (“During the next 13 years, various courts labored over the exact 
meaning of the words ‘sudden and accidental.’”).   
137
 JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS: LAW AND STRATEGY FOR 
INSURERS AND POLICYHOLDERS 825 (1994).  Much of the litigation focused on whether the word "sud-
den" should be given a strictly temporal meaning, i.e., whether in order for the exception to apply, the 
discharge of pollution had to have been “abrupt.”  See Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 80-81.  
138
 See Kathleen E. Payne, Linking Tort Reform to Fairness and Moral Values, 1995 DET. C.L.
REV. 1207, 1220 (1995) (“The year 1986 is viewed as the peak of the insurance crisis, a time when the 
cost of liability insurance skyrocketed and the availability of coverage for some products and services 
disappeared altogether.”); see generally Richard N. Clarke et al., Perspectives on the Insurance Crisis: 
Sources of the Crisis in Liability Insurance: An Economic Analysis, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 367 (1988) (pro-
viding background information on the insurance crisis and some of its possible causes).  But see Peter A. 
Lefkin, Perspectives on the Insurance Crisis: Shattering Some Myths on the Insurance Liability Crisis: 
A Comment on the Article by Clarke, Warren-Boulton, Smith, and Simon, 5 YALE J. ON REG. 417 (1988) 
(questioning the existence of an “insurance crisis,” at least as to the full extent claimed by insurers).  
139
 See Koloms, 687 N.E.2d at 81 (“[Around 1985,] insurance companies responded [to the confu-
sion over ‘sudden and accidental’ by drafting a new version of the [pollution] exclusion [clause], which . 
. . is now commonly known as the ‘absolute pollution exclusion.’”). 
140
 Amy Timmer, Are They Lying Now or Were They Lying Then? The Insurance Industry’s Am-
biguous Pollution Exclusion: Why the Insurer, and not the Innocent Insured, Should Pay for Pollution 
Caused by Prior Landowners, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 355, 375 n.72 (1994).  As noted earlier, these and 
other forms of insurance are updated every so often, see supra note 122 and accompanying text, so 
naturally, variations of the “absolute” exclusion language exist.  For example, another fairly common 
version provides that “[t]his insurance does not apply to . . . [b]odily [i]njury or [p]roperty [d]amage 
arising out of the actual, alleged, or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants at or 
from premises you own, rent or occupy.”  Bick, supra note 125, at 124.  However, the original “abso-
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While one might think that the 1986 pollution exclusion clause would 
have provided a “rock solid” defense for insurers, one feature of the clause, 
that being its definition of the term “pollutant,”141 served to allow insurers’ 
liability and confusion over the clause to live on.  Today’s standard defini-
tion characterizes “pollutant” as “any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irri-
tant or contaminant, including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, 
chemicals, and waste.”142  Furthermore, some policies include more specific 
pollution exclusion clauses that focus on a type or class of pollutants, in 
particular asbestos.143  For instance, the court in Highlands Insurance Com-
pany v. Celotex Corporation144 was charged with determining whether as-
bestos exclusion policies applied only to asbestosis, or to all asbestos-
related diseases.145  One of the policies at issue146 provided that “[t]his pol-
icy shall not apply to any liability arising out of ASBESTOSIS and related 
diseases arising out of asbestos products."147 The court ultimately concluded 
that this policy was meant to exclude all asbestos-related diseases, partly by 
relying on the doctrine of collateral estoppel.148
lute” clause quoted in the full text above continues to form the basis for the ones existing today.  See 
supra note 123 and accompanying text (stating as much).      
141
 William Goldfarb et al., Unsafe Sewage Sludge or Beneficial Biosolids?: Liability, Planning, 
and Management Issues Regarding the Land Application of Sewage Treatment Residuals, 26 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 687, 757 (1999). 
142
 Id.
143
 See, e.g., Walter G. Wright, Jr. & Stephanie M. Irby, The Transactional Challenges Posed by 
Mold: Risk Management and Allocation Issues, 56 ARK. L. REV. 295, 354 n.366 (2003) (stating that 
“[m]any policies exclude coverage for indoor contaminants such as asbestos, lead-based paint, and 
mold”); Redmond v. State Farm Ins. Co., 728 A.2d 1202, 1204 (D.C. 1999) (noting that “State Farm [, a 
prominent insurance company,]  ha[s] excluded lead paint coverage since August 24, 1987”).  Further 
support lies in the fact that it has traditionally been difficult, if not impossible, to obtain insurance for 
certain substances such as asbestos.  See Stonewall Ins. Co. v. Asbestos Claims Mgmt. Corp., 73 F.3d 
1178, 1202 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that “no coverage was available for asbestos claims after 1985”); 
Nicholas J. Guiliano, Comment, The Sudden and Accidental Exception to the Pollution Exclusion Solu-
tion?, 13 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 261, 280 (1994) (“[T]oday[,] virtually no one can obtain pollution 
insurance at any price.”).  
Interestingly, some courts have actually suggested that insurance companies should (or at least 
could) be a bit more detailed and careful in the drafting of their pollution exclusion clauses in order to 
increase the clauses’ effectiveness.  See, e.g., Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 667 A.2d 617, 624 n.3 (Md. 
1995) (“To be sure that lead paint poisoning claims were excluded from coverage, Allstate [an insurance 
company] could have included a provision . . . explicitly excluding such claims.”).  
144
 Highlands Ins. Co. v. Celotex Corp., 743 F. Supp. 28 (D. D.C. 1990). 
145
 Id. at 29. 
146
 There were actually fourteen different exclusion clauses before the court that had been issued 
from several different insurance companies, but all of the clauses were similar to one another.  See id. at
30-31.     
147
 Id. at 30 n.12. 
148
 See id. at 32-33.  The collateral estoppel doctrine essentially acts to prohibit parties from re-
litigating issues that were already decided by a court or administrative body.  See Jerald D. Stubbs, 
Fighting Fraud Illustrated: The Robins AFB Case, 38 A.F. L. REV. 141, 168 (1994) (“The doctrine of 
collateral estoppel precludes relitigating issues of fact or law actually litigated and determined in a prior 
lawsuit . . . . The effect of collateral estoppel attaches not only to judicial proceedings, but also to ad-
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Similarly, in In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation,149 it fell to the 
court to determine whether an insurance carrier that had issued a policy 
expressly excluding asbestos from coverage was entitled to summary judg-
ment on the issue of being liable to the plaintiffs’ claims of injuries stem-
ming from exposure to asbestos.150  The policy at hand, which was issued by 
United National Insurance Company (“United”),151 provided in part that 
“[the] insurance does not apply to any liability arising out of . . . ingesting 
or prolonged physical exposure to asbestos or goods of products containing 
asbestos [, or t]he manufacture, sale, storage or disposal of asbestos or 
goods or products containing asbestos.”152  The court found that the policy’s
“clear and unambiguous” language precluded United from being liable to 
the plaintiffs.153
As these last two cases help to demonstrate, the meaning of pollutant 
has and continues to be heavily litigated,154 and as will be shown later, this 
may prove to be one of the key issues in mixed-dust cases. 155
In summary, the most obvious effect, as well as the intent of insurers, 
behind the creation the “absolute” pollution exclusion clauses (which re-
mains the standard today),156 as well the more specific pollution exclusion 
ministrative proceedings if certain conditions are met.”).  Virtually all courts use the doctrine in one way 
or another.  See Eugene R. Anderson & Nadia V. Holober, Preventing Inconsistencies in Litigation with 
a Spotlight on Insurance Coverage Litigation: The Doctrines of Judicial Estoppel, Equitable Estoppel, 
Quasi-Estoppel, Collateral Estoppel, "MEND the Hold," "FRAUD on the Court" and Judicial and 
Evidentiary Admissions, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 589, 680 (1997-98) (“Most courts and the Restatement, 
Second, of Judgments apply collateral estoppel [when the proper conditions are met] . . . . “).  
149
 In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 96-968, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13383 (E.D. La. Sept. 2, 
1997). 
150
 See id. at *3-5.  There were actually three unique policies issued from three different carriers at 
issue, see id., but only the policy dealing with asbestos merits attention here. 
151
 Id. at *30.  United is an insurance carrier based out of Pennsylvania and handles many different 
types of policies.  See Pa. Ins. Dep’t, Company Information, available at 
http://www.insurance.state.pa.us/cgi/gfsearch.pl?level=2&item=gf1581 (last modified Feb. 10, 2006; 
last visited Feb. 26, 2006). 
152
 In re Asbestos Prods., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13383 at *30-31. 
153
 See id. at *31-32. 
154
 See Kurt C. Schultheis, Sullins v. Allstate: Lead Paint and the Growing Ambiguity of the Pollu-
tion Exclusion Clause, 27 U. BALT. L. REV. 475, 493-94 (1998) (noting that “the pivotal issue current 
courts often face [when dealing with CGLs] revolves around defining pollutants” and that 
“[c]onsiderable debate surrounds the legally operative meaning of the word [pollutant]"); see also infra 
note 159 (discussing issues related to the precise scope of pollution exclusion clauses). 
155
 See generally infra Parts II.C.1.e, III.A.2-4 (analyzing the key issue of what constitutes a 
pollutant within the meaning of pollution exclusion clauses, and how courts’ interpretation of the word 
might impact the filing of mixed-dust claims).  
156
 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.  Not only does the language of the 1986 “absolute” 
clause provide the basis for today’s pollution exclusion clauses, see id., but it also replaced prior ver-
sions upon and since its release, see, e.g., Mark G. Cooper, Survey, Annual Survey of Michigan Law, 
June 1, 1999–May 31, 2000: Insurance Law, 47 WAYNE L. REV. 601, 645 n.286 (2001) (stating that the 
“sudden and accidental exclusion has now nearly universally been replaced by the . . . ‘absolute pollu-
tion’ exclusion [clause].”); see also supra note 139 and accompanying text (noting that the absolute 
pollution exclusion clause continues to play a tremendous role in insurance policies today). 
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of the type just examined, was to eliminate any exceptions to the pollution 
exclusion by removing the “sudden and accidental” proviso.157  While the 
fairly straightforward language of the “absolute” pollution exclusion clause 
did not prove to be the “elixir” that insurers had hoped, it did serve to alle-
viate litigation concerning the clauses somewhat.158  But given that history 
is a great predictor of the future, the precise application and meaning of 
today’s policies, as was the case with the 1986 and other versions, will 
likely continue to be a source of much dispute and confusion in the 
courts.159  Since the 1986 revision remains the standard today,160 it is neces-
sary to examine under what circumstances courts have upheld the use of 
such clauses, and how they have been interpreted.  This, in turn, requires a 
look into general principles of insurance policy interpretation. 
    c)  Legal Principles Pertaining to Insurance Interpretation.  At the 
outset, it must be noted that insurance policies, generally speaking, are con-
sidered to be normal contracts, and thus are interpreted as any other con-
tract would be.161  As one court has noted, “[t]he goal of interpreting an in-
surance policy is to ascertain the intent of the parties as manifested by the 
language of the written instrument.”162 This means that courts tend to up-
hold insurance clauses as valid without regard to whether they are “fair” or 
not.163  The Alabama Supreme Court recognized the majority rule when it 
157
 See, e.g., Weaver, 674 A.2d at 977. 
158
 See Leiter, supra note 123, at 293-97 (listing interpretative issues in CGL policies that were 
eliminated or reduced by the adoption of the absolute pollution exclusion clause).  
159
 See, e.g., Bick, supra note 125, at 119 (noting that “[a] new universe of debate is on the rise, 
namely, the application of . . . the ‘absolute’ pollution exclusions to indoor releases of pollutants”); 
Leiter, supra note 123, at 295 (“[T]he [1986] revised pollution exclusion is not as absolute as the insur-
ance industry no doubt hoped. Several terms remain ambiguous, including the all-important terms ‘dis-
charge, dispersal, release or escape,’ and ‘pollutants.’”); see also text accompanying supra note 141; 
supra note 154 and accompanying text (stating that interpretative issues pertaining to pollution exclu-
sion clauses, such as the meaning of “pollutant,” remain a problem). 
160
 See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
161
 See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Zen Design Group, Ltd., 329 F.3d 546, 553 (6th Cir. 2003) (“In 
general, interpretation of insurance policies is governed by the same principles used to interpret ordinary 
contracts.”). 
162
 Riccio v. American Republic Ins. Co., 683 A.2d 1226, 1231 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (internal 
quotations omitted).  This is buttressed by the “general rule that an insurance company has the right to 
limit the coverage of a policy issued by it and when it has done so, the plain language of the limitation 
must be respected.” Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Fibreboard Corp., 227 Cal. Rptr. 203, 205 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1986). 
163
 See, e.g., Tate v. Allstate Ins. Co., 692 So. 2d 822, 824 (Ala. 1997) (“[A c]ourt must not rewrite 
[an insurance] policy so as to include or exclude coverage that was not intended.”). Of course, this does 
not mean that courts will blindly “rubber stamp” any insurance policy without regard to its content.  In 
particular, if a court deems that an insurance policy is contrary to public policy, which has been de-
scribed as “a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where it will carry 
you,” Story v. First Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 156 So. 101, 103 (Fla. 1934), then the policy will be de-
clared void, and thus unenforceable.  See, e.g., Burt v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 187 U.S. 362 (1902) 
(declaring life insurance policy procured by a man after he was convicted and sentenced to be executed 
to be against public policy, as his beneficiaries would benefit from his committing crimes); Tate, 692 So. 
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wrote that “[i]t is a GENERALLY accepted principle that if there is no ambi-
guity in an INSURANCE POLICY, a court is bound to enforce the policy as 
written and cannot ignore express provisions of the contract.”164  One court 
stated this more bluntly: 
A court may not "rewrite" an insurance contract, or construe clear and 
unambiguous language to mean other than what it says. An insured 
will not be heard to complain that his reasonable expectations were 
frustrated by policy terms which are clear and unambiguous.165
Although the preceding method of interpreting insurance agreements, 
which is typically referred to as “four corners” or formalistic approach,166
represents the majority rule,167 another widely used and competing system 
exists, known as the “reasonable expectations” (sometimes referred to as 
the “functional”) approach.168  As its name suggests, under the “reasonable 
2d 822 (holding that insurance providing coverage for award of punitive damages was contrary to public 
policy, as honoring it would have thwarted the rationale of punitive damages).   
Even so, courts are usually reticent to strike down insurance contracts on public policy grounds.  
See, e.g., T.H.E. Ins. Co. v. DeMutis, No. 98-1683, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1561, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 
17, 1999) (“Generally[,] insurance companies are free to decide what risks to undertake and what risks 
to reject. The power of courts to formulate pronouncements of public policy is sharply restricted; other-
wise they would become judicial legislatures rather than instrumentalities for the interpretation of law.”) 
(internal citations and quotations omitted). 
164
 Tate, 692 So. 2d at 824.  
165
 Riccio, 683 A.2d at 1231 (internal citations omitted); accord Fibreboard, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 205 
(“In reviewing the terms of an insurance policy, courts must interpret the words according to their plain 
meaning . . . and will not adopt a strained or absurd interpretation in order to create an ambiguity where 
none exists.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).   
166
 See, e.g., Collins v. Farmers Ins. Co., 822 P.2d 1146, 1159 (Or. 1991):  
Under [this] approach, the court looks to the “four corners” of the insurance policy . . . [and t]he 
insured is held to have read and to have understood the clear language of the policy. Extrinsic evi-
dence relating to the insurance contract may [only] be examined for the purpose of determining the 
parties’ intention to an objective analysis of the "four corners" of the contract.  
Id. at 1159 (internal citations omitted); see generally Keith A. Rowley, Contract Construction and 
Interpretation: From the "Four Corners" to Parol Evidence (and Everything in Between), 69 MISS. L.J. 
73 (1999) (providing background on the various interpretative techniques that courts employ when 
dealing with contracts, including the “four corners” approach).      
167
 See, e.g., Duff Supply Co. v. Crum & Forster Ins. Co., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6383, No. 96-
8481, at *12-13 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1997) (describing the “four corners” test in the context of insurance 
interpretation and stating that “[it] is the majority rule”). 
168
 See, e.g., Collins, 822 P.2d at 1159 (“Two competing decisional approaches to interpreting 
insurance contracts have evolved [, including] the ‘functional’ or ‘reasonable expectation’ approach.”); 
see also Jeffrey W. Stempel, Domtar Baby: Misplaced Notions of Equitable Apportionment Create a 
Thicket of Potential Unfairness for Insurance Policyholders, 25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 769, 848 (1999) 
(noting that “Minnesota, like many [other] states, has adopted in [some] form the ‘reasonable expecta-
tions’ approach [in interpreting CGL policies]”).  Significantly, comment e to section 211 of the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts (1981) seems to endorse the “reasonable expectation” method in inter-
preting insurance contracts, as it provides that “[a]part from government regulation, courts in construing 
and applying a standardized contract [including insurance policies] seek to effectuate the reasonable 
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expectation” method, “objectively reasonable expectations of applicants 
and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will 
be honored even though painstaking study of the policy provisions would 
have negated those expectations.”169 It could thus be said that the “reason-
able expectations” doctrine is more of a results-oriented, rather than a true 
interpretive, approach.170  Essentially, courts that have adopted the “reason-
able expectations” approach will go out of their way, even “bend over 
backward,”171 to find coverage for insureds, even though neither the policy 
nor the insurer intended for the coverage to exist.172
expectations of the average member of the public who accepts it.”  See also id. cmt. e, illus. 4 (suggest-
ing that policy-holder should be provided coverage under policy “without regard to his knowledge or 
understanding of the quoted language at the time of contracting”).   Even so, some courts, such as the 
Florida Supreme Court, adamantly oppose the doctrine: 
We decline to adopt the doctrine of reasonable expectations . . . . To apply the doctrine to an un-
ambiguous provision would be to rewrite the contract and the basis upon which the premiums are 
charged . . . . [Furthermore, c]onstruing insurance policies upon a determination as to whether the 
insured’s subjective expectations are reasonable can only lead to uncertainty and unnecessary liti-
gation . . . . [We also note that] after more than twenty years of attention to the doctrine in various 
forms by different courts, there is still great uncertainty as to the theoretical underpinnings of the 
doctrine, its scope, and the details of its application.  
Deni Assocs. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d 1135, 1140 (1998); see also Peter Nash 
Swisher, Symposium Introduction, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 6-7 (1998) (stating that “a number of . . . com-
mentators have been critical of the [doctrine], and [many] courts have expressly rejected [it]”).   
169
 Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions: Part I, 83 HARV.
L. REV. 961, 967 (1970).  The formal birth of the “reasonable expectations” doctrine has been attributed 
to then-professor of law (now Judge) Keeton’s influential article on the subject.  See Swisher, supra note 
168, at 1-8 (describing the origins of the controversial approach).       
170
 See Swisher, supra note 168, at 5 (describing the doctrine as being “result-oriented” as opposed 
to the “more traditional [f]ormalistic insurance contract analysis”).  It should also be noted that there are 
several variations to the approach, and the Arizona Supreme Court had an occasion to note some of the 
more common ones:  
1) Where the contract terms, although not ambiguous to the court, cannot be understood by the 
reasonably intelligent consumer who might check on his or her rights, the court will interpret them 
in light of the objective, reasonable expectations of the average insured. 
2) Where the insured did not receive full and adequate notice of the term in question, and the pro-
vision is either unusual or unexpected, or one that emasculates apparent coverage. 
3) Where some activity which [sic] can be reasonably attributed to the insurer would create an ob-
jective impression of coverage in the mind of a reasonable insured. 
4) Where some activity reasonably attributable to the insurer has induced a particular insured rea-
sonably to believe that he has coverage, although such coverage is expressly and unambiguously 
denied by the policy. 
Gordinier v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 742 P.2d 277, 283-85 (1987) (internal citations omitted).  
171
 Tracey Cordes, Who Gets the Bill?: Determining Insurers’ Duty to Defend and Indemnify 
Against Hazardous Waste Clean-up Costs Under General Liability Policies, 18 ENVTL. L. 931, 951 
(1988). 
172
 See generally Stephen J. Ware, Comment, A Critique of the Reasonable Expectations Doctrine,
56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461 (1989) (questioning the motives and correctness of the approach, and providing 
examples of how courts seemingly ignore express language in policies in their quests to find insurers 
liable for coverage).  For anyone seeking more material on the controversy regarding the reasonable 
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Returning now to the majority rule, a corollary of the “four corners” 
approach is that “[a] policy is not made ambiguous by the fact that the par-
ties interpret the policy differently.”173  And especially important for our 
purposes is that the rule applies equally to exclusion clauses found within 
insurance policies, i.e., as long as they are unambiguous and do not violate 
public policy, they will be upheld by courts employing the majority ap-
proach.174  In particular, many courts have upheld the “absolute” pollution 
exclusion clauses, such as the 1986 ISO one.175  According to one commen-
tator, at least two reasons exist for this:176 First, pollution exclusion clauses 
are necessary for insurance companies to be able to “continue to serve their 
function of providing economic stability to their insureds;”177 Second, the 
absence of the clauses might lead to intentional or careless pollution by 
insureds, because they would know that their insurer(s) would be obligated 
to defend them in any action related to pollutants.178  But at least one more 
reason exists: Placing the financial responsibility for pollution that may 
occur gradually over time on the insured makes sense, since the insured is 
the party that is in the most advantageous situation to guard against such 
pollution.179
Although the preceding makes it apparent that insurance contracts, in-
cluding pollution exclusion clauses, are, for the most part, upheld as written 
by the courts, the general rule is tempered by the constructive principle 
expectations doctrine, one excellent source to consult is Swisher, supra note 168 (providing general 
information on the doctrine and listing many law review articles and pieces both advocating and dispar-
aging its use).  
173
 Tate, 692 So. 2d at 824. 
174
 See, e.g., DeMutis, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1561, at *7 (“Explicit and unambiguous exclusions 
contained in insurance policies will be upheld.”); Knight v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 92-2244, 1993 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 3760, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 24, 1993) (“When [they are] clear and unambiguous, [insurance] 
exclusions are upheld.”). 
175
 See, e.g., Alcolac, Inc. v. California Union Ins. Co., 716 F. Supp. 1546, 1549 (D. Md. 1989) 
(“This pollution exclusion [clause] is just what it purports to be—absolute—and the Court perceives no 
reason why [the insurer] should be denied the benefit of its bargain with [the insured], as reflected in the 
insurance contract.”) (emphasis added); see also Schultheis, supra note 154, at 493 (noting that “[c]ourts 
tend to uphold and enforce pollution exclusion clauses”).  The 1986 clause is reproduced in the text 
accompanying supra note 140.       
176
 See Schultheis, supra note 154, at 493 (stating that courts principally rely on “two [unique] 
public policy rationales” to uphold pollution exclusion clauses). 
177
 Id.; see also Nancer Ballard & Peter M. Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of the Com-
prehensive General Liability Pollution Exclusion, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 610, 628 (1990) (stating that 
“[f]rom a public and regulatory point of view, CGL insurance is designed to promote business stabil-
ity”). 
178
 See Schultheis, supra note 154, at 493.  This concern was shared by the Supreme Court of 
North Carolina: “Relaxed vigilance is even more likely where the insured knows that the intentional 
deposit of toxic material in his dumpsters, so long as it is unexpected, affords him coverage. In this case, 
it pays the insured to keep his head in the sand.”  Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. 
Co., 340 S.E.2d 374, 381 (1986). 
179
 See Peerless, 340 S.E.2d at 381 (noting that the insured is “the party with the most control over 
the circumstances most likely to cause the pollution”). 
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known as contra proferentum180 that courts often employ when interpreting 
contracts.181  Essentially, this doctrine holds that any ambiguities in a docu-
ment are to be construed against the drafter, which in this context are obvi-
ously insurance companies.182  The rationale most often cited for this prin-
ciple is that since it is the drafting party that is in the most advantageous 
position to secure favorable terms for it and to reduce confusing language in 
the document that could be construed against the party’s interests, common 
sense and fairness dictate that any ambiguities should be resolved in favor 
of the non-drafting party.183  Because insurance policies, including even the 
so-called “absolute” pollution exclusion clauses, are often deemed ambigu-
ous,
184
 the contra proferentum principle is one of great importance in insur-
ance law.   Indeed, one authority has labeled it "the most familiar expres-
sion in the reports of insurance cases,”185 and virtually every state recog-
nizes the principle.186
Having examined in general terms some of the contract law principles 
that apply to the interpretation of insurance policies, we can now examine 
how courts have actually used these principles in resolving some of the 
more common issues that arise in connection with CGL policies, including 
the prevalent pollution exclusion clauses.187
180
 In Latin, literally “against the offeror.” Klapp v. United Ins. Group Agency, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 
447, 455 n.12 (Mich. 2003). 
181
 See, e.g., In re Celotex Corp., 196 B.R. 973, 1003 n.210 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (Labeling the maxim 
as “the most prominent rule of construction in insurance law”).   
182
 See Gregory T. Lawrence, Note, Sheets v. Brethren Mutual: Maryland’s High Court Miscon-
strues CGL to Cover Excluded Economic Loss Caused by Negligent Misrepresentation, 27 U. BALT. L.
REV. 189, 194 n.24 (1997) (describing the contra proferentum doctrine, particularly in the context of 
insurance policy interpretation).  
183
 See generally David S. Miller, Note, Insurance as Contract: The Argument for Abandoning the 
Ambiguity Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1849 (1988) (providing background on the creation and reasons 
for the contra proferentum doctrine).  The use of contra proferentum in the context of insurance policies 
is also sometimes justified on the ground that insurance policies essentially amount to contracts of 
adhesion, thus placing courts in the unenviable position of having to “police” the policies to prevent 
unfairness.  See Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 607 A.2d 1255, 1260 (N.J. 1992) (“[B]ecause 
insurance policies are adhesion contracts, courts must assume a particularly vigilant role in ensuring 
their conformity to public policy and principles of fairness.”); see Ware, supra note 172, at 1463-66 
(listing factors applicable to insurance policies that are seen by courts as indicia of adhesion contracts, 
and describing how courts have dealt with the problem).  
184
 See, e.g., supra notes 154, 159 and accompanying text. 
185
 2 GEORGE COUCH ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 15:74, 334 (rev. ed. 1984); see also note 
182 and accompanying text (noting that many courts rely on the doctrine when called on to interpret 
insurance policies). 
186
 See, e.g., Kunin v. Benefit Trust Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 538-39 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Accord-
ing to the law of California and, indeed, every other state as well as the District of Columbia, ambigui-
ties in insurance contracts must be construed against the insurer.”). 
187
 Addressing every possible contemporary interpretative issue stemming from pollution exclu-
sion (and there are possibly hundreds of them, see Leiter, supra note 123, at 283 n.120 (recognizing that 
“more than 800 disputes relating to pollution exclusion clauses in CGL policies have been litigated since 
1970”)) is neither possible nor necessary for the purposes of this Comment.  Rather, certain key issues 
2006]  Mixed Dust Claims—The Next Asbestos 139
    d)  Determining the Applicability of Pollution Exclusion Clauses to 
Particular Factual Situations.  As a preliminary matter, and contrary to 
what many might think, most cases involving pollution exclusion clauses 
do not hinge on the overall validity of the clauses;188 rather, courts are typi-
cally asked to resolve narrower issues, perhaps chief among which is the 
applicability of a clause to the fact pattern before it.189  Probably the thresh-
old issue that must be decided is whether the CGL policy in question is 
“occurrence-based” or “claims-made,”190 for this may single-handedly de-
termine whether and to what extent the insured will be provided coverage 
under the CGL.191  Under an occurrence-based policy, the policy that was in 
effect at the time of the event that gave rise to the claim will control, re-
gardless of when the insured posts its claim with the insurance carrier.192
Thus, for example, if a coal miner who between the years of 1975-1977 was 
exposed to pneumoconiosis-developing agents and who develops an illness 
several years later sues his employer in 1988, and the company then seeks 
indemnification or other assistance from the insurance carrier, the policy 
that would determine the extent, if any, of the carrier’s responsibility would 
be the one(s) in place between 1975-1977, the time of when the event that 
led to the claim took place.  
In contrast, under a claims-based structure, the policy that was in ef-
fect at the time the insured files its claims with the carrier will determine 
what coverage, if any, exists.193  This, of course, is desirable from the insur-
ance companies’ point of view in the context of pollution exclusion clauses, 
for the more recent the CGL policy is, the less likely it is that the insured 
will be provided coverage.194  So, to vary slightly our previous example 
involving the miner, if the mining company’s insurance policy was a 
claims-made one, then the controlling policy would have been the one in 
place in 1988.  This might very well preclude the carrier from being liable, 
as 1986 marked the year when the insurance industry began adopting the 
that seem to be litigated fairly frequently will be discussed in order to demonstrate, and possibly predict, 
how courts might resolve pollution exclusion cases.   
188
 See Schultheis, supra note 154, at 493 (“Litigation concerning the current pollution exclusion 
clause focuses less on the clause’s general validity or whether the facts supporting the underlying claim 
meet the definition of an occurrence.”). 
189
 See, e.g., supra notes 154, 159 and accompanying text (providing examples of issues courts 
must resolve in the context of pollution exclusion clauses). 
190
 See Julian, supra note 122, at 60 (“Determining the applicable policy begins by ascertaining 
whether the CGL policy is a claims made policy or an occurrence policy.”). 
191
 See id. (“This first step of determining [whether] the applicable policy [is based on the occur-
rence or claims made trigger] can be critical to evaluating the case for coverage.”). 
192
 See id.  Determining the exact time of the occurrence is not always so simple. See id. at 61. 
193
 See id. at 60. 
194
 See generally Part II.C.1.a (explaining various changes that CGL policies have undergone, 
including the reasons for them and how they have lessened insurers’ liability); see also Hartford, 509 
U.S. at 770-78 (describing interests of insurance companies and some of the tactics used to accomplish 
them). 
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“absolute” pollution exclusion clauses.195  Incidentally, the most prevalent 
type of policy today is “claims-made,”196 which has done wonders from the 
insurance carriers’ point of view to cut down on their liability towards in-
sureds.197  This decrease in liability was magnified by the insurance compa-
nies’ successful insistence on the inclusion of a retroactive provision that 
transformed former occurrence-based policies into claims-made ones.198
    e)  The Meaning of “Pollutant” Within Pollution Exclusion Clauses.  
Another important and oft-litigated interpretative issue associated with pol-
lution exclusion clauses is the meaning of “pollutant,”199 for this may very 
well determine whether the clause will serve to spare the insurer from li-
ability.200 Although the word is typically defined in CGL policies,201 courts 
nonetheless often find themselves faced with the task of determining 
whether a specific type of pollutant is covered under a CGL.202 One sub-
stance whose status as a pollutant has spawned considerable dispute is lead 
paint,203 but among the many other materials that have been alleged by in-
surance companies to be pollutants are carpet dye used in a private home,204
195
 See supra notes 123, 125, 156 and accompanying text.  
196
 See, e.g., Julian, supra note 122, at 59 (“Prior to the 1980s, most CGL policies were [occur-
rence-based].  Since then, virtually all CGL policies take the [claims-made] form.”); Ian Ayres and Peter 
Siegelman, The Economics of the Insurance Antitrust Suits: Toward an Exclusionary Theory, 63 TUL. L.
REV. 971, 974 (1989) (“New CGL forms are written on a claims-made rather than an occurrence ba-
sis.”).   
197
 See Ayres, supra note 196, at 976 (“The move to a claims-made form . . . eliminated the in-
sured’s coverage for prospective claims made after the expiration of a current policy, the so-called long 
tail risk.”); Julian, supra note 122, at 59 (“[E]stablishing an earlier occurrence policy as the applicable 
policy is more likely to result in coverage than under a later claims made policy.”); see generally Hart-
ford, 509 U.S. 764 (describing the insurance industry’s motivations for changing policies from being 
occurrence-based to claims-made, and the effects of this change). 
198
 Ayres, supra note 196, at 975: 
The movement to the claims-made form by itself would not have eliminated insurers’ liability for 
[all] past injuries . . . . To eliminate their responsibility for these past risks, however, insurance 
companies changed the CGL forms to include a retroactive provision. This provision ended insur-
ance companies’ liability for injuries that occurred before a certain date, typically the start of the 
policy term. 
Id.; see also Hartford, 509 U.S. at 771 (“[T]he [insurance industry] wanted the ‘claims-made’ policy to 
have a ‘retroactive date’ provision, which would further restrict coverage to claims based on incidents 
that occurred after a certain date.”).  
199
 See supra notes 154, 159 and accompanying text.  
200
 See Schultheis, supra note 154, at 494 (“[T]he pivotal issue current courts often face revolves 
around defining pollutants because once something is deemed a pollutant, coverage is barred by the 
absolute pollution exclusion clause.”); see also infra notes 213-17 (describing case where the court 
concluded that insurance carrier was not liable on a suit alleging injuries caused by exposure to lead 
paint after finding that lead was a “pollutant” within the meaning of the carrier’s insurance policy).   
201
 See supra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.    
202
 See supra notes 154, 159 and accompanying text. 
203
 See Schultheis, supra note 154 (analyzing cases that involved the issue of whether lead paint 
was a “pollutant” under insurance policies). 
204
 Regent Ins. Co. v. Holmes, 835 F. Supp. 579 (D. Kan. 1993). 
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flooring material used in a chicken processing plant,205 sand that blew from 
a construction site,206 and carbon monoxide expelled from a residential 
bathroom heater.207
As explained earlier, courts will apply general principles of contract 
interpretation when analyzing insurance policies,208 and pollution exclusion 
clauses are no exception.209  Accordingly, when required to interpret the 
definition of pollutant in a CGL policy, the first step courts take is to deter-
mine whether the policy is ambiguous.210 As it turns out, courts addressing 
the issue often find ambiguity in the language of CGL policies, particularly 
as to the meaning of pollutant.211  However, when a court finds that no am-
biguity in the policy exists and that the policy’s pollutant definition encom-
passes the substance in question, the insurance company will prevail.212
This was precisely the case in St. Leger v. American Fire & Casualty Insur-
ance Company,213 where the court had to determine whether lead paint was 
a pollutant under the applicable pollution exclusion clause.214  The court 
found that the pollution exclusion clause was not ambiguous, and that the 
clause’s definition of pollutant included lead paint.215  In support of its con-
clusion, the court found persuasive another opinion in which the court had 
found that “lead is a chemical that irritates and contaminates."216  The St. 
Leger decision was based on several additional factors, including that in-
gestion of dust in homes containing lead released by lead paint is the most 
common cause of lead poisoning in children and that Congress has identi-
205
 West American Ins. Co. v. Tufco Flooring East, Inc., 409 S.E.2d 692 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991). 
206
 Molton, Allen & Williams, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 95 (Ala. 1977). 
207
 Thompson v. Temple, 580 So. 2d 1133 (La. Ct. App. 1991).   
208
 See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
209
 See, e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 28 F. Supp. 2d 440, 445 (E.D. Mich. 1998) 
(court noting that “[t]he general rules of contract construction dictate[d]” its construction of the pollu-
tion exclusion clause in question). 
210
 See, e.g., id. at 444 (“If a contract is clear and unambiguous, the court must enforce the contract 
as written, according to its plain meaning, without looking to extrinsic evidence. It is improper for the 
court to ignore the plain meaning of the policy’s language in favor of a technical or strained construc-
tion.”) (internal citations omitted); see also supra notes 163-165 and accompanying text (recognizing 
this tendency by the courts). 
211
 See supra notes 154, 158-59, 187-88 and accompanying text (addressing some interpretative 
issues that arise in connection with CGL policies).  
212
 See, e.g., Schultheis, supra note 154, at 486-87 (“From the policy alone, the court must deter-
mine what acts by the insured entitle the insured to the duty to defend. If the policy’s terms are unambi-
guous, the inquiry ends.”); see also supra notes 164-65, 212, and accompanying text (noting that courts 
typically uphold unambiguous insurance policies and other contracts as written). 
213
 870 F. Supp. 641 (E.D. Pa. 1994).   
214
 See id. at 642-43.  A pollution exclusion clause virtually identical to the one at issue in the case 
is reproduced in supra note 140.   
215
 St. Leger, 870 F. Supp. at 643.   
216
 See id. at 643.  The case relied on by the court was Kaytes v. Imperial Casualty & Indemnity 
Company, No. 93-1573, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21256 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 7, 1994).      
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fied lead as a pollutant in the context of ambient air quality under the Clean 
Air Act.217
In contrast, when a court charged with interpreting the meaning of pol-
lutant in a pollution exclusion clause finds the term to be ambiguous, it will 
undergo a much more extensive analysis, namely through the admittance of 
extrinsic evidence.218  One substance whose status as a “pollutant” seems 
rife with ambiguity, and which is particularly relevant to this Comment, is 
asbestos.219  The courts seem to be torn on this issue, with some conclu-
sively finding that asbestos falls within the pollution exclusion clause,220
and others reaching the opposite conclusion.221  However, regardless of the 
substance at issue, courts tend to take a similar approach in determining the 
meaning of a pollution exclusion clause when the clause is said to be am-
biguous,222 and illustrative of such an approach is Owens-Corning Fiberglas 
Corporation v. Allstate Insurance Company.223  In Owens-Corning, the 
court, faced with determining whether asbestos fibers were a pollutant,224
217
 St. Leger, 870 F. Supp. at 643.  For more information on the Clean Air Act, see supra notes 
131-32 and accompanying text.
218
 See, e.g., Alabama Plating Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 690 So. 2d 331, 335 (Ala. 
1996) (“Given th[e] ambiguity in the ‘pollution exclusion [clause],’ we look to extrinsic evidence of the 
drafter’s intent.”); Schultheis, supra note 154, at 487 (“Only when the relevant portion of the insurance 
policy is ambiguous, must the court attempt to construe the meaning of the policy. In doing so, the court 
may look to extrinsic evidence proffered by the insurer or the insured.”).  The prerequisite of finding 
ambiguity before consulting extrinsic evidence is well established, for courts are loath to “create ambi-
guity where none exists.”  See Schilberg Integrated Metals Corp. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 819 A.2d 773, 794 
(Conn. 2003); see also supra notes 212 and accompanying text (stating that if a court interpreting a 
contract deems the document to be unambiguous, its duty ends).  
219
 See, e.g., Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 74 Ohio Misc. 2d 144, 149 (Ohio 
Ct. Com. Pl. 1993) [discussed in infra notes 223-239 and accompanying text] (“It . . . is far from certain 
whether asbestos constitutes an ‘irritant,’ ‘contaminant,’ or ‘pollutant’ within the meaning of the [pollu-
tion] exclusion.”); see also Sylvia Pena-Alfaro, Comment, The Toxic Mold Terrifying Texas: Mold’s 
Hold on the Insurance Industry, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 541, 564 (2003) (identifying asbestos as “the most 
litigated . . . among the indoor air pollutants that cause infirmities”). 
220
 See, e.g., American States Ins. Co. v. Zippro Constr. Co., 455 S.E.2d 133, 135 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1995) (“There is little question that asbestos constitutes a pollutant as unambiguously defined in the 
exclusion.”); see also supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text; infra note 237 and accompanying text 
(instances where asbestos was deemed to be a “pollutant”). 
221
 See, e.g., Maryland Cas. Co. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 794 F. Supp. 1206 (S.D.N.Y. 1991): 
[The court] find[s] the language of the provision ambiguous at least with regard to asbestos . . . . 
[N]othing in the provision suggests that asbestos falls within its terms. One would not usually as-
sociate asbestos with the substances listed in the exclusion, namely, smoke, fumes or waste. Those 
substances bear a closer relation to industrial pollution, the usual subject of the ordinary pollution 
exclusion. 
Id. at 1229 (internal citations omitted); see also supra note 219 (recognizing the confusion surrounding 
asbestos’ status as a pollutant within the meaning of pollution exclusion clauses). 
222
 See, e.g., supra notes 161, 186, 218 and accompanying text (providing examples of uniformity 
in courts’ approach to analyzing insurance contracts). 
223
 74 Ohio Misc. 2d 144. 
224
 See id. at 147. The definition of pollutant that was at issue was similar to the ones found in the 
text accompanying supra notes 135 and 142.   
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commenced its task by analyzing whether the pollution exclusion clause 
was ambiguous.225  The court answered this question in the affirmative after 
noting in part that first, asbestos was not defined anywhere in the exclusion, 
and second, that it was not undisputed that asbestos was to be considered a 
pollutant within the meaning of the policy.226  The court then recalled the 
principle of contra proferentum227 before moving on with its analysis.  Ini-
tially, the court very briefly discussed the pollution exclusion clauses’ his-
torical background, and noted that they were created mainly due to insurers’ 
concerns over “environmentally related losses and liabilities.”228
Next, the court turned to the main question before it, namely whether 
asbestos should be considered a “pollutant” under the clause as a matter of 
law.229  The court recognized that many other decisions had classified asbes-
tos as pollutants, but ultimately did not find these to be terribly persuasive 
because, in the court’s opinion, they were not on point.230  For instance, one 
of those decisions had dealt not with pollution exclusion clauses, but rather 
with the question of whether asbestos was a pollutant under the purview of 
a federal act.231  Another of the decisions had primarily focused on “whether 
the manner in which the material was released affected the applicability of 
the pollution exclusion.”232
225
 See Owens-Corning, 74 Ohio Misc. 2d at 148 (“Initially, [we note that] if the terms of a con-
tract are definite and certain, construction is unnecessary, and the court must apply the plain meaning of 
the contract . . . .”).  As mentioned earlier, determining whether a contract or insurance policy is am-
biguous is almost always the first step courts take in their analyses.  See supra note 212 and accompany-
ing text.   
226
 See Owens-Corning, 74 Ohio Misc. 2d at 149.  
227
 Id. at 149 ("A contract of insurance prepared by an insurer and in language selected by the 
insurer must be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer if the language 
used is doubtful, uncertain or ambiguous.") (quoting Am. Fin. Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 239 
N.E.2d 33, 35 (Ohio 1968)). 
228
 Owens-Corning, 74 Ohio Misc. 2d at 150 (emphasis in original).  The court additionally noted 
that “[i]t . . . would appear that general product liability matters were not a chief concern.”  See also 
supra note 125 and accompanying text (mentioning the prominent role that environmental pollution 
played in the proliferation of pollution exclusion clauses).  
229
 See Owens-Corning, 74 Ohio Misc. 2d at 150-52.  
230
 See id.
231
 See id. at 50.  That opinion was United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1205 (E.D. Pa. 
1989), and the act at issue there was the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act, see id. at 1206, which is currently codified in Title 42, Sections 9601-9675 of the United 
States Code (2004).  For readers who wish to explore this act further, which was mainly passed to ad-
dress the problem of hazardous waste sites, see Martin A. McCrory, Who’s on First: CERCLA Cost 
Recovery, Contribution, and Protection, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 3, 4 (1999), a good starting point would be 
Payson R. Peabody, Comment, Taming CERCLA: A Proposal to Resolve the Trustee “Owner” Liability 
Quandary, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 405 (1994), which explains, among other things, why the act was 
passed and the procedures it sets for filing claims against offenders.    
232
 Owens-Corning, 74 Ohio Misc. 2d at 151.  That case was Hydro Systems, Inc. v. Continental 
Insurance Company, 717 F. Supp. 700 (C.D. Cal. 1989). 
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Then, the Owens-Corning court turned to authorities that had reached 
the opposite conclusion, i.e., that did find asbestos to be a pollutant.233  The 
court began by noting that “plentiful authority” demonstrated that the pollu-
tion exclusion clauses were created mainly to limit liability relating to toxic 
waste causing environmental damage, rather than “ordinary” damage like 
bodily injury to persons.234  For example, the court quoted with approval 
Continental Casualty Company v. Rapid-American Corporation,235 which 
had found that the pollution exclusion clauses at issue did not apply to the 
plaintiffs’ actions because “[t]he underlying complaints before us do not 
allege environmental pollution of land, a water course, or the atmosphere, 
but simply bodily injury sustained by an ultimate user of a product."236                          
The Owens-Corning court then acknowledged that some opinions had 
explicitly classified asbestos as a pollutant within the meaning of pollution 
exclusion clauses,237 but dismissed these as unpersuasive because they 
“[we]re [not] supported by [either] case law [or] a compelling rationale.”238
The court proceeded to conclude that asbestos could not be categorized as a 
pollutant within the meaning of the exclusion.239
f)  Pollution Exclusion Clauses Relating to Environmental Pollu-
tion.  One final issue related to pollution exclusion clauses that comes up 
fairly often, and is thus worth addressing here, is the applicability of such 
clauses to incidents that are not related to environmental pollution.240 As 
233
 See Owens-Corning, 74 Ohio Misc. 2d at 152.  
234
 See id. at 151-52; see generally supra notes 125, 129, 131-34, 228 and accompanying text 
(describing some of the events that led up to the adoption of pollution exclusion clauses by the insurance 
industry). 
235
 581 N.Y.S.2d 669 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992).  
236
 Id. at 670. 
237
 See Owens-Corning, 74 Ohio Misc. 2d at 152.  One of those cases was Great Northern Insur-
ance Company v. Benjamin Franklin Federal Savings and Loan Association, 793 F. Supp. 259 (D. Or. 
1990), where the court found that “asbestos is a solid irritant,” id. at 263, and that asbestos “is . . . a 
contaminant within the meaning of the policy," id. at 264. 
238
 See Owens-Corning, 74 Ohio Misc. 2d at 153.   
239
 See id. at 158. The Owens-Corning court had to decide other issues, most of which are tangen-
tial to this Comment.  One of those was whether the manner in which the asbestos was released was 
relevant to interpreting the pollution exclusion clause, see id. at 152-55, which the court ultimately 
found that it was not, see id. at 154.  Another such issue was whether the asbestos had been released into 
the “atmosphere” (which was one of the elements of the pollution exclusion clause), see id. at 154-56, 
and after relying in part on a dictionary definition of atmosphere, id. at 155, the court concluded that the 
asbestos fibers in the case at bar had not been released into the atmosphere, see id. at 156.   
240
 See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 123: 
The most interesting current controversy over the [applicability] of [pollution exclusion clauses] 
involves circumstances in which an individual is injured by exposure to a toxic substance in a non-
environmental setting. Clearly, most circumstances in which a known pollutant discharged into the 
environment results in injury to exposed individuals fall squarely under the absolute exclusion. 
When an individual is injured in a more routine exposure to a toxic substance, however, some 
courts find that the resulting losses fall outside the scope of the exclusion. 
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noted earlier, it is widely accepted that the original purpose of pollution 
exclusion clauses, including that of the “absolute” clause, was to curtail 
insurance carriers’ liability for damages arising out of pollution or other 
environmentally related disasters.241  Somewhat expectedly, the courts are in 
disagreement on this issue: while the majority of them tend to uphold the 
clause in all applicable contexts,242 some courts have reached the opposite 
result.243
An opinion illustrative of the majority position is Assicurazioni Gen-
erali, S.p.A. v. Neil,244 where the court was faced with the question of 
whether a pollution exclusion clause precluded an insurance carrier from 
being liable to a claim filed against a hotel by former guests who had alleg-
edly suffered from carbon monoxide poisoning during their stay.245  The 
plaintiffs argued that the exclusion clause had been intended to eliminate 
coverage only for injuries arising out of environmental pollution, and not 
from the type of incident they alleged (carbon monoxide poisoning inside 
of a hotel).246 Specifically, the plaintiffs argued that carbon monoxide was 
not a “pollutant” within the meaning of the policy.247  In rejecting the plain-
tiffs’ contention, the court found that the language of the policy was “quite 
expansive . . . [and] exclude[d] from coverage the contamination of any
environment by pollutants that are introduced at any time, anywhere, in any
way."248  The court also found to be of significance other language of the 
policy that defined “contamination” as “any injurious condition arising out 
of the presence of pollutants, whether permanent or transient in any envi-
ronment."249 Based on the preceding language and the policy’s definition of 
pollutant, the court concluded that carbon monoxide, the substance alleg-
Id. at 295; see also supra note 159 and accompanying text (noting that the exact applicability of pollu-
tion exclusion clauses is often the source of debate and confusion).  This issue was also addressed by the 
court in Owens-Corning, 74 Ohio Misc. 2d 144, which was discussed in supra Part II.C.1.e.      
241
 See text accompanying supra note 234. 
242
 See, e.g., Leiter, supra note 123, at 296 n.188; see also supra notes 163-65 and accompanying 
text (noting that most courts will give effect to the plain meaning of clearly written contracts, including 
insurance policies).   
243
 See, e.g., Sullins, 667 A.2d at 623 (“It appears . . . that the insurance industry intended the 
pollution exclusion to apply only to environmental pollution. That supports our conclusion that [the 
pollution exclusion clause] . . . before us [does] not encompass[ ] lead paint, a product used legally and 
intentionally.”) (emphasis in original); see also supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text (describing 
case where court found that the plaintiffs’ complaints were not of the type for which the pollution exclu-
sion clauses at issue had been drafted).
244
 160 F.3d 997 (4th Cir. 1998). 
245
 See id. at 999. 
246
 See id. at 1000-01. 
247
 See id. at 1000. The policy defined pollutants as “smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, sounds, 
alkalies, chemicals, liquids, solids, gases, thermal pollutants and all other irritants or contaminations,” 
id. at 999-1000, which closely resembles the standard definition found in typical policies, see, e.g., 
supra note 224.  
248
 See Assicurazioni, 160 F.3d at 1000 (emphasis added). 
249
 Id. (emphasis added). 
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edly responsible for causing plaintiffs’ injuries, “plainly f[ell] within th[e] 
policy . . . . “250
As mentioned earlier, however, not every court agrees with the major-
ity approach.251  According to one commentator, decisions reaching an op-
posite conclusion from that adopted by the Assicurazioni court, i.e., that 
standard pollution exclusion clauses found in CGLs apply only to claims 
stemming from environmental or similar pollution-related events, and not to 
those involving “ordinary” personal injury or property damage, generally 
fall into two somewhat related categories.252  The first of these stems from a 
sense of public policy or fairness, where courts are tempted to curtail the 
reach of the pollution exclusion clauses in order to avoid potentially inequi-
table or absurd results,253 while the second occurs when courts rely on the 
“reasonable expectations” doctrine to construe the policies as applying only 
to “traditional” environmental pollution.254
One case exemplifying the first category is Westchester Fire Insurance 
Company v. Pittsburg,255 in which the court had to determine whether an 
insurance company had a duty to defend a city against a lawsuit filed by 
some of the city’s residents who claimed to have suffered injuries as a result 
of chemicals being sprayed by one of the city’s vehicles.256  The case hinged 
on whether the substance that had injured the plaintiffs was a “pollutant” 
within the meaning of the policy at issue.257
In ruling against the insurance company, the court stated that it was be-
ing asked by the insurance company “to stretch the definition of ‘pollutant’ 
beyond what a reasonable person placed in the position of the insured 
would have understood the word to mean."258  The court further noted that 
the insurance company’s proposed definition of pollutants would include 
“any substance or chemical that allegedly causes injury to any person,”259
and that this construction was unacceptable because “there is virtually no 
substance or chemical in existence that would not irritate or damage some 
250
 Id.
251
 See supra note 242 and accompanying text.   
252
 See Leiter, supra note 123, at 296-97.   
253
 See id. at 295-96.  That some courts have taken this stance is hardly surprising, as it has been 
said that “[t]he comprehensiveness of the absolute pollution exclusion almost defies belief.”  Id.; see 
also supra note 125 (addressing the burgeoning scope of pollution exclusion clauses).   
254
 See Leiter, supra note 123, at 296.  As mentioned earlier, the reasonable expectations doctrine 
is widely used by courts in interpreting insurance policies.  See, e.g., supra note 168 and accompanying 
text.  
255
 768 F. Supp. 1463.  See supra note 119 (mentioning the Pittsburg case). 
256
 See Pittsburg, 768 F. Supp. at 1465.  
257
 See id. at 1465-66, 1469.  The definition of pollutant at issue, id. at 1469, was similar to those 
previously analyzed, see, e.g., supra note 247.   
258
 Pittsburg, 768 F. Supp. at 1470. 
259
 Id.  
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person or property.”260  The court ultimately construed the term pollutant as 
“not merely any substance that may cause harm . . . , but rather [as] a toxic 
or particularly harmful material [that] is recognized as such in industry or 
by governmental regulators.”261
Illustrative of the second category is Nautilus Insurance Company v. 
Jabar.262  In Jabar, an insurance company maintained that it had no duty to 
defend a roofing company from a lawsuit brought by a woman who was 
allegedly injured after being exposed to fumes from the roofing company’s 
products at her place of employment, for the claim, the company argued, 
fell within the language of the insured’s pollution exclusion clause.263
Initially, the court found that the “total pollution exclusion clause is 
ambiguous . . . because an ordinarily intelligent insured could reasonably 
interpret the pollution exclusion clause as applying only to environmental 
pollution.”264  This conclusion was based in part on the court’s reasoning 
that certain terms found in the pollution exclusion clause, such as discharge, 
dispersal, release, and escape, were considered “terms of art” in environ-
mental law, and that such terms usually refer to damage or injury resulting 
from environmental pollution.265  According to the court, this had two ef-
fects: first, the insured, a roofing company, could not have been reasonably 
expected to think that its insurance policy would not have provided protec-
tion against the type of suit it was facing.266  Second, adopting the insurance 
company’s proposed interpretation of the policy would be unfair to the in-
sured, as this “would [have] render[ed] the [insurance] policy virtually 
meaningless to [the roofing company.]”267
260
 Id.  The court’s concern over the expansive breadth of pollution exclusion clauses was shared 
by the justices deciding Pipefitters Welfare Educational Fund v. Westchester Fire Insurance Company,
976 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1992), which involved an issue similar to that found in Pittsburg.  In interpreting 
the pollution exclusion language, the Pipefitters court noted that “[w]ithout some limiting principle, the 
pollution exclusion clause would extend far beyond its intended scope, and lead to some absurd results,” 
id. at 1043, and that “[in order t]o redress this problem, courts have taken a common sense approach 
when determining the scope of [the policies],” id.; see also supra note 125 (commenting on the seem-
ingly ever-widening exclusionary nature of the clauses).    
261
 Pittsburg, 768 F. Supp. at 1460. In reaching its conclusion, the court seemed to rely in part on 
the contra proferentum doctrine, because in construing the policy against the carrier, the court noted that 
the company “failed to define the limitations of its pollution exclusion clause in clear and explicit 
terms.”  Id. at 1471.  It will be recalled that courts often invoke this doctrine when an insurance policy 
or contract is deemed to be ambiguous.  See, e.g., supra notes 181, 186-87 and accompanying text.         
262
 188 F.3d 27 (1st Cir. 1999). 
263
 See id. at 28.  Predictably, the policy’s language was similar to that found in policies addressed 
earlier.  See, e.g., supra note 257. 
264
 Jabar, 188 F.3d at 30. 
265
 See id.  
266
 Id. at 30 (“[I]t is entirely reasonable that an ordinarily intelligent insured would understand this 
provision to exclude coverage only for injuries caused by traditional environmental pollution.”).   
267
 Id.  Ironically, it is likely that this is precisely what the insurance company wanted.  See supra 
note 125. 
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The court also found ambiguity in the policy’s definition of “pollut-
ant.”268  In the course of deciding the issue, the court noted that adopting 
“[a] purely literal interpretation of this language, without regard to the fact 
pattern alleged in the underlying complaint, would surely stretch the in-
tended meaning of the policy exclusion.”269   Thus, the court stated that it 
“agree[d] with those courts which have restricted the exclusion’s scope to 
only those hazards traditionally associated with environmental pollution,”270
in part because “[i]t seems far more reasonable that a policyholder would 
understand the exclusion as being limited to irritants and contaminants 
commonly thought of as environmental pollutants . . . . “271  Relying on this 
reasoning and on the contra proferentum principle,272 the court ultimately 
ruled in favor of the insured.273
The above discussion should serve to demonstrate the extent of insur-
ance law’s potential influence on the number of mixed-dust claims filed.  
The focus of the Comment will now turn to proposed federal legislation, in 
particular the Fairness in Asbestos Resolution Act, that could have a similar, 
or perhaps even more pronounced, impact on the filing of mixed-dust 
claims.   
D.   Potential Federal Legislation Dealing With Asbestos 
          1.    Previous Failed Attempts by Congress to Pass  
              Asbestos Legislation 
The number of mixed-dust pneumoconiosis claims filed might also be 
influenced by Congressional efforts to deal with asbestos.  In light of the 
"elephantine" problem of asbestos,274 Congress has tried numerous times, 
268
 See Jabar, 188 F.3d at 30.  It is not uncommon, of course, for courts to find ambiguity in the 
word “pollutant” within the meaning of pollution exclusion clauses.  See, e.g., supra notes 155, 160 and 
accompanying text.
269
 Jabar, 188 F.3d at 30. In connection with this point, the court approvingly quoted Pittsburg,
768 F. Supp. 1463, and Pipefitters, 976 F.2d 1037, which were discussed earlier in supra notes 255-61 
and accompanying text. 
270
 Jabar, 188 F.3d at 31.
271
 Id. (quoting Regional Bank of Colorado, N.A. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 35 F.3d 494, 
498 (10th Cir. 1994)).    
272
 Jabar, 188 F.3d at 31 (“It is a well-settled principle . . . that if the language of an insurance 
policy is ambiguous, it will be construed against the insurer in favor of coverage.”) (internal citations 
and quotations omitted).  As further proof of its prevalence, contra proferentum was also used by the 
court in the previous case examined, Pittsburg. See supra note 261.  
273
 Jabar, 188 F.3d at 31.
274
 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999).  In Ortiz, the Court had to determine 
whether the lower courts had properly granted class certification to plaintiffs suing a manufacturer for 
asbestos-related injuries.  See id. at 821.  This particular class was founded upon a “limited fund” set-
tlement, meaning that the aggregate of the claims outweighed the assets available under the fund.  See 
id. at 821, 828-30, 834.  The Court ultimately reversed the Fifth Circuit’s judgment and remanded the 
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albeit unsuccessfully, to pass legislation dealing with the issue.275  The first 
major attempt at this came in 1998 through the “Fairness in Asbestos Com-
pensation Act of 1998,”276 whose objective was to “establish legal standards 
and procedures for the fair, prompt, inexpensive, and efficient resolution of 
personal injury claims arising out of asbestos exposure, and for other pur-
poses.”277  The bill was sent to, and considered by, the Committee on the 
Judiciary of both the House and Senate, but ultimately nothing came of it.278
The following year, a new session of Congress, the 106th, considered a new 
variation of the 1998 proposed act entitled the “Asbestos Compensation Act 
of 2000,”279 but the bill never went beyond the floor of the House.280
Somewhat curiously, the next attempt by Congress to pass legislation aimed 
case to district court, in part because it found that some class members’ needs had not been given ade-
quate consideration.  See id. at 830-32.  In his brief concurring opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist la-
mented “the massive impact [that] asbestos-related claims [have had] on the federal courts,” id. at 865, 
and stated that “the elephantine mass of asbestos cases . . . cries out for a legislative solution,” id. (inter-
nal citations and quotations omitted).  Other courts and commentators share Justice Rehnquist’s senti-
ments about the asbestos situation.  See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 
1327 (5th Cir. 1985) (“There is no doubt that a desperate need exists for federal legislation in the field of 
asbestos litigation.”); Robin Jones, Comment, Searching for Solutions to the Problems Caused by the 
"Elephantine Mass" of Asbestos Litigation, 14 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 549, 565 (2001) (“Congress should act 
to create a commission to regulate the diagnosis of asbestos-related diseases.”). 
275
 See Georgene Vairo, Remedies for Victims of Terrorism, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1265, 1291 
(2002) (“There have been [many] bills proposed in Congress to deal with the asbestos litigation.”); 
Kenneth S. Rivlin & Jamaica D. Potts, Not so Fast: The Sealed Air Asbestos Settlement and Methods of 
Risk Management in the Acquisition of Companies With Asbestos Liabilities, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 626, 
643 (2003) (“For at least 15 years, Congress has reviewed asbestos legislation but has not adopted 
substantial reform except in the area of bankruptcy.”); see generally Mary S. Lyman & Letitia Cham-
bers, Asbestos Litigation: A History of Congressional Consideration 1977 to 2000, 18 MEALEY’S LITIG.
REP.:ASBESTOS, Sept. 17, 2003 (providing historical background information on Congress’ past failed 
attempts to legislate asbestos). 
276
 Virtually identical versions of the bill were introduced in both the Senate and the House of the 
105th Congress.  The Senate bill was S. 2546, while the House version was H.R. 3905.  For more in-
formation on S. 2546, see Jennifer S. Ray, Products Liability Update: Legislative Update - A Return to 
Modest Proposals, Findlaw.com, at http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Jan/1/130852.html (last visited Feb. 
26, 2006), while more information about H.R. 3905 may be found in George F. Sanderson, III, Note, 
Congressional Involvement in Class Action Reform: A Survey of Legislative Proposals Past and Present,
2 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 315, 320 (1998-99).     
277
 Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 105th Congress for S. 2546, at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d105:SN02546:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 20, 
2006) [hereinafter Status of S. 2546].  The aspirations of the House version, H.R. 3905, were identical to 
those of S. 2546.  Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 105th Congress for H.R. 3905, at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d105:HR03905:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 20, 
2006) [hereinafter Status of H.R. 3905]. 
278
 See Status of S. 2546, supra note 277; Status of H.R. 3905, supra note 277.
279
 H.R. 1283 (1999).  When it was introduced in the House, the bill was unimaginatively named 
the “Fairness in Asbestos Compensation of 1999,” but its title was changed by the time it was reported.  
See Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 106th Congress for H.R. 1283, at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/z?c106:H.R.1283: (last visited Feb. 20, 2006) [hereinafter Status of 
H.R. 1283] (listing two different bills under H.R. 1283); see Jones, supra note 274, at 549-50, 554-56 
(describing purposes and procedures of the proposed Act).   
280
 See Status of H.R. 1283, supra note 279.  
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at curbing the problem of asbestos litigation did not occur until earlier in 
2003, when several different bills were proposed; 281 among these are the 
Asbestos Claims Criteria and Compensation Act of 2003,282 the Asbestos 
Compensation Fairness Act of 2003,283 and the Fairness in Asbestos Injury 
Resolution Act of 2003, or “FAIR Act of 2003” for short.284
        2.    The FAIR Act 
More recently, the Senate had occasion to consider the FAIR Act of 
2004.285  In an oversimplified summary, the Act would create an administra-
tive division called the Office of Asbestos Disease Compensation within the 
Department of Labor that would be responsible for processing both existing 
and future claims involving asbestos-related injuries.  Under the non-
adversarial, no-fault scheme of the Act, a claimant would have to prove an 
entitlement to compensation under a preponderance of evidence standard, 
and any claims would be paid out from the so-called Asbestos Injury 
Claims Resolution Fund, which would be bankrolled by companies and 
insurers, that the Act would create. The Act would also establish the Advi-
sory Committee on Asbestos Disease Compensation that would be respon-
sible for, among other things, streamlining the filing and claims processing 
procedures and establishing benchmarks to ensure  the quality and integrity 
of the compensation program.   
281
 This does not mean that no type of asbestos legislation was considered during that period.  For 
example, in 2001, the House of the 107th Congress considered (but never passed) bill H.R. 1412, whose 
purpose was to exempt asbestos settlement funds from federal taxes.  See Congress, Bill Summary & 
Status for the 107th Congress of H.R. 1412, at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR01412:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).  And in 2002, the 
Senate of the 107th Congress pondered a (doomed) bill, S. 2641, that would have eliminated, to the 
extent that was possible, any products containing asbestos.  See Congress, Bill Summary & Status for 
the 107th Congress of S. 2641, at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107: 
SN02641:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).      
282
 S. 413, 108th Cong.  For a summary of the bill and other information, see Congress, Bill Sum-
mary & Status for the 108th Congress of S. 413, at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d108:SN00413:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).  
283
 H.R. 1586, 108th Cong. Further information about the bill may be found at Congress, Bill 
Summary & Status for the 108th Congress of H.R. 1586, at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR01586:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).  
284
 S. 1125, 108th Cong. See Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress of S. 1125,
at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:SN01125:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 20, 
2006) [hereinafter Status of S. 1125].  The FAIR Act of 2003 was approved by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee and sent to the full Senate for a vote, but the bill failed to pass.  See Anthony J. Sebok, The 
New Asbestos Bill, Part One: Why It Is Imperative That It Pass, FindLaw.com (July 14, 2003), at
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20030714.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2006) (“On July 10, the Senate 
Judiciary Committee voted to send a modified version of FAIR to the full Senate.”); Status of S. 1125.   
285
 S. 2290, 108th Cong.   
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As with Congress’ previous efforts to enact major asbestos-related leg-
islation, the FAIR Act of 2004 failed to pass.286  Even so, the Act, along with 
the other past attempts, evinces Congress’ determination to legislatively 
solve, or at least diminish, the “asbestos crisis.”  And because the FAIR Act 
garnered a lot of attention, even though it did not pass it is likely a good 
indication of the sort of legislation Congress might one day enact to deal 
with asbestos.  Thus, it is worth examining a few key aspects of the Act 
that, as will be addressed in greater detail later,287 could have a pronounced 
impact on mixed-dust claims.   
The first of these is the Act’s preemption of all other federal and state 
laws that would conflict with it.288  Relatedly, the Act would also render 
void “[a]ny agreement, understanding, or undertaking … with respect to the 
treatment of any asbestos claim that requires future performance by any 
party….”289  As if these features were not enough to establish the Act’s 
prominence in the realm of asbestos claims, the Act goes on to expressly 
foreclose the possibility of pursuing asbestos-related claims in other ven-
ues.
290
  Furthermore, any existing asbestos claims, except for those in which 
a plaintiff is seeking to enforce an already-entered judgment from which no 
more appeals may be had, are preempted by the act.291 Thus, the preemptive 
nature of the Act would likely impact the number of mixed-dust claims 
brought in the future.292
The other significant part of the Act that merits attention here is that 
depending on the type of disease alleged, the claimant must, as part of es-
tablishing his claim, demonstrate that his disease was not caused by sub-
stances other than asbestos.  Specifically, claimants alleged to be suffering 
286
 See Congress, Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress of S. 2290, at 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:SN02290:@@@D&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 20, 
2006).
287
 See generally infra Part III.B (discussing how the FAIR Act, if it were to become law, might 
lead to an increase in the number of mixed-dust claims filed). 
288
 S. 2290 § 403(a) (“The provisions of this Act shall supersede any and all Federal and State laws 
insofar as they may relate to any asbestos claim . . . .”). 
289
 Id. § 403(b)(1); see also id. § 403(b)(2) (“Any such agreement, understanding, or undertaking 
by any such person or affiliated group shall be of no force or effect, and no person shall have any rights 
or claims with respect to any of the foregoing.”). 
290
 Id. § 403(c) (“The remedies provided under this Act shall be the exclusive remedy for any 
asbestos claim . . .  under any Federal or State law.”); see also id. § 403(d)(1) (“No asbestos claim . . .  
may be pursued and no pending asbestos claim may be maintained in any Federal or State court, except 
for enforcement of claims for which an order or judgment has been duly entered by a court that is no 
longer subject to any appeal or judicial review before the date of enactment of this Act.”).  
291
 Id. § 403(d)(3) (“Any action asserting an asbestos claim . . .  in any Federal or State court, 
except actions for which an order or judgment has been duly entered by a court that is no longer subject 
to any appeal or judicial review before the date of enactment of this Act, is preempted by this Act.”).   
292
 See generally infra Part III.B (analyzing the potential that this feature of the FAIR Act might 
have on the filing of mixed-dust claims).  
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from non-malignant Level III,293 non-malignant Level IV,294 and non-
malignant Level V295 asbestos diseases must all provide medical documen-
tation “excluding other more likely causes of [his or her] pulmonary condi-
tion.”296  Just as with the Act’s preemptive character just examined, it is 
likely that this aspect of the Act would affect the filing of mixed-dust 
claims.297
III.  POTENTIAL IMPACT OF INSURANCE POLICY EXCLUSIONS AND 
ASBESTOS LEGISLATION SIMILAR TO THE FAIR ACT ON THE NUMBER OF 
MIXED-DUST CLAIMS FILED
As suggested by the earlier discussion, the current state of insurance 
policies, especially as they apply to claims alleging injuries related to asbes-
tos exposure, might lead to an increase in the number of asbestos lawsuits 
filed under the rubric of mixed-dust claims.  The passing of legislation deal-
ing with asbestos claims, such as the FAIR Act, might have a similar effect 
on asbestos claims being filed as mixed-dust ones.  This section will first 
analyze in further detail why some would-be asbestos plaintiffs might be 
motivated to file mixed-dust claims instead, and will then examine some 
problems that they might face in their attempts. 
A.    How Insurance Law as It Currently Stands Can Affect Asbestos Claims 
        1.    Policies Containing Specific Asbestos Exclusion Clauses 
For plaintiffs who are considering filing lawsuits alleging injury 
caused by asbestos exposure, the most formidable obstacle before them 
from an insurance standpoint, even more so than the generic “absolute” 
pollution exclusion clause,298 is policies that specifically exclude asbestos 
from coverage.299  As was noted earlier, aside from the pervasiveness of 
pollution exclusion clauses in general,300 it is becoming increasingly more 
common for insurance companies to include language in their policies that 
excludes from coverage specific substances,301 and particularly relevant to 
this Comment are those policies that single out asbestos.   
293
 See S. 2290 § 121(d)(3). 
294
 See id. § 121(d)(4).  
295
 See id. § 121(d)(5). 
296
 See id. §§ 121(d)(3)(D)(ii), 121(d)(4)(D)(ii), 121(d)(5)(D)(ii). Expectedly, an evidentiary 
requirement that is common to all claims under the Act is a showing of “exposure” to asbestos.  See id. § 
121(d) (categorizing the different levels of compensable diseases).         
297
 See generally infra Part III.B (discussing this possibility in more detail). 
298
 See supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
299
 See, e.g., supra notes 147, 152 and accompanying text. 
300
 See supra notes 123, 125, 156 and accompanying text. 
301
 See, e.g., supra notes 143, 147, 152 and accompanying text. 
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It is, of course, difficult to predict in a vacuum how or whether a par-
ticular insurance policy might apply to any given set of facts,302 especially 
since the language of insurance policies frequently change.303  Even so, be-
cause it is likely that a policy specifically excluding asbestos from coverage 
would be declared enforceable304 and, obviously, applicable to asbestos,305
there would be an obvious incentive for a plaintiff that is considering filing 
a personal injury claim to try to get around such an exclusion, possibly by 
simply not alleging asbestos as an injury-causing agent in the complaint, so 
that the insurance carrier(s), as well as the defendant(s), might be held li-
able.  This is because many firms are either on the brink of or have already 
declared bankruptcy as a result of asbestos litigation,306 and so even if a 
plaintiff were to win a judgment for his asbestos-related injuries, he might 
not be able to collect any money from the defendant(s) directly.     
302
 See, e.g., Consumers County Mut. Ins. Co v. PW & Sons Trucking Inc., 307 F.3d 362, 365 (5th 
Cir. 2002) (stating that “[w]hen interpreting an insurance policy, [the court] . . . cannot simply consider 
its terms in the abstract [, but r]ather [should] consider the policy as a whole”) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted); see Donald A. Winslow, Tax Avoidance and the Definition of Insurance: The Con-
tinuing Examination of Captive Insurance Companies, 40 CASE W. RES. 79, 104-05 (1990) (describing 
case where a court “consider[ed] all the facts and circumstances in determining whether . . . insurance 
[existed]”).  This is so, notwithstanding that “[m]ost CGL policies are virtually identical[, since they are 
based on] standard forms [that are] traditionally drafted by insurance industry trade associations.”  Brian 
S. Rudick, Comment, The Pollution Exclusion Clause in Pennsylvania: Revisiting Techalloy v. Reli-
ance, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 885, 891 (1995).  See also supra notes 117, 156 and accompanying text (noting 
the characteristic uniformity among CGL policies). 
303
 See, e.g., supra note 122 and accompanying text. 
304
 See, e.g., Pittston Co. Ultramar Am. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 124 F.3d 508, 520 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(“[W]hen the terms of an insurance contract are clear, it is the function of a court to enforce it as written 
and not [to] make a better contract for either of the parties.”); see also supra notes 163-65, 175, 242 and 
accompanying text (recognizing that courts typically enforce policies without modifying them).  But see 
supra note 163 (noting that courts do have the power to render certain insurance policies void on the 
ground that they are contrary to public policy). 
305
 Because courts generally will uphold insurance policies that are written clearly, see, e.g., supra 
note 165 and accompanying text, it is almost inconceivable that a court would find a policy explicitly 
excluding asbestos from coverage to be inapplicable to a claim alleging injuries stemming from asbestos 
exposure.  See, e.g., Fibreboard, 227 Cal. Rptr. at 205 (“The insurance [policies] eliminated coverage 
for asbestos-related injuries arising from exposure . . . [, and w]hen a policy of insurance in plain lan-
guage excludes a particular peril from coverage that language must be respected."); supra notes 149-53 
(similar case); cf. Carey Canada, Inc. v. Columbia Casualty Co., 940 F.2d 1548 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding 
possible ambiguity in the term “asbestosis” as used in a policy’s exclusion clause, and remanding case 
for a determination as to whether the term encompassed just asbestosis, or all asbestos-related diseases); 
supra notes 144-48 (discussing similar issue of ambiguity as to the term asbestosis). 
306
 See Rivlin, supra note 275, at 642-43 (describing the bankruptcy of companies vis-à-vis the 
asbestos problem); see also H. Ward Classen, An Investigation into the Statute of Limitations and Prod-
uct Identification in Asbestos Litigation, 30 HOW. L.J. 1, 21 (1987) (noting that “many asbestos manu-
facturers c[ould] no longer afford to pay [asbestos] claims” in as early as 1987).  Because of this, many 
asbestos plaintiffs have taken to suing smaller or local companies or defendants, even those who might 
only have been tangentially linked to the plaintiffs’ injuries, such as a hardware store that at one point 
might have sold a product containing asbestos or an independent contractor that possibly used asbestos-
containing material in his work.  See Love & Goldberg, supra note 8, at 18. 
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2.    Possible Duties That Insurers Might Have in Relation to  
               Mixed-Dust Claims Filed 
This last point leads to the related issue of what it would mean for the 
parties involved in an asbestos or mixed-dust lawsuit if it were determined, 
as a preliminary matter, that the exclusion clause in an insurance policy did 
not alleviate the carrier from any responsibility in the suit; in other words, 
the insurance company would not be “let off the hook,” although how and 
for what the insurer might be held liable would naturally depend on the 
outcome of the case.  Of course, it is hard to predict the exact nature and 
extent of an insurance company’s liability in any given case, since this 
would depend on what the policy provided and the facts of the case.  Even 
so, one analyzing in general terms the duties of an insurance carrier under 
the typical business CGL policy307 that could be implicated in a claim alleg-
ing diseases caused by asbestos or mixed-dust might find two distinct cate-
gories, those being to defend the claim and to indemnify the insured defen-
dant from any adverse judgments against it.308
To determine whether either duty exists, a separate analysis for each 
type is required,309 and this process can be complex in asbestos-related 
cases.
310
 A detailed examination of the exact contours of the analyses is not 
307
 See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
308
 See, e.g., Schultheis, supra note 154, at 476, 479-80: 
Insurers owe their insureds two contractual duties—the duty to defend and the duty to indemnify . 
. . . Pollution exclusion clauses attempt to limit or eliminate the[se duties] . . . against claims in-
volving pollution.  [However, w]hen the . . . pollution exclusion clause [is deemed to] not apply, . . 
. the insurer may have a duty to defend and indemnify the insured. 
Id.
309
 See, e.g., Enron Oil Trading & Transp. Co. v. Underwriters of Lloyd’s of London, 47 F. Supp. 
2d 1152, 1160-61 (D. Mon. 1996) (“It is well settled that the duty to indemnify is not necessarily coex-
tensive with the duty to defend.  On the contrary, an insurer’s duty to defend is conceptually distinct 
from and legally independent of its duty to indemnify . . . .”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).  
310
 See, e.g., Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and Political Issues Raised by Asbestos 
Litigation (Part 2 of 2), 36 VAND. L. REV. 573, 709-10 (1983) (“Ascertaining which, if any, insurance 
companies has incurred the duty to defend and indemnify an asbestos manufacturer is difficult because 
many different insurers may have insured a manufacturer during the progress of a claimant’s asbestos-
related disease.”).  An issue that was alluded to earlier in supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text, 
and which is probably the single most complicated aspect of determining an insurer’s duty, is whether 
the injury or incident at the heart of the plaintiff’s claim occurred during the coverage period, or whether 
the policy was “triggered.”  See generally James M. Fischer, Insurance Coverage for Mass Exposure 
Tort Claims: The Debate Over the Appropriate Trigger Rule, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 625 (1997) (describing 
the issue of triggering vis-à-vis insurance policies and the inherent difficulties related thereto, especially 
as it applies to exposure claims filed in tort).  For our purposes, it is enough to say that courts have 
adopted several types of tests to determine if and when an insurance policy was triggered, including the 
“manifestation theory,” which looks at the time the victim became aware of the problem, the “injury in 
fact theory," which asks when actual damage or physical injury occurred, the “exposure theory,” which 
focuses on the time that the victim was first exposed to the injury-causing agents, and the "continuous" 
or "multiple" trigger theory, which contemplates exposure at several different spans of time.  See Inland 
Waters Pollution Control v. Ins. Co., 997 F.2d 172, 183 (6th Cir. 1991) (describing the above tests).  As 
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needed here, and is best left to be addressed by other sources.311  It suffices 
to say that the duty to defend, as its name suggests, imposes an obligation 
on the insurance carrier to provide legal representation to a defendant being 
sued,312 while the duty to indemnify makes the insurer responsible for the 
actual judgment entered against a defendant that falls within the coverage 
of the policy.313  Since in most cases, defending against a lawsuit would 
probably be cheaper than paying the entire resulting judgment, it is perhaps 
not surprising that a duty to defend is much more likely to be found than a 
duty to indemnify.314  A further difference between the two duties is at what 
point their existence is determined; the decision regarding a duty to defend 
is made at the beginning of the lawsuit, while the one regarding a duty to 
indemnify is made after a verdict or other decision is reached.315
As it relates to this Comment, the practical effect of how courts deter-
mine whether there is a duty to indemnify or defend is that, at a minimum, 
an insurance carrier who has issued a CGL would likely be obligated to 
defend an insured who is being sued for injuries stemming from asbestos or 
other similar pollutants,316 notwithstanding that the policy might contain a 
might be expected, the appropriateness of each type of test depends on which of the various trigger 
manifestations is provided for in the policy at hand.  See, e.g., YWCA v. Allstate Ins. Co., 275 F.3d 
1145, 1151 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“Examination of the language in the [i]nsurers’ policies indicates the 
appropriateness of applying a [certain] trigger.”).  It is not a mere coincidence that most of today’s CGL 
policies are of the “claims-made” variety. See supra notes 196-98 and accompanying text (documenting 
insurers’ interests in issuing claims-made policies and some of their attempts to accomplish that goal).  
311
 See Schultheis, supra note 154, at 479-89 (describing how some courts determine whether 
there is a duty to defend); Enron Oil Trading, 47 F. Supp. 2d at 1160-61 (explaining process to impose a 
duty to indemnify on an insurer, and how it differs from the one used to find a duty to defend).   
312
 See generally Susan Randall, Redefining the Insurer’s Duty to Defend, 3 CONN. INS. L.J. 221 
(1996-97) (describing duty to defend and raising typical questions that arise in association with it).  
313
 See Cyprus Amax Minerals Co. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 74 P.3d 294, 299-302 (Colo. 2003) 
(explaining duty to indemnify and some common issues related to it).  
314
 See, e.g., Ethicon, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 737 F. Supp. 1320, 1330 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(“[T]he duty to indemnify is far narrower than the duty to defend.”); see also Cyprus, 74 P.3d at 299 
(“Because the duty to defend encompasses any potential claims raised by the facts and the duty to in-
demnify relates to the actual liability imposed, this court has considered the duty to defend to be a 
broader concept than the duty to indemnify.”); Burt Rigid Box, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., 302 
F.3d 83, 97 (2d Cir. 2002) (“An insurer’s duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify . . . . 
Indeed, an insurer has a duty to defend even if . . . the claim may be meritless or not covered [by the 
policy].”).  
315
 See Ethicon, 737 F. Supp. at 1330, where the court, in deciding whether an insurance provider 
was liable for indemnifying its insured, stated: 
Whereas an insurer’s duty to defend is viewed from the beginning of a lawsuit, the duty to indem-
nify is decided after the completion of litigation. It is a retrospective, rather than a prospective, de-
termination. The [c]ourt must . . . determine  whether the injury found, and the cause of action de-
cided, fit within the insurance policy at issue. . . . [For example, i]n the instant case, the [c]ourt 
must decide if the findings of the . . . jury, which resulted in a total verdict of almost $12 million 
for [the defendant in the original action], arose from the type of injury covered by the [insurance] 
policies.
316
 This is not only because courts tend to liberally find a duty to defend, see supra note 314 and 
accompanying text, but also because exactly what constitutes a pollutant within the meaning of a policy 
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specific317 or generic318 pollution exclusion.  Whether the insurance carrier 
would ultimately have to indemnify any adverse judgments entered against 
the insured is harder to predict,319 but even if the insurer’s duty were limited 
to defending the claim, this would still, of course, be helpful to a defendant.  
In addition, the plaintiff may be further prejudiced if only a duty to defend, 
and not to indemnify, is found, because the defendant(s) in the case might 
not be able to pay a judgment in favor of the plaintiff.320                          
   3.    Applicability of Pollution Exclusion Clauses to Mixed-Dust    
                Claims Alleging Asbestos 
Another interesting question that is raised in conjunction with the ap-
plicability of pollution exclusions to mixed-dust claims is what would hap-
pen if asbestos were only one of several substances alleged by the plaintiff 
to have caused his injuries.  Such a scenario is hardly only an academic 
point, for mixed-dust claims, by definition, involve the allegation of at least 
two injury-causing substances,321 and there is a good chance that asbestos 
could be one of those substances.322 It is hard to predict what courts faced 
with such a situation would do, but two outcomes are likely, depending on 
the details of the insurance policy: if the policy contained exclusionary lan-
guage dealing specifically with asbestos,323 it is probable that courts would 
find that an allegation of asbestos in the complaint would be enough to trig-
ger the policy’s exclusion clause, and hence the insurance carrier would be 
devoid of liability.  It is also possible, although unlikely, that the plaintiff 
might be allowed to proceed with his claim after having been given a 
chance to modify the complaint to eliminate any references to asbestos.   
is a question that comes up frequently, and one that courts often struggle to answer.  See, e.g., supra
notes 154, 159 and accompanying text.  But see Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Ropka, 536 A.2d 
1214, 1218 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (“It is generally true that an insurer has no duty to defend a cause 
of action against an insured if that cause of action asserts liability on the part of the insured that comes 
within an exclusion in the insurance policy.”); Leiter, supra note 123, at 296 (“The many cases in which 
courts find the absolute pollution exclusion to be clear and unambiguous far outnumber the few in which 
courts choose . . . to grant coverage for the insured.”).    
317
 See, e.g., supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
318
 See, e.g., supra note 140 and accompanying text.  
319
 See supra note 314 and accompanying (noting that courts are more willing to find a duty to 
defend than to indemnify).   
320
 See supra note 306 and accompanying text. 
321
 See text accompanying supra note 5.   
322
 See, e.g., Mark A. Koppel, Case Notes, Gilliam v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories: An Intro-
duction to Fear-of-Disease Damages in Arkansas, 48 ARK. L. REV. 555, 567 (1995) (“Possibly the most 
common examples of toxic tort litigation are the asbestos cases. It has been estimated that the potential 
number of lawsuits arising from work-related asbestos exposure could be in the millions.”); see also 
supra note 219 and accompanying text (noting the prominent role that asbestos plays in litigation in-
volving pollution exclusion clauses).   
323
 See, e.g., text accompanying supra note 152. 
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If, however, the policy only has a general pollution exclusion clause,324
predicting the outcome would be harder, for one of two things would be 
possible, depending on whether asbestos were deemed by the court to be a 
“pollutant” within the meaning of the clause:325 if the court found that as-
bestos is indeed a pollutant, then, as explained above, the pollution exclu-
sion clause would most likely shield the insurance carrier from liability, 
unless the plaintiff were given the opportunity to proceed with his claim 
sans the asbestos allegation; if the court reached the opposite conclusion, 
however, then the extent, if any, of the insurance carrier’s liability would 
likely depend on whether the other injury-causing substances alleged by the 
plaintiff were classified as pollutants within the meaning of the pollution 
exclusion clause.326
 4.    Effect of Pollution Exclusion Clauses on Mixed-Dust Claims 
               Alleging at Least One Pollutant Within the Meaning of the   
               Clause 
A similar dilemma would arise in a situation where a plaintiff alleges 
that his injuries were caused by several substances, and a court were to find 
that only one or some of the substances listed in the complaint were “pol-
lutants” within the meaning of the policy’s pollution exclusion clause at 
issue.  For instance, if a plaintiff alleged that he was suffering from mixed-
dust pneumoconiosis caused by asbestos, talc, lead paint, and beryllium, 
and a court were to conclude that only asbestos and beryllium were pollut-
ants, it is unlikely that the court would dismiss the plaintiff’s suit, since 
presumably he could still make a prima facie case with the other substances 
not falling within the purview of the pollution exclusion clause (talc and 
lead paint in this hypothetical case); rather, the court would probably allow 
the plaintiff the opportunity to modify his complaint accordingly.  
B.     Possible Ramifications of Legislation Like the FAIR Act  
        Being Passed 
As mentioned earlier, Congress did not enact the FAIR Act of 2004.327
Even so, given the high number of similar past attempts328 and the opinion 
324
 See, e.g., supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
325
 The reader may recall that a disagreement exists among many courts as to whether asbestos 
should be qualified as a pollutant under pollution exclusion clauses.  See, e.g., supra notes 219-21 and 
accompanying text.    
326
 See, e.g., supra note 212 and accompanying text (noting that an insurer’s liability is often 
determined by the court’s interpretation of the word “pollutant” in the policy’s pollution exclusion 
clause). 
327
 See text accompanying supra note 286.  
328
 See generally supra Part II.D.1 (discussing failed asbestos legislation proposals).   
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of many influential persons like Chief Justice William Rehnquist that the 
asbestos situation as it stands can only be remedied through a legislative 
solution,329 it is not far-fetched to think that some form of legislation relat-
ing to asbestos claims will one day be passed by Congress.  Furthermore, 
because the aim of such legislation would be to prevent persons from filing 
asbestos-related lawsuits, a corresponding increase in the number of asbes-
tos claims filed under the rubric of mixed-dust is possible.   
This may be illustrated by using the FAIR Act of 2004 as an example.  
Had the Act passed, an increase in mixed-dust claims might have resulted 
because the Act would have served as the exclusive means for persons suf-
fering from asbestos-related ailments to receive compensation, since the Act 
would prohibit any asbestos claims from being filed in state or federal 
courts.330  Furthermore, the Act would have negated almost all settlements 
and claims related to asbestos that are already in existence.331  Simply put, if 
the FAIR Act or similar legislation were to pass, a plaintiff suffering from 
asbestos-related ailments who, for whatever reason,332 wanted to bring his 
claim in the form of a tort lawsuit in the court system rather than as an ad-
ministrative claim would have had to either forego his claim altogether, or 
somehow shape his claim in such a way as to fall out of the legislation’s 
scope.  That is where mixed-dust claims come in.   
As explained earlier, one of the things that a claimant must do to re-
ceive compensation for certain diseases under the FAIR Act is to establish 
that his injures were caused either exclusively or heavily by asbestos.333
The significance of this is that some plaintiffs whose injuries were at least 
partly caused by substances other than asbestos would probably not be eli-
gible to apply for compensation under the FAIR Act, and so would look 
toward filing their claims elsewhere, that is, in the courts.  This means that 
someone who is contemplating filing a lawsuit to recover damages for his 
asbestos-related afflictions should at least consider the possibility of mold-
329
 See supra note 274 and accompanying text.   
330
 See supra notes 290-91 and accompanying text. 
331
 See supra note 289 and accompanying text. 
332
 One such reason might be a belief that the amount available for recovery would be lower than 
in a lawsuit. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employes Division, BMWE Legislative 
Issues – 108th Congress (2004), available at http://www.bmwewash.org/Legislative%20Issues/ 
2004%20-%2003-04%20Legis%20Issues.htm (last visited Feb. 26, 2006) (describing the FAIR Act of 
2004 as a “partisan measure that fails to provide asbestos disease victims fair and certain compensa-
tion”).  This would be particularly true if mixed-dust lawsuits were considered to be in the nature of 
either products liability or toxic tort claims, as they likely would be, see, e.g., infra note 405; infra note 
401 and accompanying text, because damage awards in products liability cases and toxic tort cases are 
notoriously large.  See, e.g., Neil Vidmar, The American Civil Jury for Auslander (Foreigners), 13 DUKE
J. COMP. & INT’L L. 95, 112 (2003) (“[P]roducts liability verdicts [routinely] involve very large 
awards.”); Scott A. Steiner, The Case Management Order: Use and Efficacy in Complex Litigation and 
the Toxic Tort, 6 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENV. L. & POL’Y 71, 77 (1999) (“Damages in toxic tort cases are 
renowned for their enormity.”).     
333
 See supra notes 293-96 and accompanying text.   
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ing his complaint to allege diseases other than asbestos as the cause of his 
injuries so as to escape the purview of the FAIR Act.  In other words, limi-
tations like those in the FAIR Act on what types of injury-causing sub-
stances are compensable might lead to a corollary increase in the number of 
asbestos claims filed under the rubric of mixed-dust.  Conversely, if legisla-
tion like the FAIR Act were to indeed become law, it is likely that some 
would-be mixed-dust and asbestos plaintiffs would find the no-fault scheme 
or other features to be attractive,334 and for that reason might mold their 
claims accordingly so as to ensure eligibility under the Act, meaning that 
the only injury-causing substance alleged would be asbestos.      
IV. CAUSATION ISSUES IN MIXED-DUST CLAIMS
The preceding discussion on the potential impact that insurance law 
and future asbestos legislation may have on the number of mixed-dust 
claims filed would not be complete without addressing the role that the all-
important issue of causation would play in such cases.  Having said that, an 
exhaustive look at every facet of the problem is not needed here; rather, this 
section will first address what are likely to be some of the most prominent 
causation issues associated with mixed-dust cases, and will then conclude 
by offering some possible solutions to those issues.      
A.    Basic Causation Issues Applicable to Mixed-Dust Claims 
At its most basic, causation in the tort realm simply refers to the gen-
eral requirement that in order for a plaintiff to recover damages, he must 
establish to the satisfaction of the court that his injuries were a result of the 
defendant’s actions.335  Naturally, the difficulty of meeting this requirement 
334
 See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing positive and negative aspects of filing 
workers’ compensation claims as opposed to suing in tort).  In fact, some attorneys always favor settling 
their cases.  See, e.g., Bruce L. Hay, Some Settlement Effects of Preclusion, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 21, 32 
(1993) (“Because settling saves litigation costs, risk-neutral parties normally will prefer to settle the case 
for an amount [that is likely to be accepted by both sides].”); see also footnotes 497-502 and accompa-
nying text (noting possible advantages to settling disputes instead of litigating them). 
335
 See, e.g., Buckner v. Sam’s Club, 75 F.3d 290 (7th Cir. 1996):  
To establish a prima facie [negligence] case, [the plaintiffs] had to present admissible evidence 
that [the defendant] owed [the plaintiff] a duty, that the duty was breached, and that the breach 
proximately caused [her] injury. Causation, therefore, is essential, and [it] means, at a minimum, 
causation in fact—that is, that the harm would not have occurred “but for” the defendants’ con-
duct. 
Id. at 294 (internal citations and quotations omitted).  There is also the matter of the plaintiff having to 
establish “proximate” or “legal” causation, which is a normative inquiry that asks whether the defendant 
should be held, rather than was, responsible for the plaintiff’s injuries.  See, e.g., Lawrence R. Liebes-
man & Steven G. Davison, Takings of Wildlife Under the Endangered Species Act After Babbitt v. Sweet 
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 5 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 137, 157 (1995) (stating 
that “proximate causation depends to a great extent on considerations of the fairness of imposing liabil-
ity for remote consequences").  To the extent that this concerns which parties should, as opposed to 
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depends on the type and facts of the case the plaintiff alleges,336 and mixed-
dust claims are no exception to this rule, for two reasons.   
First, because mixed-dust claims, by definition, involve the allegation 
of at least two injury-causing substances,337 it would be hard, if not impos-
sible, for some plaintiffs to convincingly establish which and to what extent 
particular substances caused his injuries, not to mention the difficulty in 
proving that a specific defendant or defendants was the source of origin of 
the substances.338  Illustrative of this is In Re Liquidation of Midland Insur-
ance Company.339 In Midland, a former manufacturer of asbestos sought to 
be indemnified by an insurance company against asbestos-related claims,340
and although the case was ultimately remanded for further factual develop-
ment,341 the court, in the course of its opinion, addressed the inherent diffi-
culty that belies diagnosing and tracing asbestos diseases, and in part noted 
that “[various] factors combine to make it impossible, as a practical matter, 
to determine which exposure or exposures to asbestos dust caused the dis-
ease.”
342
  It is likely that the problem presented in Midland would only be 
made worse in mixed-dust claims, since a plaintiff in such a situation would 
have to contend with tracing the exposure of not just one substance, but at 
least two.343
Second, most mixed-dust claims could be likened to other “toxic tort” 
cases,
344
 and satisfying the causation requirement in toxic tort cases has 
those who could, be held responsible for mixed-dust claims, however, such considerations are beyond 
the scope of this Comment.    
336
 See, e.g., In re Ethyl Corp., 975 S.W.2d 606, 616 (Tex. 1998) (stating that “[the type of] evi-
dence [that would be required] regarding causation [in an asbestos case] would vary depending on the 
length of exposure and the dates of exposure”); see also Ramona L. Paetzold, Same-Sex Sexual Harass-
ment: Can it be Sex-Related for Purposes of Title VII, 1 EMPL. RTS. & EMPLOY. POL’Y J. 25, 47 (1997) 
(noting that “[the d]ifficulty in establishing the causation nexus for sexual harassment varies depending 
on the type of conduct that is alleged to be harassing”). 
337
 See text accompanying supra note 5.  
338
 See Love & Golberg, supra note 8, at 17 (“[W]ith the many different dusts known to cause lung 
disease found in industrial and commercial workplaces, it is . . . improbable that a physician will be able 
to discern which portion of [the lung] scarring is caused by which source.”). 
339
 709 N.Y.S.2d 24 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000). 
340
 See id. at 27. 
341
 See id. at 39. 
342
 Id. at 30. 
343
 See text accompanying supra note 5. 
344
 See, e.g., Jones v. Nathan Trotter & Co., 615 N.Y.S.2d 162 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994); Loupe v. 
Avondale Shipyards, 470 So. 2d 336 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (both involving mixed-dust claims in which 
the plaintiff alleged that he was exposed to “toxic” substances).  That the substances alleged in a mixed-
dust claim may be either organic or inorganic, see supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text, are of little 
import, for either type can serve as the basis for a toxic tort claim.  See, e.g., Castellow v. Chevron USA, 
97 F. Supp. 2d 780 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (toxic tort claim in which plaintiff alleged that benzene, an inor-
ganic substance, was responsible for causing decedent’s leukemia); Roche v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 278 F. 
Supp. 2d 744 (E.D. Va. 2003) (toxic tort case where plaintiffs sued the company that owned their apart-
ment, alleging that they had become sick as a result of being exposed to mold, an organic substance). 
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always been challenging.345  An exhaustive analysis of toxic tort cases is 
unwarranted here, but in an oversimplified manner it can be said that these 
cases, which are of a relatively modern origin,346 involve situations in which 
a plaintiff suffers harm after being exposed to a toxic substance and sues the 
manufacturer of the substance or the person or company responsible for the 
exposure having taken place.347  Among the most prominent examples of 
toxic tort cases are those involving asbestos, silicone breast implants, to-
bacco, Agent Orange, and formaldehyde,348 as well as the relatively new 
“wave” of toxic mold cases.349  As was alluded to earlier, the hardest obsta-
cle to overcome for toxic tort plaintiffs is that of proving causation.350  This 
is most likely due to a combination of several characteristics that distin-
guish toxic tort cases from other tort cases, among  those being the complex 
345
 See, e.g., Scott Richardson, Comment, Attorney General’s Warning: Legislation May Now be 
Hazardous to Tobacco Companies’ Health, 28 AKRON L. REV. 291, 295 (1995) (“One of the largest 
problems with toxic tort cases has been the ability to prove actual causation.”); M. Neil Browne et al., 
The Epistemological Role of Expert Witnesses and Toxic Torts, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 2 (1998) (“[P]roving 
causation is often a heavy burden for a toxic tort plaintiff.”); Janet V. Siegel, Negotiating for Environ-
mental Justice: Turning Polluters into “Good Neighbors” Through Collaborative Bargaining, 10 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 147, 168 (2002) (“[A] significant challenge for toxic tort plaintiffs is establishing 
causation.”); infra note 350 and accompanying text; see generally Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating 
General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117 
(1997); Laurie Alberts, Comment, Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation: “Which Way Do We Go, Judge?,”
10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 147 (2002) (both advocating the adoption of alternative causation models in toxic 
tort cases, in light of the difficulties plaintiffs in those case often face).      
346
 See, e.g., Robert F. Blomquist, Book Review, Bottomless Pit: Toxic Trials, The American Legal 
Profession, and Popular Perceptions of the Law, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 953, 954 n.5 (1996) (reviewing 
JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL ACTION (1995) (“Toxic tort law is of relatively recent vintage in American 
law.”). 
347
 See Ann Taylor, Comment, Public Health Funds: The Next Step in the Evolution of Tort Law,
21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 753, 756 (1994) (“Toxic torts are the legal actions arising when a person is 
exposed to toxic substances and harm results.”).  For more information on toxic tort cases in general, the 
reader may wish to consult Allan Kanner, Toxic Tort Litigation in a Regulatory World, 41 WASHBURN 
L.J. 535 (2002) and Steiner, supra note 332, which are both excellent sources of guidance on the topic.  
348
 See Browne, supra note 345, at 2.  Many of these cases are brought under a theory of product 
liability.  See id. at 3 n.14 (noting that “[t]oxic tort cases are usually brought under theories of negli-
gence, strict products liability and nuisance, trespass, or liability for abnormally dangerous activities”); 
Robert F. Blomquist, Emerging Themes and Dilemmas in American Toxic Tort Law, 1988-91: A Legal-
Historical and Philosophical Exegesis, 18 S. ILL. U. L. J. 1, 25 (1993) (recognizing that “[t]oxic tort 
liability theory has definite antecedents in product liability law of the 1960s”). 
349
 See, e.g., Pena-Alfaro, supra note 219, at 544 (realizing a “recent surge in [toxic] mold-related 
claims”); see generally Kristin A. Grant, Note, Toxic Mold: What Insurers Can Do to Abate the Influx of 
Litigation and Convince the American Homeowner That, When it Comes to Mold Coverage, They Can 
Still Be Fun Guys, 38 NEW ENG.L. REV. 141 (2003) (providing information on what toxic mold is and 
the magnitude of the problem concerning toxic mold litigation); D. Chris Harkins, Comment, The Writ-
ing is on the Wall . . . And Inside it: The Recent Explosion of Toxic Mold Litigation and the Insurance 
Industry Response, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1101 (2002) (tracing the history of toxic mold and comment-
ing on the increasing number of toxic mold claims).  
350
 See supra note 345 and accompanying text; see also Carey C. Jordan, Comment, Medical 
Monitoring in Toxic Tort Cases: Another Windfall for Texas Plaintiffs?, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 473, 479 
(1996) (“[C]ausation usually presents the tallest hurdle in a toxic tort action because the plaintiff cannot 
establish a straightforward cause and effect relationship.”). 
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etiology351 of the diseases, the inadequacy of scientific data on toxic expo-
sure and its impact on humans, and the often-long latency between expo-
sure and manifestations of sickness.352
In any event, in order for a toxic tort plaintiff to satisfy his burden as it 
relates to causation, he must, at a minimum, prove both that he was exposed 
to a toxic substance and that the exposure caused the injury he seeks com-
pensation for.353  The first of these prongs can be thought of as “general” 
causation, because the question asked at this stage is whether the sub-
stance(s) in question could have caused the injuries alleged by the plain-
tiff.354  In contrast, the second part of the analysis, commonly referred to as 
“specific” causation, is concerned with whether the exposure to the sub-
stance(s) in fact caused the plaintiff’s injury.355  Almost invariably, the way 
a plaintiff would go about proving causation in these circumstances is to 
present expert testimony or other scientific data, typically in the form of 
epidemiological or other scientific studies,356 that support his position.357
351
 The study of etiology in this context refers to the determination of a disease’s cause or origin, 
typically accomplished via a medical diagnosis.  See Steven A. Heimberg, Comment, Status of the 
Emergency Room Psychotherapist: Privacy Rites, 30 UCLA L. REV. 1316, 1317 n.10 (1983). 
352
 See Taylor, supra note 347, at 757-61 (discussing latency issues in toxic tort cases and how 
complicated the act of proving causation can be).  For a more detailed analysis of these issues, see 
Jordan, supra note 350, at 479-80 (etiology); Gary E. Marchant, Genetics in the Courtroom: Genetics 
and Toxic Torts, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 949, 972-76 (2001) (exposure); and Jesse R. Lee, Medical 
Monitoring Damages: Issues Concerning the Administration of Medical Monitoring Programs, 20 AM.
J. L. AND MED. 251, 256-57 (1994) (latency). 
353
 See Mandi L. Williams, Note, The History of Daubert and Its Effect on Toxic Tort Class Action 
Certification, 22 REV. LITIG. 181, 195 (2003). 
354
 See id.; see also Jeffry D. Cutler, Implications of Strict Scrutiny of Scientific Evidence: Does 
Daubert Deal a Death Blow to Toxic Tort Plaintiffs?, 10 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 189, 198 (1995). 
355
 See Williams, supra note 353, at 195; Cutler, supra note 354, at 198. 
356
 Epidemiology is a branch of medicine that is concerned with “the study of the causes, distribu-
tion, and control of disease in populations.”  Dictionary.com,  http://dictionary.reference. 
com/search?r=2&q=epidemiology (last visited Dec. 29, 2003).  The discipline is statistical in nature, as 
its purpose is to “track and compare large groups of individuals over extended periods of time.”  Lars 
Noah, Medicine’s Epistemology: Mapping the Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical 
Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 386 (2002).  Thus, for purposes of establishing causation, these 
studies are considered circumstantial, as opposed to direct, evidence, since they do not concern the 
individual plaintiff, but rather only allow the fact-finder, based on the statistical information, to infer a 
link between a toxic substance and the plaintiff’s injury.  See Michael C. McCarthy, Note, “Helpful” or 
“Reasonably Reliable”?  Analyzing the Expert Witness’s Methodology Under Federal Rules of Evidence 
702 and 703, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 350, 363 (1992) (“[E]pidemiological studies only provide indirect 
support [to establishing causation], often supplying the basis from which to infer an affirmative answer 
to th[e] question [of whether a specific substance caused plaintiff’s injury].”).     
 Other types of studies commonly used by plaintiffs in toxic tort cases include results of animal 
testing, in vitro experiments, molecular analysis, and case studies.  See Cutler, supra note 354, at 199-
205 (describing these tests); see also infra notes 356-57 and accompanying text (discussing how causa-
tion is typically established in toxic tort suits). 
357
 See, e.g., Browne, supra note 345, at 71 (“[E]xpert testimony will virtually always be needed in 
toxic tort cases.”); Williams, supra note 353, at 195 (“In typical toxic tort suits, establishing causation 
depends on information from expert testimony, including epidemiological studies, case studies, animal 
studies, and pharmacological studies.”).   
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B.    Possible Evidentiary Burdens to Proving Causation  
        in Mixed-Dust Claims 
Being of a scientific nature, the introduction of these types of evidence 
raises another complex issue, namely whether the evidence satisfy the re-
quirements of admissibility under the rules of evidence of the various states 
and of the Federal system.358  It is not necessary to fully address this topic 
here,359 but a brief summary of the major issues that come up in this context, 
using the Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) as a model,360 would be infor-
mative.  The sine qua non of admissibility of all evidence, whether scien-
tific or not, is its relevancy to the case at hand; simply put, if evidence is not 
relevant, it cannot be admitted.361 Relevancy is defined as “having any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the deter-
mination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be 
without the evidence.”362  As this language suggests, the relevancy standard 
is extremely easy to satisfy,363 and this is consistent with the Federal Rules 
358
 See Alberts, supra note 345, at 41 (noting that “[t]he admissibility standards enumerated by the 
Federal Rules of Evidence with respect to scientific evidence and the cases that interpret such rules are 
applicable in toxic tort litigation”); Kuhn v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 14 P.3d 1170 (Kan. 2000) (subject-
ing expert testimony in toxic tort case to the admissibility standard of the Kansas rules of evidence); see 
generally Leslie A. Lunney, Protecting Juries From Themselves: Restricting the Admission of Expert 
Testimony in Toxic Tort Cases, 48 SMU L. REV. 103 (1994) (discussing evidentiary rule issues in con-
nection with toxic tort cases). 
359
 Some sources that extensively discuss the problems of admissibility of scientific testimony in 
toxic tort cases are Lunney, supra note 358; Richardson, supra note 345; Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, 
Clinical Medical Evidence of Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: Into the Crucible of Daubert, 38 HOUS. L.
REV. 369 (2001); and Wendy S. Neal, Case Note, General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997): 
The Future of Scientific Evidence in Toxic Tort Litigation, 67 U. CIN. L. REV. 881 (1999).  
360
 This is because “most, if not all, state evidentiary rules are based upon, or directly derived 
from, the Federal Rules of Evidence.”  J. Allan Cobb, Evidentiary Issues Concerning Online "Sting" 
Operations: A Hypothetical Based Analysis Regarding Authentication, Identification, and Admissibility 
of Online Conversations—A Novel Test for the Application of Old Rules to New Crimes, 39 BRANDEIS 
L.J. 785, 788 n.21 (2001).  See also James F. Flanagan, Forfeiture by Wrongdoing and Those Who Ac-
quiesce in Witness Intimidation: A Reach Exceeding Its Grasp and Other Problems with Federal Rule of 
Evidence 804(b)(6), 51 DRAKE L. REV. 459, 500 n.268 (2003) (“Forty-one states have adopted rules of 
evidence primarily based upon the Federal Rules of Evidence.”).
361
 FED. R. EVID. 402 (“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the 
Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the 
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which [sic] is not relevant is not admissible.”).  
See also Jill Witkowski, Note, Can Juries Really Believe What They See? New Foundational Require-
ments for the Authentication of Digital Images, 10 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 267, 273 (2002) (“[Under] the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, evidence must first be relevant before it is admissible.”).      
362
 FED. R. EVID. 401. 
363
 See Joan L. Larsen, Comment, Of Propensity, Prejudice, and Plain Meaning: The Accused’s 
Use of Exculpatory Specific Acts Evidence and the Need to Amend Rule 404(b), 87 NW. U.L. REV. 651, 
654 (1993) (“Relevance . . . is relatively easy to clear given the liberal standards established by the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.”).
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of Evidence’s skewed approach as a whole towards admissibility of evi-
dence.364
Assuming that the proposed evidence is found to be relevant in a toxic 
tort case, there is still the matter of satisfying the requirements applicable to 
scientific evidence set forth in Rule 702, which embodies a three-pronged 
test.365  Under Rule 702, evidence of a scientific nature may only be admit-
ted if: 1) it is based upon sufficient facts or data, 2) it is the product of reli-
able principles and methods, and 3) the principles and methods were ap-
plied reliably to the facts of the case.366  This test is essentially a codifica-
tion of the seminal Supreme Court case Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma-
ceuticals,367 which itself replaced the long-standing Frye standard for the 
364
 See Eli P. Mazur, Note, Rational Expectations of Lenience: Implicit Plea Agreements and the 
Prosecutor’s Role as a Minister of Justice, 51 DUKE L.J. 1333, 1350 (2002) (noting that “the Federal 
Rules of Evidence have a ‘liberal thrust’ favoring the admission of relevant evidence”).  This does not 
mean, of course, that any piece of evidence will be admitted automatically if it is found to be relevant, 
for even highly relevant evidence may be excluded if, for instance, it is being offered for an improper 
purpose or if the court determines that the evidence would do more harm than good.  See FED. R. EVID.
403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by 
the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”); see also Timothy B. 
Henseler, Comment, A Critical Look at the Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence in the Wake of Daubert:
The Lie Detector Fails the Test, 46 CATH. U.L. REV. 1247, 1291 n.286 (1997) (recognizing that 
“[e]xcludable evidence may in fact be highly relevant”) (emphasis added).     
365
 FED. R. EVID. 702: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the 
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, ex-
perience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) 
the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the 
facts of the case.  
Id.
366
 Id. See generally Gregory Todd Jones & Reidar Hagtvedt, Sample Date as Evidence: Meeting 
the Requirements of Daubert and the Recently Amended Federal Rules of Evidence, 18 GA. ST. U.L.
REV. 721 (2002) (analyzing Rule 702 in depth). 
367
 See Paul S. Miller & Bert W. Rein, “Gatekeeping” Agency Reliance on Scientific and Techni-
cal Materials After Daubert: Ensuring Relevance and Reliability in the Administrative Process, 17 
TOURO L. REV. 297, 298 (2000) (“[T]he principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Daubert and its 
progeny [are] now codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 702.”).  In Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 (1993), two 
minor children who were born with birth defects, along with their parents, brought suit against Merrell 
Dow, the manufacturer of the anti-nausea prescription drug Bendectin, alleging that the birth defects 
resulted from the mothers’ ingestion of Bendectin during their pregnancies.  See id. at 582.  The defen-
dant moved for summary judgment, and in support of its motion produced an affidavit by an expert who 
had concluded that no evidence showing that Bendectin caused birth defects existed.  See id.  The plain-
tiffs countered by presenting contrary testimony from no less than eight experts who, based on experi-
ments and research conducted, claimed to have found a link between Bendectin and birth defects.  See 
id. at 583.   
The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment because it determined that 
the expert testimony submitted by the plaintiffs did not pass the then-prevailing Frye test of admissibil-
ity, i.e., the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the evidence was generally accepted by the scientific 
community, and so it could not be considered by the court.  See id. at 583-84.  The Ninth Circuit Court 
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admissibility of scientific evidence.368  Again, a detailed examination of the 
mechanics of Rule 702 is not necessary here.369  Rather, it suffices to say 
that any person considering filing a mixed-dust claim should be aware of 
the Rules’ limitations on the admissibility of evidence, particularly as they 
apply to scientific evidence, as it is likely that much of the evidence pre-
sented in support of a mixed-dust claim would be of such a nature.370
of Appeals, also citing to Frye, affirmed the lower court’s ruling.  See id. at 584.  The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Circuit Courts of Appeal as to whether the Frye stan-
dard of general acceptance was the appropriate one for admissibility of scientific evidence.  See id. at 
585.        
In reversing the Ninth Circuit, the Court, after examining the language of Rule 702 and its drafting 
history, concluded that Rule 702 had superseded Frye’s “rigid ‘general acceptance’ requirement [, which 
was] at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules and their ‘general approach of relaxing the 
traditional barriers to ‘opinion’ testimony.’”  Id. at 587-89.  The Court then outlined the factors that a 
district court should consider, along with the requirements of Rule 702, when deciding the admissibility 
of scientific evidence, among which were 1) whether the evidence has been, or could be, tested, 2) 
whether the evidence has been subject to peer review and publication, 3) the known or potential rate of 
error associated with the data, 4) the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the accuracy of 
the evidence, and 5) to what degree the evidence enjoys general acceptance in the scientific community.  
See id. at 593-94.  
An abundance of authority on Daubert and its implications exist.  See generally Stan Kitzinger, 
Note, The Supreme Court Waves Good-Bye to Frye: Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 58
ALB. L. REV. 575 (1994) (providing some background information on the case, as well as a dissection of 
the opinion); David G. Owen, A Decade of Daubert, 80 DENV. U.L. REV. 345 (2002) (tracking Daubert’s
influence on later-decided cases, and in particular on district courts’ “gate-keeper” role); William L. 
Anderson et al., Daubert’s Backwash: Litigation-Generated Science, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 619 (2001) 
(positing that Daubert has spawned “litigation-generated” science, i.e., scientific evidence that is 
achieved by tailoring data to meet the needs of its proponent).    
368
 See Audrey Rogers, Prosecutorial Use of Expert Testimony in Domestic Violence Cases: from 
Recantation to Refusal to Testify, 8 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 67, 75 n.29 (1998) (“Daubert rejected the 
seventy-year-old Frye test of admissibility of expert testimony.”).  The Frye test, whose name hails from 
the 1923 United States District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 
1013, was the prevailing standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence in federal courts for nearly 
seventy years before being rejected by the Supreme Court in Daubert. See supra note 362 and accom-
panying text.  The crux of the Frye test was that in order for scientific evidence to be admitted, the party 
offering it had to establish to the satisfaction of the court that the evidence was “generally accepted” as 
reliable by the scientific community. See Ryan McDonald, Note, Juries and Crime Labs: Correcting the 
Weak Links in the DNA Chain, 24 AM. J. L. AND MED. 345, 359 (1998); supra note 367. 
Although no longer used by the federal courts, many states to this day employ the Frye test.  See, 
e.g., Robin Jean Davis, Admitting Expert Testimony in Federal Courts and Its Impact on West Virginia 
Jurisprudence, 104 W. VA L. REV. 485, 494 n.35 (2002) (“[T]he Frye test is still used today by many 
state courts as the basis for admitting expert testimony.”).   
Interestingly, the influential Frye opinion is only a few pages long, and contains no citations to 
other cases or any other authority.  See Frye, 293 F. 1013.  For more information on the Frye case, see 
Lisa Gonzalez, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: The History and Demise of Frye v. United 
States, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 371 (1993) and Andrew R. Stolfi, Note, Why Illinois Should Abandon 
Frye’s General Acceptance Standard for the Admission of Novel Scientific Evidence, 78 CHI.-KENT. L.
REV. 861 (2003).  
369
 See supra notes 365-66 and accompanying text.  
370
 This is because most mixed-dust claims would be considered toxic tort cases, see supra note 
344 and accompanying text, and scientific evidence is almost always needed to be presented in those 
types of cases in order for a plaintiff to prevail, see supra notes 356-57 and accompanying text.      
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C.    Ways to Prove Causation in Mixed-Dust Claims 
Returning now to the issue of how a toxic tort plaintiff would go about 
proving causation, it would be fruitful to examine the types of evidence a 
plaintiff alleging a mixed-dust claim could present.  Aside from possibly 
relying on the same type of evidence frequently used in other toxic tort 
cases, such as epidemiological data or case studies,371 a mixed-dust plain-
tiff’s case-in-chief would likely hinge on an expert being able to success-
fully diagnose the different substances responsible for the plaintiff’s ail-
ments,372 for without that diagnosis, it would not be possible to link the al-
leged substances to any particular defendants.373  The exact mechanics of 
that process is complex,374 and because a detailed analysis of it here would 
be neither necessary nor helpful, a summary will be presented instead.   
The way that a diagnosis of mixed-dust disease, i.e., of a disease re-
sulting from at least two substances,375 is made is through the use of a de-
vice known as a scanning electron microscope, which is powerful enough to 
be able to analyze the atomic particles of the plaintiff’s lung tissue.376
Based on the results of the microscope’s analysis, qualified technicians 
would first identify the substances found, and then would prepare a report 
quantifying the substances’ presence per cubic centimeter of lung tissue.377
A pathologist would then mine the report for scientific data, as well as 
371
 See supra notes 356-57 and accompanying text.   
372
 See Raphael Metzger, Silicosis or Mixed Dust Pneumoconiosis? Diagnosis and Etiology by 
Scanning Electron Microscopy, 11 MEALEY’S EMERGING TOXIC TORTS: THE PLAINTIFFS’ PERSPECTIVE,
Oct. 4, 2002, at 25, 26  [hereinafter Mealey’s Diagnosis] (stating that a “[mixed-dust] diagnosis is essen-
tially a pathologic diagnosis that is dependent on the identification and quantification of [certain] par-
ticulates in the patient’s lung tissue”). 
373
 It will be recalled that by definition, mixed-dust claims always involve at least two substances, 
see text accompanying supra note 5, so it would be crucial for a plaintiff attempting to make such a case 
to produce a diagnosis that differentiates between the various substances so that each substance could be 
linked to the appropriate defendant(s).  Linking the cause(s) of the plaintiff’s injury to the actions of a 
defendant is, of course, needed to satisfy the “specific” causation requirement in toxic tort cases.  See 
text accompanying supra note 355; cf. Part IV.E.2 (describing how some courts have eased causation 
requirements for plaintiffs in certain cases, including by shifting the burden to defendants to exculpate 
themselves from being responsible for plaintiff’s injuries rather than requiring the plaintiff to identify 
which defendants caused his injuries, when doing so would be unfair or unduly restrictive to the plain-
tiff).    
374
 See generally Mealey’s Diagnosis, supra note 372 (describing step-by-step how a diagnosis of 
mixed-dust would be made).  For further reading, see K. HONMA, PATHOLOGY OF NON-ASBESTOS 
PNEUMOCONIOSIS (SILICOSIS AND MIXED DUST PNEUMOCONIOSIS) (1999), 
http://www.conganat.org/seap/revista/v32-n3/97.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2006; on file with author); 
Martha L. Warnock, Case Study of Pneumoconiosis, at http://pathhsw5m54. 
ucsf.edu/case20/discussion20.html (last modified Oct. 1, 1998; last visited Dec. 27, 2003); and Alterna-
tive Exposures, supra note 6.  
375
 See text accompanying supra note 5.  
376
 See Mealey’s Diagnosis, supra note 372, at 26.  
377
 See id.  
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compare the amounts listed in the report to those found in the lungs of dis-
ease-free persons that are of similar age and sex to the plaintiff.378
Assuming that the procedures of the test were followed and that the 
data culled from the test was not corrupted, there is a fair chance that an 
accurate diagnosis of mixed-dust, if indeed the plaintiff is suffering from 
the condition, can be made.379  It is also possible to diagnose mixed-dust 
pneumoconiosis using simpler, more crude techniques than employing a 
scanning electron microscope, such as less sophisticated microscopy tech-
nology or an examination of tissue slides, but such techniques are not as 
accurate and can lead to incorrect results.380
For example, if scanning microscope technology is not possible or 
available because of monetary costs or logistical concerns, it is still theo-
retically possible to yield an accurate diagnosis of mixed-dust pneumoco-
niosis by using a combination of the patient’s exposure history and an 
analysis of the patient’s chest X-rays and pathology material.381  In the 
hands of a trained and skilled pathologist, such a technique might allow for 
the correct separation and identification of the substances at issue because 
some of their unique characteristics, particularly their shape and size, would 
likely show up on the X-rays.382  Even so, this technique is hardly foolproof, 
and an inaccurate diagnosis through its use should always be a concern.383
The use of a scanning electron microscope affords mixed-dust plain-
tiffs another advantage apart from more accurate diagnoses; it may also 
make it easier for a plaintiff to trace the etiology of the disease.384  This 
might be feasible because an accurate and complete identification and quan-
tification of the particles found in a plaintiff’s lung tissue would go a long 
way towards associating the particles with the materials that they came 
378
 See id. 
379
 See id. at 25-27. Despite the accuracy of the scanning electron microscope, there is no guaran-
tee that a complete and successful diagnosis of mixed-dust disease will always be possible.  See, e.g., 
supra note 338 and accompanying text; see generally Part IV (addressing some of the causation prob-
lems mixed-dust plaintiffs might face). 
380
 See Mealey’s Diagnosis, supra note 372, at 26. One fairly frequent example of a misdiagnosis 
occurs when mixed-dust disease is mistaken for silicosis, most likely due to the fact that the appearance 
of silica is often confused with that of other substances.  See id. Silicosis is a lung disease associated 
with the inhalation of silica particles, see text accompanying supra note 22, and is one of the most 
prevalent occupational lung diseases, see DEMOSTHENES BOUROS ET AL., ASSOCIATION OF 
MALIGNANCY WITH DISEASES CAUSING INTERSTITIAL PULMONARY CHANGES (2002), 
http://www.chestjournal.org/cgi/reprint/121/4/1278.pdf (last visited Feb. 26, 2006; on file with author) 
(identifying silicosis as a “common occupational lung disease”).       
381
 See Love & Goldberg, supra note 8, at 18. 
382
 See id.
383
 See id.; see also supra notes 379-80 and accompanying text. 
384
 See Mealey’s Diagnosis, supra note 372, at 26-27; see also supra note 351 and accompanying 
text (addressing etiology). 
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from, and perhaps even the manufacturers of such materials.385  As men-
tioned earlier, this is crucial if the plaintiff is to make a successful case.386
D.    How Courts Have Handled Causation Issues in Mixed-Dust Claims 
Having introduced a few ways through which a mixed-dust plaintiff 
could establish causation, at this point it would be useful to see how courts 
faced with mixed-dust claims have handled causation issues.  As mentioned 
earlier, one can find reported mixed-dust cases in the nature of both tort and 
workers’ compensation.387  As can be expected, given that most workers’ 
compensation cases operate on a no-fault basis,388 the level of causation that 
needs to be established in mixed-dust tort cases, as opposed to mixed-dust 
workers’ compensation claims, is different.   
1.    Example of a Mixed-Dust Tort Case Dealing With Causation 
One can gleam what type of causation mixed-dust tort plaintiffs might 
be faced with by examining Bailey v. North American Refractories Com-
pany,389 one of the few mixed-dust tort cases reported.390 In Bailey, employ-
ees of a manufacturer of asbestos products sued the company, alleging that 
exposure to toxic substances during their employment had caused them 
mixed-dust pneumoconiosis, among other things.391 The court ruled that in 
order for the employees to prevail in their suits, they had to establish by a 
preponderance of the evidence that their exposure to the substances were a 
385
 See Mealey’s Diagnosis, supra note 372, at 26.  One powerful example of this technology’s 
potential is demonstrated by an episode where a pathologist who was asked to make a mixed-dust diag-
nosis was able to opine, after examining a subject’s lung tissue slide with a scanning electron, that the 
subject had at one point come into contact with cadmium-containing red paint, presumably at the sub-
ject’s workplace. See id. at 27.  The pathologist came to this conclusion after the microscope analysis 
revealed a single particle of cadmium, along with an unidentified element.  See id.  The subject’s occu-
pational history, which had not been known to the pathologist, confirmed that the subject had performed 
auto bodywork for years, including by being involved in the process of sanding paint onto red sports 
cars, which likely explains the presence of cadmium (found in paint) and the unidentified element (from 
the sanding process).  See id.       
386
 See, e.g., supra notes 372-73 and accompanying text (addressing the issue of linking injury-
causing substances to defendants). 
387
 See, e.g., supra notes 59, 60 (examples of mixed-dust workers’ compensation and tort claims, 
respectively).  
388
 See supra note 40. 
389
 95 S.W.3d 868.  Bailey was mentioned in supra note 60.    
390
 See id.; supra note 62 and accompanying text.  Although not expressly stated in the opinion, 
the plaintiffs’ case was essentially one based on a products liability theory, as they alleged that “products 
manufactured by either [of the defendants] exposed [them] to asbestos, thus causing asbestos-related 
illnesses [including mixed-dust pneumoconiosis].”  Bailey, 95 S.W.3d at 870.  This is not surprising, as 
a great portion of personal injury asbestos-related lawsuits are categorized as products liability actions.  
See, e.g., Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 941 P.2d 1203, 1214 (Cal. 1997) (“Most asbestos personal 
injury actions are tried on a products liability theory.”).  The same could be said for other types of toxic 
tort lawsuits.  See supra note 438.   
391
 See supra note 60. 
2006]  Mixed Dust Claims—The Next Asbestos 169
“substantial factor” in the forming of their diseases.392 In reaching its deci-
sion, the court declined to adopt the “fiber-drift”393 or “frequency-
regularity-proximity”394 causation tests that were advocated by plaintiffs 
and the defendant, respectively,395 reasoning that adopting either test as a 
matter of law would infringe upon the jury’s prerogative to decide whether 
the manufacturer was indeed liable for plaintiffs’ injuries.396
2.    Example of a Workers’ Compensation Claim Involving  
           Mixed-Dust 
Somewhat in contrast to Bailey is Songer, Inc. v. Workmen’s Compen-
sation Appeal Board,397 a workers’ compensation case in which an industrial 
bricklayer alleged that he had been rendered permanently disabled from 
mixed-dust pneumoconiosis as a result of workplace exposure to several 
substances, including asbestos and silica.398  On an appeal by one of the 
claimant’s former employers,399 the court affirmed an award of workers’ 
compensation benefits to the claimant, based primarily on the testimony of 
a doctor who had diagnosed the claimant as suffering from mixed-dust dis-
ease after conducting an examination, pulmonary function studies, and X-
rays on the claimant.400  In other words, in affirming the award of benefits to 
392
 See Bailey, 95 S.W.3d at 871. Incidentally, this is the standard of causation that has been 
adopted by section 431 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), which provides in part that “ [t]he 
actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if . . . his conduct is a substantial factor in 
bringing about the harm”). 
393
 The fiber-drift theory states that the particles of certain substances, once released in the air, can 
remain airborne for long periods of time and thus travel substantial distances.  See Bailey, 95 S.W.3d at 
872; see also Jackson v. Anchor Packing Co., 994 F.2d 1295, 1300 n.6 (8th Cir. 1993) (explaining fiber-
drift theory). 
394
 Under the frequency-regularity-proximity test, the plaintiff must demonstrate that he was in 
close proximity to a specific substance on a regular basis and over an extended period of time.  See 
Bailey, 95 S.W.3d at 872; see generally Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., 782 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 
1986) (asbestos case in which the court discusses and adopts the test). 
395
 See Bailey, 95 S.W.3d at 872-73. 
396
 See id.  
397
 613 A.2d 658 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992). 
398
 See id. at 658. 
399
 The main issue before the court was which of the claimant’s former employers, Songer, Inc. or 
Pneumatic Concrete Corporation, should be held liable for the employee’s compensation.  See id. at 659-
660. Songer, the claimant’s most recent employer, argued that Pneumatic should be the one responsible 
because that is where the claimant had worked the longest, and therefore had presumably been more 
exposed to injurious substances there than at Songer.  See id. at 659-62.  The court ultimately sided with 
Songer, declining to adopt the “last injurious exposure” rule propounded by Pneumatic, and ruled that 
Pneumatic was the company liable for the claimant’s award.  See id. at 661-62.  The “last injurious 
exposure” rule is not uncommon in workers’ compensation scheme, and is mentioned elsewhere in this 
Comment.  See supra note 80 and accompanying text; infra notes 403 (discussing the rule).           
400
 See Songer, 613 A.2d at 659.  That is typical of the level of proof required in workers’ compen-
sation cases.  See, e.g., Hartman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 462 So. 2d 1310, 1312 (La. Ct. App. 
1985):  
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the claimant, the Songer court practically took at face value plaintiff’s and 
his doctor’s testimony, and as will be elaborated shortly, this is not atypical 
in workers’ compensation claims.      
E.    Facilitating the Obstacle of Establishing Causation in Mixed-Dust  
       Claims 
1.    How Congress and Some States Have Eased the Causation 
           Standard in Workers’ Compensation Claims 
Songer is an example of how the legislatures and courts have facili-
tated claimants’ burden of proving causation in workers’ compensation 
cases.  Had Songer been filed as a toxic tort case instead, the claimant 
would have had to link, by a preponderance of the evidence, the substances 
allegedly responsible for his injuries to a specific defendant.401  But because 
this was a workers’ compensation claim, the claimant had no such burden.  
Rather, he had the benefit of title 77, section 411 of the Pennsylvania Stat-
utes, which provided in part at the time:
The employer liable for compensation [for certain workplace diseases] 
shall be the employer in whose employment the employe [sic] was last 
exposed for a period of not less than one year to the hazard of the oc-
cupational disease claimed. In the event the employe [sic] did not 
work in an exposure at least one year for any employer during the 
three hundred week period prior to disability or death, the employer 
liable for the compensation shall be that employer giving the longest 
period of employment in which the employe [sic] was exposed to the 
hazards of the disease claimed.402
Statutes of this sort undoubtedly make it easier for claimants to be 
awarded benefits, for their practical effect is to ensure that there will always 
be at least one employer who can be found liable for a claimant’s compen-
The next question [in this workers’ compensation case] is whether [the claimant] proved that his 
lungs were impaired. His case was basically the testimony of . . . his treating physician . . . to the 
effect that he suffers from "mixed dust pneumoconiosis” . . . . We find this testimony, together with 
[the claimant’s] subjective complaints of tiredness and shortness of breath, sufficient to constitute 
a prima facia case of impairment of the lungs. 
Id. at 1312; see also KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 342.316, described in supra Part II.B.1, and the Black Lung 
Benefits Act, analyzed in supra Part II.B.2 (both imposing similar requirements of medical evidence on 
claimants seeking workers’ compensation benefits). 
401
 See text accompanying supra note 355. 
402
 Songer, 613 A.2d at 660.  The current version of the statute may be found in Title 77, Section 
411 of the Pennsylvania Statutes (2003).  
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sation.  Perhaps that is why similar statutes have been enacted in many 
other states.403
a) Applicability of Existing Pneumoconiosis Statutes to Mixed-Dust 
Claims. In addition to statutes like the one examined above, both states and 
the federal government have enacted several other types of presumptions 
intended to facilitate the recovery of workers’ compensation awards for 
pneumoconiosis injuries that arguably would be applicable to claims in-
volving mixed-dust disease.404  This is only arguable, rather than certain, 
because it is hard to predict the impact that such statutes would have on 
mixed-dust claims, whether they are in the form of a tort lawsuit or a work-
ers’ compensation claim, given that, by their terms, the statutes seem to deal 
only with “ordinary” pneumoconiosis, as opposed to mixed-dust pneumo-
coniosis.405  Of course, if it turned out, whether by court decision or some 
other way, that any existing statutes were deemed to not apply to mixed-
dust claims, the legislature of the various states or Congress could either 
pass new laws or modify the existing ones so as to correct the problem.  
Thus, the passing of statutes creating presumptions applicable to mixed-
dust claims is one way in which the potential difficulties of proving causa-
tion in such cases, particularly those filed in tort, could be alleviated.406
2.    How Courts Have Relaxed the Method of Proving Causation in  
           Certain Types of Lawsuits 
Another way that the problem of establishing causation in mixed-dust 
lawsuits might be lessened is through the adoption of alternative methods to 
403
 See, e.g., N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 44-a (“The employer in whose employment an em-
ployee was last exposed to an injurious dust hazard shall be liable for the payments required by this 
chapter when disability or death of the employee shall be due to silicosis or other dust disease.”); see 
also D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1510; MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-72-303; VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-403(B); W. VA.
CODE § 23-4-8c (2003) (all containing similar provisions); supra note 80 and accompanying text; supra
note 399 (discussing the “last injurious exposure” rule).   
404
 Many states have enacted presumptions applicable to workers’ compensation programs.  E.g.,
N.Y. WORKERS’ COMP. LAW § 47 (CONSOL. 2003) (providing that exposures to certain diseases are 
presumed to be harmful); 77 P.S. § 413 (2003) (creating presumption that certain disabilities arise during 
a person’s course of employment); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-6-302 (2003) (stating that persons suffering 
from certain diseases are presumed to be “totally disabled,” a designation that affects how much benefits 
they are entitled to receive); W. VA. CODE § 23-4-8c (2003) (providing that deceased persons who were 
exposed to certain substances for a period of at least ten out of the fifteen years preceding his death are 
presumed to have been suffering from a chronic respiratory disability at time of death).  As for examples 
of similar presumptions found in the federal code, see supra note 103 (outlining presumptions applica-
ble to pneumoconiosis derived from mining). 
405
 The difference between the two essentially has to do with how they are caused; specifically, 
“ordinary” pneumoconiosis is caused by one substance, whereas mixed-dust pneumoconiosis involves at 
least two.  See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see generally supra Part I.A (describing the dis-
ease).       
406
 See generally Part IV (addressing some of the causation issues mixed-dust plaintiffs might 
face).  
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satisfy causation as courts have done in other settings, particularly in the 
toxic tort field, as, for instance, with asbestos claims.  Classic examples of 
this type of “causation relaxation” are Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & 
Sault. Ste. Marie Railway Company407 and Summers v. Tice.408
This legal phenomenon occurs mostly in cases where courts feel sym-
pathetic towards plaintiffs whose injuries were almost certainly the result of 
the defendant(s)’s wrongdoing, but for one reason or another cannot satisfy 
407
 179 N.W. 45 (Minn. 1920).  In Anderson, the court was faced with the difficult question of 
whether a railroad should be held liable for the destruction of plaintiff’s property due to a fire originat-
ing from one of the railroad’s trains even though there was a good chance that another, unrelated fire of 
unknown origin would have destroyed plaintiff’s house just the same.  See id. at 45-46.  The defendant 
argued that under the circumstances, the plaintiff could not satisfy the “but-for” because it was impossi-
ble to prove that the damage to his property would not have occurred if the railroad fire had never hap-
pened.  See id. at 46-47. The court ultimately sided with the plaintiff, and in so doing, approved of the 
trial court’s jury instructions, which provided in part: 
If you find that other fire or fires not set by one of the defendant’s engines mingled with one that 
was set by one of the defendant’s engines, . . . [and if] you should find that the fire set by the en-
gine was a material or substantial element in causing plaintiff’s damage . . . [,] the defendant is li-
able . . . . 
Id. at 46.  The rule enunciated by the Anderson court has come to be known as the “substantial factor” 
doctrine, and it has since become firmly embedded in the legal bedrock, having been adopted by the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts and most jurisdictions.  See John D. Rue, Note, Returning to the Roots of 
the Bramble Bush: The “But For” Test Regains Primacy in Causal Analysis in the American Law Insti-
tute’s Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2679, 2681-83 (2003) (discussing 
origin and impact of the “substantial factor” test).  
408
 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948). The dilemma faced by the Tice court was as vexing and interesting as 
the one presented by the facts in Anderson, discussed in supra note 407.  In Tice, the plaintiff, a hunter, 
suffered injuries to his eye and mouth after having been unintentionally shot at by two of his hunting 
companions.  See Tice, 199 P.2d at 2.  A bench trial determined that both of the defendants had acted 
negligently in discharging their weapons towards the direction of the plaintiff in their misguided attempt 
at hunting quail, and that the plaintiff’s injuries were a “direct result” of defendants’ actions.  See id. at 
2.  Furthermore, the court cleared the plaintiff of any contributory negligence.  See id.  
The problem, however, was that it was impossible to determine whether plaintiff’s injuries had been 
caused by only one of the men’s shots or by both, since the shots had been fired virtually simultane-
ously, and even if only one of the men had been responsible, the plaintiff probably could not have 
proven which of the two men was culpable.  See id.   This left the court with two unsavory choices: 
either allow causation to be proven by an alternative method, or allow the injured and innocent plaintiff 
to go uncompensated by the two decidedly negligent defendants.  See id. at 2-5  The court chose the 
former, and concluded that for “reasons of policy and justice,” it made more sense to shift the burden of 
causation to the defendants, in that it was up to each defendant to exculpate himself lest they both face 
liability for the plaintiff’s injury; this, instead of imposing upon the plaintiff the formidable task of 
proving which defendant had injured him, seemed proper to the court.  See id. The impulse to side with 
“innocent” plaintiffs over “guilty” defendants is not uncommon.  See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Laborato-
ries, 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980) (“[A]s between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the 
latter should bear the cost of the injury.”). 
The rule set forth in Tice, sometimes known as the “alternative liability” doctrine, is well estab-
lished in American law, see Rue, supra note 407, at 2694-95, and has been applied in various factual 
situations.  Notable instances are medical malpractice actions where an unconscious plaintiff was almost 
certainly injured due to the negligence of one or few of a select group involved in his treatment, see, 
e.g., Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1944), and products liability cases where the plaintiff was 
harmed by a generically defective product and cannot prove which defendant was responsible for the 
particular unit that caused his injuries, see, e.g., Anderson v. Somberg, 338 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1975).     
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the traditional “but-for” causation test, i.e., that had it not been for defen-
dant(s)’s actions, they would not have been injured.409  The courts’ dilemma 
in this regard is understandable, for as one commentator has noted, 
“[t]raditional notions of causation were developed before the existence of 
toxic torts was acknowledged. Applying these tests to toxic tort cases is 
analogous to placing a square peg into a round hole – [they] just will not 
fit.”410
Being mindful of the similar dilemma faced by plaintiffs in toxic tort 
cases,
411
 courts over time have built upon the doctrines of Anderson and 
Tice,  among others, 412 to create alternative methods to proving causation 
that are better suited to the unique nature of toxic tort cases.413  Among 
these are variants of the substantial factor test recognized in Anderson,414 a 
409
 See, e.g., Lindquist v. City of Jersey City Fire Dep’t, 814 A.2d 1069, 1079-80 (N.J. 2003) 
(“[We] recognized that the need for a broader [causation] standard was due in part to the extraordinary 
and unique burdens facing plaintiffs who seek to prove causation in toxic-tort litigation . . . .”) (internal 
citations and quotations omitted); Gerald W. Boston, Toxic Apportionment: A Causation and Risk Con-
tribution Model, 25 ENVTL. L. 549, 628 (1995) (“The understandable judicial reluctance to preside over 
a plaintiff’s failure to sustain the traditional burdens of proof has led to a relaxation of causal stan-
dards.”); see generally Rue, supra note 407 (tracing the gradual shift in tort law from the traditional 
“but-for” standard to alternative causation tests employed in certain factual circumstances, and also 
exploring some reasons for why courts have seen fit to occasionally  “bend” the rules of causation).  
410
 Myra P. Mulcahy, Note, Proving Causation in Toxic Torts Litigation, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1299, 1326 (1983).  See Shelly Brinker, Comment, Opening the Door to the Indeterminate Plaintiff: An 
Analysis of the Causation Barriers Facing Environmental Toxic Tort Plaintiffs, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1289, 
1298-1302 (1999) (outlining problems that arise when  traditional notions of causation are applied to 
toxic tort cases).  Many commentators have commended courts’ relaxation of the causation burden in 
toxic tort cases.  See, e.g., Simcha David Schonfeld, Note, Establishing the Causal Link in Asbestos 
Litigation: An Alternative Approach, 68 BROOKLYN L. REV. 379, 399 (2002) (“[A]s a matter of public 
policy, a system must be adopted in which [asbestos] plaintiffs are not left entirely without recourse. 
These individuals suffered great harm at the hands of numerous negligent companies and should not be 
left to shoulder the accompanying financial burden alone.”); Development of the Law, Toxic Waste 
Litigation: IX. Common Law Personal Injury Recovery, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1602, 1603 (1986) (“[C]ourts 
have long recognized their obligation to do corrective justice by compensating innocent victims and . . . 
to deter wrongdoing by compelling those who create harms to bear the costs . . . .”). 
411
 See generally Part IV (exploring some of the causation issues mixed-dust plaintiffs might 
encounter); see also Schonfeld, supra note 410, at 383 (“To allow for recovery in virtually any asbestos 
case, . . . courts [would have had to] relax the standard causation requirements. Noting this dilemma, 
many courts have done just that.”). 
412
 See supra notes 407-08 and accompanying text. 
413
 See, e.g., Brinker, supra note 410, at 1302 (“In recognition of the uncertainty that surrounds 
[causation in] toxic torts . . . , a majority of courts have modified traditional common-law causation 
rules in the toxic tort context.”); see generally Joseph Sanders & Julie Machal-Fulks, The Admissibility 
of Differential Diagnosis Testimony to Prove Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: The Interplay of Adjective 
and Substantive Law, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 107 (2001) (listing some ways in which courts have 
attempted to deal with the problem of causation in toxic tort cases); Brian M. DiMasi, Comment, The 
Threshold Level of Proof of Asbestos Causation: The “Frequency, Regularity and Proximity Test” and a 
Modified Summers v. Tice Theory of Burden-Shifting, 24 CAP. U.L. REV. 735, 738-44 (1995) (tracing the 
gradual development of various causation tests applicable to asbestos lawsuits).  
414
 See, e.g., Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1105 (5th Cir. 1974) (in a 
suit against an asbestos manufacturer, court held that causation could be satisfied with a showing that 
defendant’s products “contributed substantially” to plaintiff’s injuries); supra note 392 and accompany-
91
174 FIU Law Review [1:107
shifting of burden similar to that employed in Tice,415 the application of the 
“market-share liability” test,416 the “frequency-regularity-proximity” test,417
the “inference of exposure” test,418 the “job site” test,419 the “fiber-drift” 
theory,420 and the “role in the occurrence of plaintiff’s injuries” test.421   In 
addition to these, many commentators have proposed the adoption of tests 
that are either variations of the above, or different altogether.422
ing note (applying similar causation standard); see also DiMasi, supra note 413, at 741-43 (describing 
the development of the substantial factor test in toxic tort cases, and attributing the origin of the test to 
asbestos cases).  Perhaps coincidentally, a comparable, if somewhat weaker, test exists under the FAIR 
Act’s no-fault compensation scheme to make out a claim for certain diseases. See supra note 296 (noting 
that for many types of diseases, the FAIR Act requires a claimant to show that there was “exposure” to 
asbestos).
415
 See DiMasi, supra note 413, at 744-48 (outlining the employment of burden-shifting in toxic 
tort cases); see also supra note 403 (describing Tice test). 
416
 See, e.g., Wheeler v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (allowing 
plaintiffs suing for injuries related to asbestos exposure to rely on the market share liability doctrine).   
The market share liability doctrine, first recognized by the California Supreme Court in Sindell, 607 P.2d 
924, allows plaintiffs who have been harmed as a result of certain types of defective products but who 
cannot trace their injuries to a specific manufacturer to sue all of the manufacturers who could have 
produced the defective product at issue at the relevant time period.  See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936-37.  
Damages would then be assessed against the defendants in an amount proportionate to their share of the 
market of the defective product.  See id. at 937.   
While the market share liability doctrine has been recognized by many other courts since then, see, 
e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Symposium, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL 
L. REV. 941, 981 (1995) (stating that “many courts have adopted [the doctrine]”), most courts have been 
dubious of the propriety of its employment in toxic tort cases.  See, e.g., Schonfeld, supra note 410, at 
387 (“[E]ven among those jurisdictions that have considered market share liability in [certain] cases, 
there has been great reluctance to expand its application to asbestos litigation.”); see also Shirley H. 
Fang, Comment, Santiago v. Sherwin-Williams Co.: Rejection of Market Share Liability in Lead-Based 
Paint Litigation, 43 BUFFALO L. REV. 725, 740-42 (1995) (describing courts’ reluctance to apply market 
share liability in other contexts, including asbestos suits).          
417
 See supra note 394 and accompanying text (describing test and providing an example of an 
asbestos case in which the court used it). 
418
 See, e.g., In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases, 960 F.2d 806, 817-18 (9th Cir. 1992) (adopting 
test in asbestos case that allows a plaintiff to recover damages by relying on an “inference of exposure,” 
which can be demonstrated by introducing enough evidence suggesting that the products of a particular 
defendant were present at the plaintiff’s worksite, and thus that those products might have contributed to 
his injuries).    
419
 See, e.g., Lockwood v. A C & S, Inc., 722 P.2d 826 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (allowing plaintiff 
who allegedly had gotten ill from exposure to asbestos in the workplace to survive motion for directed 
verdict, even though he had no direct evidence as to which products caused his injuries, or who made 
them.).   
420
 See supra note 393 and accompanying text (explaining test). 
421
 See Ingram v. Acands, Inc., 977 F.2d 1332, 1344 (9th Cir. 1992) (asbestos case in which the 
court held that if “the plaintiff presents evidence that the defendant’s asbestos was present in the work-
place, it is the jury’s task to determine if the presence of that asbestos played a role in the occurrence of 
the plaintiff’s injuries”).     
422
 See generally Schonfeld, supra note 410 (advocating a four-pronged alternative approach to 
causation in asbestos cases); Berger, supra note 345 (proposing new model for toxic tort cases whereby 
plaintiff would only have to prove that a defendant failed to develop and disclose information needed to 
assess latent risks, rather than that the defendant caused plaintiff’s injuries); Andrew G. Celli, Jr., Note, 
Toward a Risk Contribution Approach to Tortfeasor Identification and Multiple Causation Cases, 65 
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a) Applicability of Causation Standards Used in Other Types of 
Toxic Tort Cases to Mixed-Dust Claims. The applicability of these numer-
ous tests to mixed-dust claims, like the applicability of pneumoconiosis 
statutes to mixed-dust claims,423 is uncertain.  One obvious reason for this is 
that courts have not yet had many opportunities to apply these tests to 
mixed-dust claims, given the relatively scant number of tort cases alleging 
mixed-dust diseases filed thus far.424  Another reason is that some courts 
have demonstrated a reluctance to make any further inroads into the already 
“relaxed” causation rules425 that are employed in toxic tort cases.426
Finally, putting aside the somewhat normative question of whether 
courts should “borrow” causation tests used in toxic tort cases to resolve 
mixed-dust tort claims, it is not clear whether at least some of the tests 
could logically be applied to mixed-dust claims.  For instance, the propriety 
of employing tests modeled after the market share liability doctrine427 or on 
the alternative liability theory recognized in Tice428 in mixed-dust claims 
might be called into question, since both of these tests require that plaintiffs 
be able to at least identify the defendants possibly responsible for their inju-
ries,429 and this may not always be feasible in mixed-dust claims because of 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 635 (1990) (outlining risk-apportionment and risk-contribution approaches to asbestos 
cases, under which defendants could be liable for “risk creative behavior,” i.e., making choices that 
created unreasonable risks of harm to plaintiffs); Brinker, supra note 410 (describing advantages and 
disadvantages of several alternative methods to traditional causation in toxic tort cases, including varia-
tions of the market share liability and burden-shifting doctrines); see also supra note 410 and accompa-
nying text (noting other examples of commentators urging or applauding alternative ways to establish 
causation in toxic tort cases). 
423
 See supra notes 404-06 and accompanying text. 
424
 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
425
 See, e.g., supra notes 411-21 and accompanying text (providing examples of how courts have 
adopted more lenient causation standards in toxic tort cases). 
426
 See, e.g., Toby M. Tonaki, Comment, Latent Disease and Toxic Torts in Hawaii: Analysis of the 
Statute of Limitations, the Rule Against Splitting Causes of Action and Nonidentification Theories of 
Liability, 15 HAWAII L. REV. 137, 174 (1993) (stating that “[some c]ourts are . . .  reluctant to apply [the 
alternative liability] theory to toxic tort products liability [cases] because plaintiffs must join all possible 
tortfeasors in court, and plaintiffs have had trouble proving that they joined all the possible tortfeasors”); 
Jordan, supra note 350, at 479 n.38 (noting that “in the past, [some] courts have been reluctant to rely 
[solely] upon epidemiological studies to determine causation in toxic tort cases”); Diane Schmauder, An 
Analysis of New Jersey’s Increased Risk Doctrine, 25 RUTGERS L. J. 893, 901 (1994) (recognizing that 
“[a number of]  courts have been [somewhat] reluctant to relax the traditional causation inquiry in the 
toxic tort context”); Christopher J. Maley, Survey, Toxic Torts: Class Actions in United States and Eng-
land, 19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 523, 526 (1996) (stating that “[h]istorically, [many] judges have 
been reluctant to certify class actions in mass toxic tort cases”); supra note 416 (describing some courts’ 
reluctance to allow market share liability to be used in asbestos cases, a type of toxic tort case).  Contra
supra note 411-13 and accompanying text (recognizing that many courts are more than willing to relax 
causation requirements in certain types of cases).   
427
 See supra note 416 (explaining the doctrine and its use). 
428
 See supra note 408 (providing information on the test and its applications). 
429
 See Richardson, supra note 345, at 311 n.170 (listing examples of asbestos cases rejecting the 
validity of the market share liability doctrine where plaintiffs could not pinpoint neither the products 
that allegedly caused their injuries nor the manufacturers of the products); DiMasi, supra note 413, at 
92
176 FIU Law Review [1:107
the potential difficulty in tracing the origins of plaintiffs’ diseases.430  A 
similar issue might arise if a plaintiff in a mixed-dust case attempted to 
prove causation by relying on the “fiber-drift” theory, since that would re-
quire that the substances responsible for the plaintiff’s injury be identified, 
a task perhaps easier said than done. 431
In light of these potential problems in applying causation models pre-
viously used in toxic tort cases to mixed-dust claims, only time will tell 
whether and how those tests will impact future cases involving mixed-dust 
disease.  However, in considering the likelihood that these tests will one 
day be applied to mixed-dust claims, one should be mindful of the courts’ 
powers to adapt, if need be, existing legal rules and tests to make them bet-
ter suited for the relatively unique situation of mixed-dust claims,432 much 
as legislatures could change existing ordinary pneumoconiosis statutes to 
ensure that they would apply to mixed-dust pneumoconiosis as well.433 One 
thing is practically certain: without any sort of leniency by the courts on the 
causation requirement, mixed-dust plaintiffs suing in tort would likely face 
a very heavy burden in winning their cases.434
3.    Reducing or Eliminating the Problem of Causation in Mixed-Dust  
           Claims By Using Settlements or Alternative Methods of  
           Compensating Victims 
One final way through which the potential causation problems facing 
would-be mixed-dust plaintiffs might be reduced, or even eliminated en-
tirely, would be to bypass the litigation process altogether, either through 
the use of settlements or the creation of statutory or judicially-created com-
pensation schemes.  These alternatives to litigation are neither new nor un-
756-57 (describing an asbestos case in which the court “refused to adopt alternative liability . . . because 
the plaintiff was unable to identify any of the defendant-manufacturer’s products at [his] work site”) 
(emphasis in original); see also supra note 416 and accompanying text (discussing some courts’ reluc-
tance to apply alternative methods of proving causation in toxic tort cases).  But see Somberg, 338 A.2d 
1, and Sindell, 607 P.2d 924, discussed at supra notes 408 and 416, respectively (both examples of the 
majority dismissing dissents’ and defendants’ concerns that not all of the parties that might have caused 
plaintiffs’ injuries had been joined as defendants in the actions).  
430
 See, e.g., supra note 373 and accompanying text; see generally Part IV (analyzing some of the 
causation issues mixed-dust plaintiffs might face). 
431
 See supra note 393 (describing test).  As was addressed earlier, mixed-dust cases always in-
volve at least two substances.  See, e.g., text accompanying supra note 5. 
432
 See generally Part IV (describing how the process of proving causation has changed over time, 
and related issues thereto).   
433
 See supra notes 404-05 and accompanying text. 
434
 See, e.g., supra note 345 and accompanying text; supra note 409 (both capturing the magnitude 
of how high an obstacle causation is to some toxic tort plaintiffs, including those who might be consid-
ering filing mixed-dust claims). 
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usual, particularly in the field of “mass torts,”435 a category to which mixed-
dust might one day belong to.436
    a)  Using Settlements as an Alternative to Mixed-Dust Litigation.  
As far as settlements are concerned, it is well known that the vast majority 
of cases filed end up being settled as opposed to going to trial,437 and in fact, 
among the most notable settlements ever entered into occurred in the field 
of “mass torts,”438 including the celebrated 1998 agreement between to-
bacco companies and various states worth hundreds of billions of dollars.439
435
 As it concerns this Comment, the term “mass tort” refers to a single product or event by one or 
more defendants that causes widespread injury to many parties.  See Barbara Frederick, Comment, 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Method or Madness?, 27 CONN. L. REV. 237, 257 n.137 
(1994); see Steven L. Schultz, Mass Torts: In Re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litiga-
tion: Bankrupt and Backlogged—A Proposal for the Use of the Federal Common Law in Mass Tort 
Class Actions, 58 BROOKLYN L. REV. 553, 554 n.3 (1992) (defining mass torts and grouping them into 
different categories).  There are many who feel that ordinary litigation is just not well suited to mass 
torts, and thus advocate special or alternative solutions to the problem.  See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, 
Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87 GEO. L.J. 1983, 2017 (1999) (“[T]he traditional tort 
system simply does not work in mass tort.”); see generally Anita Bernstein, Formed by Thalidomide: 
Mass Torts as a False Cure for Toxic Exposure, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2153 (1997) (providing at least eight 
reasons for why traditional rules of litigation are ill-suited to the unique characteristics of mass torts); 
Joseph M. Guzzardo & Jennifer L. Monachino, Note, Gulf War Syndrom—Is Litigation the Answer?: 
Learning Lessons From In Re Agent Orange, 10 ST. JOHN’S J.L. COMM. 673 (1995) (highlighting prob-
lems that plaintiffs face in mass tort litigation, using the Agent Orange litigation as background); cf. 
supra note 410 and accompanying text (noting examples of commentators who share the belief that 
ordinary litigation rules should not be used in toxic tort cases, but who advocate changes to the rules, 
rather than the altogether replacement of mass tort litigation by the adoption of alternative systems of 
compensation).  But see John A. Siliciano, Symposium, Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis, 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 990, 1012 (1995) (analyzing the supposed problems with mass tort litigation in 
American law, and concluding that “[t]he ‘crisis’ of mass torts may, in the end, [simply] be a crisis of 
faith”).      
436
 Even though mixed-dust claims, at least those filed in tort, are relatively few in number today, 
see supra note 62, it is possible that mixed-dust claims might one day belong to the category of mass 
torts, as the two might share some characteristics, see generally Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action 
and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L. REV. 845 (1987) (outlining 
the “legal characteristics” of mass torts). Specifically, two factors that mixed-dust claims might one day 
have in common with mass torts is the potential for there to be a large number of claims filed, see gen-
erally supra Part III (examining potential future increase in the filing of mixed-dust claims), and the 
uncertainty about what legal standards and rules would apply in connection with proving causation, see 
generally Part IV (analyzing issues related to standards of causation potentially applicable to mixed-dust 
claims).  See also supra note 15 (positing how the class-action lawsuit filed by Ground Zero workers 
may lead to an increase in the number of mixed-dust claims filed).   
437
 See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, A Traditionalist Looks at Mediation: It’s Here to Stay and Much 
Better than I Thought, 3 NEV. L.J. 196, 222 (2002-03) (“[M]ost cases settle or are otherwise terminated 
without trial.”); Stephen N. Subrin, Uniformity in Procedural Rules and the Attributes of a Sound Pro-
cedural System: The Case for Presumptive Limits, 49 ALA. L. REV. 79, 93 (1997) (“[T]he vast majority 
of cases—probably over 95%—will terminate or settle prior to trial with or without case manage-
ment.”). 
438
 See generally Erichson, supra note 435 (describing settlements, some of which were ultimately 
unsuccessful, that arose in mass tort cases involving injurious breast implants and asbestos-related 
injuries).   
439
 See McClendon v. Ga. Dep’t of Cmty. Health, 261 F.3d 1252, 1253-56 (11th Cir. 2001) (pro-
viding background and details on the agreement).  Interestingly, this agreement was “the largest settle-
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Among the factors that might make the use of settlements a desirable way 
to deal with a potential future influx of mixed-dust claims440 are that they 
reduce the private and social cost of litigation441 and sometimes allow par-
ties to avoid the hassles of litigation altogether,442 that they serve to prevent 
the judicial system from being more backlogged than it already is,443 that 
they allow the parties to reach finality in a mutually satisfactory manner 
while foregoing the risks associated with trial, 444 and that they help compa-
nies avoid unwanted negative publicity that is often associated with a public 
trial.445
Of course, not every aspect of settlements are positive; in fact, depend-
ing on the circumstances, both the parties involved and society as a whole 
can be hurt through settlements if they are used inappropriately.446  For in-
stance, it is not uncommon for wealthy defendants to purposely prolong the 
litigation process, particularly through the use of discovery, in order to 
pressure who is likely to be a poorer plaintiff to settle.447  At the other end of 
the spectrum, there are those who feel that it is defendants who are some-
ment of a civil lawsuit in history.”  Jeffrey Abramson, The Jury and Popular Culture, 50 DEPAUL L.
REV. 497, 518 (2000). 
440
 See generally supra Part III (addressing potential increase in the number of mixed-dust claims 
filed). 
441
 See, e.g., Thomas F. Cotter, Refining the "Presumptive Illegality" Approach to Settlements of 
Patent Disputes Involving Reverse Payments: A Commentary on Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, 87 MINN.
L. REV. 1789, 1790, 1795 (2003) (noting that settlements are “viewed as [a] social good because [they] 
reduce[ ] the private and social costs of litigation”). 
442
 See Roger S. Haydock, Civil Justice and Dispute Resolution in the Twenty-First Century: 
Mediation and Arbitration Now and for the Future, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 745, 754-55 (2000) 
(outlining some of the unpleasant aspects associated with litigating disputes).  
443
 See R. Bryan Morrison, Case Note, To Seal Or Not To Seal? That Is Still the Question: Arkan-
sas Best Corp. v. General Electric Capital Corp., 49 ARK. L. REV. 325, 344 n.131 (1996) (“[O]ur civil 
justice system could not bear the increased burden that would accompany reducing the frequency of 
settlement. . . .  If a large percentage of our cases did not settle, the backlog in our courts would become 
totally intolerable.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).   
444
 See Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey Rice, Symposium, Jury-Determined Settlements and Summary Jury 
Trials: Observations About Alternative Dispute Resolution in an Adversary Culture, 19 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV. 89, 99 (1991) (“Parties in personal injury disputes often attempt a settlement [because t]hey want 
to . . . decrease transaction costs, avoid the risks of trial, and have a final resolution as early as possi-
ble.”); see also supra note 334 (noting the preference for settlements that risk-averse parties have).   
445
 See, e.g., Andrew K. Craig, The Rise in Press Criticism of the Athlete and the Future of Libel 
Litigation Involving Athletes and the Press, 4 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 527, 548 n.202 (1994) (docu-
menting the controversy surrounding the settlement agreement entered between Michael Jackson and a 
boy that had accused him of sexual molestation, and noting that many believed Jackson’s settlement 
amounted to “buying the silence of his accuser”).   
446
 See generally Steven Shavell, The Fundamental Divergence Between the Private and the Social 
Motive to Use the Legal System, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 575 (1997) (outlining positive and negative aspects 
of using settlements from a legal, as well as sociological, point of view). 
447
 See Ethan A. Heinz, Comment, The Conflicting Mandates of FRE 412 and FRCP 26: Should 
Courts Allow Discovery of a Sexual Harassment Plaintiff ’s Sexual History?, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 
529-31 (1999) (explaining how some lawyers abuse discovery to “force an unfair settlement or with-
drawal from the suit,” and providing the example of such practices in sexual harassment suits). 
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times unfairly pressured to settle due to the threat of massive class action 
lawsuits, particularly in mass torts, a practice labeled by one court as “judi-
cial blackmail.”448
    b) Compensation Schemes as an Alternative to Mixed-Dust Litiga-
tion. As with settlements, the use of programs that either change or elimi-
nate traditional concepts of litigation have been around for a long time449
and continue to flourish today, as demonstrated by some compensation 
schemes that were addressed earlier, such as those in the Black Lung Bene-
fits Act,450 states’ workers’ compensation programs,451 and the FAIR Act.452
Other notable examples of attempts at curbing mass tort litigation by creat-
ing alternative methods of compensation include the now-defunct National 
Swine Flu Immunization Program, through which the federal government 
“accepted primary responsibility for injuries caused by the manufacture, 
distribution, or administration of this swine flu vaccine”;453 the National 
Childhood Vaccine Program Injury Act, which established a no-fault com-
pensation program for injuries associated with vaccinations;454 and the 
agreement reached in the Agent Orange litigation,455 which was facilitated 
through the use of the federal Multi-District Litigation Panel.456
448
 See, e.g., Paul V. Niemeyer, Comment, Remarks to the Institute for Law and Economic Policy,
39 ARIZ. L. REV. 719, 719-720 (1997) (noting that “[in certain situations,] companies faced even with 
the threat of a class action [see] settle[ments] as the only economic alternative”); see generally T. Dean 
Malone, Comment, Castano v. American Tobacco Co. and Beyond: The Propriety of Certifying Nation-
wide Mass-Tort Class Actions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 When the Basis of the Suit Is a 
"Novel" Claim or Injury, 49 BAYLOR L. REV. 817 (1997) (explaining the compromising situation that 
defendants are sometimes put in due to class action suits, and noting that the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has labeled settlements achieved as the result of threats of expensive and prolonged litigation as 
“judicial blackmail”).  
449
 See generally Perry H. Apelbaum & Samara T. Ryder, The Third Wave of Federal Tort Reform: 
Protecting the Public or Pushing the Constitutional Envelope, 8 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 591 
(1999) (outlining development of tort reforms through legislation in the United States). Another excel-
lent, but somewhat more theoretical, examination of the issues surrounding legislative tort reform may 
be found in Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The American Civil 
Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1 (2002).     
450
 See generally supra Part II.B.2 (describing the act). 
451
 See generally supra Part II.B.1 (explaining the procedures that must be followed in Kentucky 
to initiate a workers’ compensation pneumoconiosis claim there).
452
 See generally supra Part II.D.2 (describing the FAIR Act). 
453
 In re Swine Flu Immunization Prods. Liab. Litig., 89 F.R.D. 695, 699 (1980).  For more infor-
mation on the program, see id. and Erichson, supra note 435, at 2020 n.216.   
454
 See Dan L. Burk & Barbara A. Boczar, Symposium, Biotechnology and Tort Liability: A Stra-
tegic Industry at Risk, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 791, 852-54 (1994); Erichson, supra note 435, at 2020 n.216
(both providing information on the act).  The current version of the act may be found in Title 42, Sec-
tions 300aa-34 of the United States Code (2003). 
455
 See generally Guzzardo, supra note 435 (providing background information on Agent Orange 
litigation, which centered around war veterans’ claims that chemicals used by the military had caused 
them various injuries, and why it seemed destined to end in a form other than trial).   In the end, the 
makers of Agent Orange settled with the veterans for $180 million.  See id. at 686 n.86. 
456
 See id. at 684.  In 1968, Congress, through the passage of Title 28, Section 1407 of the United 
States Code (2003), created federal multi-district litigation panels, often referred to as “MDLs,” ostensi-
94
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And just as with settlements,457 the use of programs or schemes as an 
alternative to mixed-dust claims would have its own advantages and disad-
vantages.458  Thus, while one could certainly say that such a strategy would 
always be surrounded by controversy, perhaps the more pertinent, as well 
more unpredictable, question related to the potential future use of settle-
ments and similar programs as alternatives to mixed-dust claims is whether 
the issue is ripe enough to be fully considered at this point.   
Finally, although it is the author’s opinion that the potential for a fu-
ture increase in mixed-dust claims is certainly real,459 mixed-dust claims are 
still in a nascent stage,460 and so it is hard to predict to what extent, or even 
whether, settlements and other alternative programs to litigation, including 
legislation like the FAIR Act,461 will apply to mixed-dust claims.  Thus, as 
with the earlier predictions concerning the impact that existing statutes 
dealing with pneumoconiosis462 and the alternative causation tests employed 
in toxic tort cases463 would have on mixed-dust claims, perhaps it could best 
be said that the question of how or whether settlements and other alterna-
tives to litigation will apply to mixed-dust claims can only be answered 
with time.         
bly to facilitate pre-trial proceedings in multi-district litigation (usually meaning class actions), but as it 
so happens, cases that are transferred to MDLs usually end up being resolved there.  See Judith Resnik 
et al., Symposium, Individuals Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 296, 299-300 (1996) (providing background information on the creation and purpose of 
MDLs); Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (outlining some of the functions of MDLs).  
MDLs have proven influential in many monumental cases, including Agent Orange litigation, see Guz-
zardo, supra note 435, asbestos cases, see In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig., 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 
1991), and tobacco-related lawsuits, see In re Tobacco/Governmental Health Care Costs Litig. v. Phillip 
Morris, Inc., 76 F. Supp. 2d 5 (D. D.C. 1999).  
457
 See supra notes 441-448 and accompanying text (addressing some positive and negative as-
pects of settlements).  
458
 Compare Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative 
Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951 (1993) (suggesting that administrative compensation 
schemes for mass torts are appropriate under certain circumstances) with The American Law Institute’s 
Reporters’ Study on Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 405 (1993) 
(questioning the use of such schemes, and concluding that a “review of the experience and design of 
administrative compensation alternatives did not persuade us that this option had a marked advantage 
over collective judicial processes, at least for the general run of injuries”); see also supra note 435 
(recognizing conflicting opinions on the use of alternatives to litigation to address problem of mass tort 
cases).     
459
 See generally supra Part III (examining potential future increase in the number of mixed-dust 
claims filed).  
460
 See supra note 62.  But see supra note 15 (recognizing the potential influx of mixed-dust 
claims stemming from Ground Zero). 
461
 See generally supra Part III.B (addressing how the passage of the FAIR Act might influence the 
filing of mixed-dust claims).   
462
 See generally Part IV.E.1.a (discussing the applicability of such statutes to mixed-dust claims). 
463
 See generally Part IV.E.2.a (examining the possibility that existing causation tests used in toxic 
tort cases might also be employed in mixed-dust claims).    
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V. CONCLUSION
Mixed-dust pneumoconiosis is a pulmonary disease of predominantly 
occupational origins that occurs after a person has been exposed to at least 
two or more organic or inorganic toxic substances over an extended period 
of time.  Cases alleging various forms of this disease have been around 
since the 1960s, but the greater portion of the reported cases thus far have 
been in the nature of workers’ compensation claims, and not tort lawsuits.  
There are definite parallels between the way mixed-dust pneumoconiosis 
and asbestos-related diseases are contracted.  In addition, existing or pend-
ing legislation aimed at curbing the asbestos problem, as well as insurance 
exclusion policies that purport to limit insurers’ liability in terms of defend-
ing or indemnifying asbestos-related claims, may have an impact on 
whether and how much a person may recover for asbestos-related diseases.   
Mainly because of these factors, the author posits that in the future, a 
significant number of would-be asbestos plaintiffs, whose sheer numbers 
have created a backlog in the courts and whose verdicts have led to many 
companies declaring bankruptcy, might choose to file their lawsuits under 
the rubric of mixed-dust claims in an attempt to bypass unfavorable insur-
ance policies or legislation aimed at solving the asbestos problem.  This 
conclusion is tempered somewhat by the fact that although mixed-dust 
claims have been sporadically filed for several decades, there has yet to be a 
boom in the number of such claims filed.   
In addition, it is hard to predict in a vacuum how or whether courts 
might apply a particular insurance policy to any given set of facts, espe-
cially since the language of policies frequently change.  A similar challenge 
exists as it relates to predicting the role that legislation dealing with asbes-
tos, pneumoconiosis, and the like might have on the filing of mixed-dust 
claims.  Some legislation, like the Fairness in Asbestos Resolution Act, or 
FAIR Act for short, has not been passed yet, so an obvious obstacle exists in 
assessing its impact; as for existing laws, many of them, such as those deal-
ing with “ordinary” pneumoconiosis, are perhaps only tangentially related 
to mixed-dust, so estimating how, or even if, they would apply to mixed-
dust claims is tricky.  Of course, it is true that legislatures could create new 
laws or change those already in the books to ensure that they would apply 
to mixed-dust pneumoconiosis as well.        
Making an accurate prediction concerning the number of asbestos suits 
that might be filed as mixed-dust claims is also made more difficult by the 
fact that the small number of mixed-dust claims filed in tort means that the 
applicable legal doctrines, particularly those concerning the plaintiff’s bur-
den of proof as it relates to causation, are not yet well-settled.  In the past, 
courts have not been remiss to adapt traditional ways of proving causation 
in exceptional cases, such as those involving toxic tort claims where a 
plaintiff cannot pinpoint the specific defendant(s) responsible for his inju-
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ries among a group of many, in order to allow that plaintiff to have his day 
in court.  At the same time, however, some courts have demonstrated a re-
luctance to adopt “relaxed” methods of proving causation in certain types of 
cases, or against certain types of defendants.  Given this, it is likely that the 
law concerning mixed-dust tort claims will only be prone to exact ascer-
tainment after a more substantial number of such claims are filed. 
Finally, assessing the full magnitude of mixed-dust claims vis-à-vis the 
legal system is complicated by the possibility that alternatives to litigation, 
such as court-sanctioned settlements or administratively based compensa-
tion schemes, might be adopted in the area. These alternative ways to com-
pensate injured persons are neither new nor unusual, particularly in the field 
of “mass torts,” to which mixed-dust claims might one day belong.  None-
theless, the impact that such techniques would have on mixed-dust claims is 
far from certain, particularly since there are many who question the propri-
ety or wisdom of them.  The author further posits, in connection with the 
adoption of alternatives to litigation, that unless courts or legislatures act to 
reduce some of the burdens that mixed-dust plaintiffs would face in press-
ing their claims, the mighty obstacle of causation might act to temper any 
eventual increase in the number of mixed-dust claims filed.           
In arriving at this conclusion, the author began by providing, in Part I, 
a brief medical background of mixed-dust claims, namely in terms of what 
they are and how they are brought about.  Among the topics discussed in 
that light was how and where mixed-dust diseases are typically contracted, 
as well as some of the varieties of the affliction and the physical effects that 
the diseases can have on those affected.      
In the next section, Part II, the author examined some workers’ com-
pensation claims involving both ordinary pneumoconiosis and mixed-dust 
pneumoconiosis, and in doing so, noted similarities in how courts resolve 
the two types of claims, including the very deferential standard that is 
shown to lower tribunals’ factual determinations.  He then examined state 
and federal statutes dealing with ordinary pneumoconiosis and mixed-dust 
pneumoconiosis, including a discussion of some of the features these stat-
utes share.  The focus of Part II then shifted to the potential impact that 
insurance law, particularly pollution exclusion clauses, might have on 
mixed-dust claims.  Within that context, the author analyzed some of the 
key interpretative issues that courts might struggle with in dealing with the 
applicability of these policies to particular sets of circumstances.  Finally, in 
Part II, the author addressed some of Congress’ attempts at finding a legis-
lative solution to the asbestos litigation problem in America, particularly the 
FAIR Act.  Specifically, some of the Act’s key features that might influence 
the number of mixed-dust claims filed were examined.             
Part III’s emphasis was predicting how today’s and tomorrow’s insur-
ance law, particularly ever-broadening pollution exclusion clauses, as well 
as possible future legislation dealing with asbestos, namely the FAIR Act, 
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might impact the number of mixed-dust claims filed.  In connection with 
the insurance aspect, the author paid special attention to exclusion clauses 
that specifically deal with asbestos, as well as how those and other types of 
exclusion clauses affect the duties of insurance carriers in terms of defend-
ing or indemnifying claims against insureds.  As for the possible ramifica-
tions that legislation like the FAIR Act would have on the filing of mixed-
dust claims, the author tackled the issue by focusing primarily on certain 
key aspects of the FAIR Act that might influence whether and how some 
asbestos plaintiffs might proceed.  Among these are that the Act would 
serve as the only means by which persons suffering from asbestos-related 
ailments could receive compensation, and that some claimants whose inju-
ries were caused or influenced by substances other than asbestos might not 
be eligible for recovery under the Act.   
In Part IV, the author addressed the role that causation could play in 
tort suits or workers’ compensation claims involving mixed-dust diseases, 
in part by comparing the elements of causation that might be implicated in 
mixed-dust tort claims to those typically encountered in traditional toxic 
tort cases, as well as by addressing the central causation hurdles that mixed-
dust tort plaintiffs might face.  Some time was also devoted to likely evi-
dentiary issues that mixed-dust plaintiffs might encounter in their attempts 
to introduce scientific and medical evidence pertinent to their case.  The 
author next discussed some techniques and strategies that a plaintiff seeking 
to make out a mixed-dust claim might rely on, including the use of a scan-
ning electron microscope, and then presented examples of how some courts 
grappling with mixed-dust claims, both in workers’ compensation and tort, 
have addressed the issue of causation.  The author then addressed some 
ways in which legislatures, mainly through the creation of alternative com-
pensation schemes, and courts, largely by “relaxing” traditional methods of 
establishing causation, have made it possible for certain persons to recover 
monetary relief for their injuries.  In this connection, the applicability of 
these existing schemes and judicial doctrines to mixed-dust claims is ad-
dressed.  In the remainder of Part IV, the author explored the feasibility and 
desirability of adopting alternatives to litigation, including settlements and 
no-fault compensation schemes, as a way of dealing with mixed-dust 
claims. 
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